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This dissertation examines the impacts of public policies on the behavioral 
health of adults in the United States.  The first essay entitled, “The Impact of Food 
Advertisements on Changing Eating Behaviors: An Experimental Study”, examines 
how three types of food advertising (healthy food, unhealthy food, and anti-obesity) 
impact consumers’ caloric and nutrient content selected in a lunch menu. The analysis 
is based on an economic experiment conducted with 186 adult non-undergraduate 
student subjects, each of which were randomly placed into either the control group or 
one of four treatments: (1) healthy food advertising, (2) anti-obesity advertising, (3) 
unhealthy food advertising, and (4) mixed (all three food) advertising. The results 
indicate that healthy, anti-obesity, and mixed food advertising reduced intakes of total 
calories, fat, sodium, and carbohydrates. Similarly, anti-obesity, healthy, and mixed 
food advertising results in increasing the probability of selecting more healthy items 
and fewer unhealthy items from a menu. Healthy food advertising has a stronger 
impact than anti-obesity or mixed food advertising. 
The second paper, “Food Stamps, Food Insufficiency and Health of the 
Elderly”, evaluates the efficacy of the Food Stamp Program (FSP) on improving the 
well-being of elderly Americans. The overarching objective of this study is to 
 determine whether and how elderly health status is affected by FSP participation, food 
insufficiency and other determinants. To carry out this goal, first a theoretical 
framework is developed to ascertain why so few eligible elderly households 
participate in the FSP, and how food intake affects health status. In addition, the model 
examines the main determinants of food insufficiency and how FSP participation and 
food insufficiency are linked to each other and then to health status. The data utilized 
in this study are a subset of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) from the year 
2002. State-specific FSP criteria are used to determine the eligibility of elderly 
households in the sample. The method used to examine these linkages is a two-step 
econometric model with two instrumental variables for the endogeneity of food stamp 
program participation and food insufficiency. In the first step, a simultaneous 
multivariate Probit model of endogenous FSP participation and food insufficiency 
equations is estimated. Based on these results, probabilities of FSP participation and 
food insufficiency are predicted in Step One for use in Step Two. In Step Two, an 
Ordered Probit of health status is estimated as a function of the predicted FSP 
participation and predicted food insecurity, controlling for other determinants of health 
status. The estimating procedure extends the Murphy and Topel’s (1985) standard 
error correction method to the case of two predicted explanatory variables. After 
correcting the standard errors, some coefficients lose their significance indicating the 
importance of the standard error correction procedure. Specifically, without the 
correction, FSP participation is found to worsen food insufficiency, but this 
relationship becomes insignificant after the correction. Conversely, being food 
insufficient significantly worsen health status with and without the correction 
 procedure. The results suggest that FSP net benefits, though increasing food 
purchasing power, are inadequate to help elderly to achieve the minimum threshold of 
food intake that could significantly improve health status.  
The third paper, “The relationship between Unemployment and Obesity: 
Evidence from NLSY 97 Survey Data”, investigates simultaneous relationship 
between unemployment and obesity in the U.S. The unemployment and obesity probit 
equations are estimated simultaneously using an instrumental variables approach to 
deal with the problem of endogeneity. The mother’s BMI and unemployment 
insurance are instrumented for obesity and unemployment, respectively. The results 
reveal unemployment significantly increases the likelihood of obesity, but not vice 
versa. This significant finding raises concerns on potential obesity-related health 
problems on unemployed individuals for policy makers. Although the results found no 
statistical evidence of weight discrimination, it is inconclusive that normal or 
underweight individuals would decrease their risks of unemployment due to no 
statistical difference in the probability of unemployment between obese and non-obese 
individuals. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Nearly half of all deaths occurring annually are the result of modifiable 
behavioral risk factors (McGinnis, 1992). These risk factors include uncontrolled 
hypertension and diabetes, smoking, physical inactivity, poor diet, alcohol abuse, 
violence, and risky sexual behavior (USDA and HHS, 2010, 2008). Poor diet 
contributes to many serious and costly health conditions. Poor diet includes under- or 
over-eating, lack of essential nutrients intake causing a prolonged nutritional 
deficiencies and food insufficiency, or consuming food and drink, which are high-
energy dense i.e. fat, sugar and low nutrients i.e. fiber, vitamins, protein leading to 
obesity. 
 
1.1 Economic Cost and Health Consequences of Obesity 
Obesity results from a combination of causes and contributing factors, 
including individual factors such as behaviors and genetics. It has been increasingly 
cited as a serious health issue in recent decades in the U.S. because more than one-
third (34.9% or 78.6 million) of U.S. adults in 2011-2012 were obese (Cynthia et al., 
2014) and being obese puts one at risk for many physical health problems such as 
heart disease, stroke, type 2 diabetes and certain types of cancer. It may also trigger 
some mental or behavioral health1 such as depression, eating disorders, distorted body 
                                               
1 Behavioral Health is a branch of interdisciplinary health, which focuses on the reciprocal relationship between the 
holistic view of human behavior and the well-being of the body as a whole entity. Behavioral health can have different 
outcomes by changing “behavior”. Behavioral health promotes the well being of individuals by intervening and 
preventing incidents of mental illness, substance abuse, or other entities in health (medanth.wikispaces).  
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image, and low self-esteem. Obesity costs society an estimated $117 billion in direct 
(preventive, diagnostic, and treatment services related to weight) and indirect 
(absenteeism, unemployment, loss of future earnings due to premature death) costs 
(Wolf, 2002). This exceeds health-care costs associated with smoking or problem 
drinking  (Finkelstein et al., 2003) and accounts for 6% to 12% of all national health 
care expenditures in the United States in 2000 (Thompson et al., 2001). The economic 
cost of obesity to businesses in the United States is more than $12 billion per annum 
(Thompson et al., 1998). Obesity-related job absenteeism costs $4.3 billion annually 
(Cawley et al., 2007). Obesity is associated with lower work productivity 
(presenteeism), which costs employers $506 per obese worker per year (Gate et al., 
2008). Many studies have found an association between obesity and unemployment. 
Both affect social and economics costs as well as a person’s overall well-being. Obese 
individuals are more likely to suffer from social stigmatization and weight 
discrimination (NHLBI, 1998), which have been documented in a variety of settings 
including in the labor market (WHO, 1998). Conversely, prolonged unemployment 
can lead to reduced consumption of healthy food. Americans who have been out of 
work for a year or more are much more likely to be obese than those unemployed for a 
shorter time. The obesity rate rises from 22.8% among those unemployed for two 
weeks or less to 32.7% among those unemployed for 52 weeks or more (Gallup-
Health ways Well-being Index, 2013). These two risk factors often occurred 
simultaneously. They are modifiable if the true effects are known. 
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1.2. Food advertising and a state-sponsored anti-obesity advertising 
 Much of the food that is advertised in the U.S. is for high-calorie and low 
nutrient food (Byrd-Bredbenner et al., 2000; Kuribayashi et al., 2001) and is targeted 
at children. U.S. food companies spent $3.5 billion in 2001 on fast-food 
advertisements and $5.8 billion on the separate food, beverage, and confectionary 
category, including $785.5 million for the top 5 soda brands (Welch, 2003). Exposure 
to food advertising on television leads to subsequent consumption of advertised food 
(Dietz, 1999) and the evidence shows that the consumption of advertised foods is 
higher than consumption of foods that are not advertised (Jeffrey et al., 2008; 
Boynton-Jarrett et al., 2003). Hence, successful food advertising could be one cause 
for the obesity crisis. As the most effective advertising medium, television advertising 
is extensively used in public health communication to convey health-related messages 
to the public, ranging from cancer prevention, seat-belt promotion, and oral health to 
drunk-driving prevention, anti-drug, and anti-tobacco campaigns. To the extent that 
obesity reflects modifiable risk behaviors that have similarities with smoking-related 
behaviors, anti-obesity advertising, which is state-sponsored, is aimed at reducing 
obesity (Emory, 2007). Generally, research has shown that such campaigns have 
small-to-moderate effects on attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors related to the primary 
message (Snyder et al., 2002; Derzon et al., 2002; Noar et al., 2006).  
 
1.3 Food Stamps Program (SNAP), Food insufficiency, and Health of the Elderly  
The Food Stamps Program, which was renamed the “Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program” (SNAP) in 2008, is a federal nutrition entitlement program. 
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Although the program is administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, under 
the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), the benefits are distributed by each U.S. state’s 
Division of Social Services or Children and Family Services. The program is designed 
to help low-income households stretch their food budget, reduce their food 
insufficiency, and ultimately improve their health. Food insufficiency, which is 
defined as “an inadequate amount of food intake due to lack of resources” (Briefel et 
al., 1992), is found in all ages of the U.S. population. Yet, the low-income elderly 
population is the most vulnerable group to deficient health. Some elderly households 
may experience food insufficiency. The presence and degree of food insufficiency and 
the outcome of the Food Stamps Program participation decision may affect the health 
status of the elderly.  
 
1.4 Objectives 
The main objective of the dissertation is to contribute to our understanding of 
the behavioral health determinants and impacts of public policy on health. The specific 
objectives are to: 
1. Evaluate the effectiveness of food advertisements i.e. unhealthy food ads, 
healthy food ads, a state-sponsored anti-obesity ads, and mixed ads on changing eating 
behaviors through changing total calories, macronutrients and healthy food items.  
2. Estimate the effectiveness of the Food Stamps Program on improving health 
of the elderly and alleviating food insufficiency.  
3. Examine why so few eligible elderly households choose to receive food 
stamps and what determines their level of food insufficiency. 
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4. Investigate the simultaneous relationship of modifiable risk factors 
contributing to social and economic costs and a person’s overall likelihood of well-
being - unemployment and obesity- during the economic recession in 2010. 
 
1.5 Outline of Dissertation 
 The dissertation consists of three essays on behavioral health and the impacts 
of public policy on health. It is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the first 
essay: The Impact of Food Advertisements on Changing Eating Behaviors: An 
Experimental Study. The economic experiment is conducted to examine the impact of 
different types of food advertisements on consumers’ purchases of lunch items; 
Chapter 3 presents the second essay: Food Stamps, Food Insufficiency and Health of 
the Elderly. The study develops a theoretical framework to understand the mechanism 
of the Food Stamps Program participation decision, food insufficiency, and these two 
factors impact on the health status of the elderly. A two-step econometric framework 
is developed to account for the endogeniety of food stamps program participation and 
food insufficiency. Chapter 4 presents the third essay: The relationship between 
Unemployment and Obesity: Evidence from NLSY 97 Survey Data. The study 
investigates the simultaneous relationship using an instrumental variable approach to 
understand how and whether obesity affects unemployment, and unemployment 
affects obesity at the same time. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE IMPACT OF FOOD ADVERTISEMENTS ON CHANGING EATING 
BEHAVIORS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 Obesity in the United States has become a serious health and economic 
problem. As reported in 2012, 34% of the population was obese and over 67% could 
be classified as overweight (WHO, 2011). A study by Lillis, 2010 put the cost of this 
problem in terms of increased health care at $150 billion per year. The obesity crisis 
has been fueled by reductions in physical activity, as well as by over-consumption of 
foods high in fat and sugar (Institute of Medicine [IOM], 2006). Although numerous 
factors play a role in obesity, the goal of this research was to examine the influence of 
food television advertisements on caloric and other nutrient intake from consumer 
choices of lunch items. Our main focus is on the impact of different types of food 
advertising on adult consumers’ purchasing behavior. Specifically, we are interested in 
three types of advertising: unhealthy food advertising, healthy food advertising, and 
anti-obesity advertising. 
Unhealthy food advertising, in this context, means television commercials that 
encourage consumption of products that are high in fat, sugar, and/or sodium. Previous  
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studies have found that the majority of food advertisements aired on television 
promote unhealthy food products2 (e.g., Cairns et al., 2009; Harris et al., 2009; Holt et 
al., 2007; Powell et al., 2007; Livingstone, 2005; Office of Communication, 2004; Hill 
and Radimer, 1997) and/or convey un- healthy nutritional messages that lead to 
greater preferences for and purchases of unhealthy products (Zimmerman and Bell, 
2010; Galcheva et al., 2008; IOM, 2006; Brownell and Horgen, 2004; Story and 
French, 2004; Hastings et al., 2003; Boynton-Jarrett et al., 2003; Gamble and Cotugna, 
1999; Lewis and Hill, 1998). Other studies have found exposure to food advertising to 
have a direct causal effect in increasing overall calorie consumption (Harris et al., 
2009; Epstein et al., 2008; Halford et al., 2004, 2007); lower fruit and vegetable 
consumption five years later (Barr-Anderson et al., 2009); and higher rates of obesity 
in children (Chou et al., 2008). These and other studies in this area have mainly relied 
on secondary and survey data, which may not allow for the observation of the 
directionality in the causal relation. That is, being obese might cause children to en- 
gage in more sedentary activities, including watching more television.  
Because secondary and survey data have been used in the majority of these 
studies, no study has been able to explicitly gauge the magnitude of the impact of 
various kinds of food advertisements on eating behavior. Also, time spent viewing 
television has been used as a proxy for advertising exposure in which various kinds of 
advertising are lumped together. In addition, most studies have examined the impact 
of food advertising on adolescent obesity rather than adult obesity. 
                                               
2 An exception to this is Desrochers and Holt (2007), whose study could neither refute nor confirm that the 
majority of food advertising aimed at children is for products low in nutritional content. 
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Campaigns for healthy food and anti-obesity advertising are far less common 
and far less studied for their ability to mitigate obesity. According to Emery et al., 
2007, research has generally shown that campaigns with health-related messages have 
small-to-moderate effects on attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors related to the primary 
message in the ad. Most healthy food advertising relates to fruit and vegetables; 
however, the amount of such advertising is negligible next to unhealthy food 
advertising. The limited amount of research on healthy food advertising has indicated 
that such advertising has a small, but statistically significant effect, on increasing the 
consumption of fruits and vegetables (Liaukonyte et al., 2012; Pollard et al., 2008). 
Anti-obesity advertising is primarily state-sponsored and is targeted at children 
(nationwide CDC’s Verb campaign is the only anti-obesity media campaigns at the 
federal level). Similar to anti-tobacco advertising, anti-obesity advertising aims to 
shock particularly obese and overweight children (or their parents) into losing weight; 
however, the anti-obesity campaigns lag behind anti-tobacco campaigns both in terms 
of their implementation (first anti-obesity campaign started in 2000, compared to 1990 
for anti-tobacco campaigns) and their exposure levels, which are much lower for the 
anti-obesity campaigns. Moreover, recent re- search suggests that a threshold level 
exists for the exposure of anti -tobacco advertising after which the campaigns become 
effective. But, the relatively modest levels of exposure to state sponsored anti-obesity 
ads might not result in measurable changes in obesity-related behavior (Emery et al., 
2007). To our knowledge, no economic studies exist that examine the efficacy of this 
type of advertising. 
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The purpose of the research summarized here was to examine and compare 
how these three types of food advertising impacted consumers’ purchases of lunch 
items for adult consumers. Specifically, we measured whether unhealthy food 
advertising had a negative dietary impact and healthy food advertising and anti-obesity 
advertising had a positive dietary impact. The analysis was based on an economic 
experiment conducted with 186 adult non-undergraduate student subjects, each of 
which was randomly placed into either the control group or one of four treatments. 
The four treatments comprised anti-obesity advertising, healthy (fruit and vegetable) 
food advertising, unhealthy food advertising, and mixed (all three) food advertising. 
By conducting this laboratory experiment, our aim was to individually assess and 
compare the potential of each type of food advertisement to impact dietary and food 
purchasing behavior. The main contribution of this re- search is that it provides the 
only measure and comparison (to our knowledge) of the relative efficacy of three 
broad types of food advertising on nutritional intake of adult subjects. This 
information is important for the policy debate over designing effective anti- obesity 
polices. 
 
2.2 Theories of how advertising effects consumer behavior 
Advertising messages are usually constructed with the goal of influencing 
consumer’s behavior (Cacioppo and Petty, 1983). There are different views on how 
advertising achieves this goal, but most research agrees that both a “central cognitive 
route” and a “peripheral route” are used. The central cognitive route is usually 
associated with careful consideration of the advertising message, while the “peripheral 
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route” is more connected to emotions and use of behavioral heuristics and cues for 
decision making (Chaudhuri and Buck, 1995). 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM–Petty and Cacioppo, 1996) is widely 
applied in advertising analysis, and implies that the more personally relevant the 
product becomes, the more persuasive an informative advertising becomes, while in 
the case of low personal relevance products advertising that allows a consumer to rely 
more on simple cues or emotions becomes more effective. Within this framework, 
healthy foods advertising that contains information about healthy diets would be more 
effective among consumers considering a change in their diet; for people unconcerned 
with their current diet, healthy foods advertising that appeals to emotions would be 
more effective. 
Somewhat connected to the concept of the “peripheral route” in the ELM is the 
concept of the “behavioral nudge” which is a change to environmental cues that would 
prompt the desired behavior, or “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters 
people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly 
changing their economic incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In this framework, 
advertising primes consumption through affective cues that are unrelated to conscious 
influences such as, for example, reported hunger in case of food ads (Harris et al., 
2009); advertising can thus unconsciously trigger healthier food consumption patterns 
though use of such cues (Marteau et al., 2001). In our research, the unhealthy 
advertising works as a “nudge” to encourage consumption of unhealthy items, while 
anti-obesity ads should nudge people towards healthier diets. 
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While there are various theories of how advertising affects consumer choices, 
it is outside the scope of this paper to disentangle the reasons behind the effectiveness 
of advertising. Both of the above models suggest that advertising can influence 
consumer behavior. We have selected a range of existing real world advertising clips 
that represent both informative messages and emotional appeals, and estimate the 
effect of those representative ads on participant behavior. We elaborate on possible 
behavioral motivations behind the estimated results further in the discussion section. 
 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Experimental design 
A total of 186 adult non-undergraduate student subjects participated in the 
economic experiment. Subjects were paid $15 cash for participation and additionally 
offered a $10 food voucher that could be spent exclusively on food items selected 
from our menus. During the experiment, the subjects completed a series of 
computerized menus interspersed with television show excerpts and several 
advertising clips that were different based on the treatment. 
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were informed that they would be 
filling out a series of computerized lunch me- nus with $10 endowment for each menu. 
Subjects were instructed that in cases where their menu choices exceed $10, they 
would need to pay the excess from their $15 participation payment. How- ever, if they 
spent less than their $10 endowment on their menu choices, they would not receive the 
difference back in cash. The subjects were told that one of the menus was randomly 
drawn before the start of the experiment and would be disclosed at the end of the 
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experiment. The choice of lunch items on that particular menu became binding for the 
subjects. 
The experiment began with the first menu presented to subjects on their 
computer screens, and the subjects were asked to type the number of servings they 
wanted next to the desired item. The total cost of all of the selected items was 
displayed at the bottom of the menu. Table 2.1 provides the list of the items on the 
menu, the prices offered, and the nutrition information (however, the nutritional 
information was not presented to the subjects in the experiment). After completing the 
first menu, the subjects watched television show excerpts from “Portlandia” and the 
2012 Emmy Awards for approximately 16 mins. A second menu identical to the first 
one was then presented to the subjects. After the second menu was completed, subjects 
were asked to complete a questionnaire disclosing their attitudes towards organic food, 
their health habits, and some demographic information (see Appendix Table A.1 for 
the list of questions). 
The experiment had one control group in which the subjects viewed only the 
television shows, and did not see any advertisements. The first treatment used healthy 
food advertising in which, after completing the first menu, the subjects viewed the 
television show excerpts interspersed with six thirty-second healthy fruit and 
vegetable advertisements. The six healthy food advertisements all involved promoting 
fruit and vegetable consumption, and included the following commercials: (1) “Eat 
more fruits and vegetables,” sponsored by Produce for Better Health and Syngenta, (2) 
“Eat 2 fruit + 2 veggies every day for good health!” sponsored by the Health 
Promotion Board, Tote Board, Singapore, (3) “Emma’s Healthy Snack,” sponsored by 
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Fresh Food, Kids, Woolworths, Australia (http://freshfoodkids.com.au), (4) “Eat 
More”, sponsored by the Department of Health and Aging, Australia, Go for 2and5 
campaign (http://www.gofor2and5.com.au/), (5) “Looking Good,” sponsored by the 
Department of Health and Aging, Australia, Go for 2and5 campaign, and (6) 
“Mummy, I’m hungry,” sponsored by the Department of Health and Aging, Australia, 
Go for 2and5 campaign. The second treatment was the anti-obesity advertising 
treatment that comprised four thirty-second and one sixty-second anti-obesity 
advertisements designed to discourage the consumption of unhealthy foods. They 
included: (1) “What Did You Eat Today?,” sponsored by Obesity P.S.A. 
(http://www.obesity.org), (2) “This is Joe,” sponsored by Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention, Safer Healthier Life, (3) “Don’t Drink Yourself Fat,” sponsored by 
NYC Department of Health, (4) “Fat Lane,” produced for Participant Productions in 
support of the marketing campaign of the film “Fast Food Nation,” and (5) “Cost of 
Obesity Pinwheel,” sponsored by the Stone Agency for Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
North Carolina. The third treatment featured unhealthy food advertising and included 
four advertisements (totaling three minutes) of savory and sweetened unhealthy foods.  
The commercials included (1) “Pepperidge Farm – Chocolate” 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=es-TbGGfNVMandfeature=player_detailpage), (2) 
“Papa John’s Pizza,” (3) “Quizno’s | Toasty Torpedo,” and (4) “Coke 2012 
Commercial: Catch” StarringNE_Bear (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S2nBBMbj 
S8w). The final treatment had mixed food advertising that featured a combination of 
healthy foods (two thirty-second ads), anti-obesity (two thirty-second ads), and 
unhealthy food advertisements (two thirty-second ads). 
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2.4 Econometric model and estimation 
Two econometric models were used to examine the impacts of the treatments. 
First, a set of difference-in-differences (DID) regression models was estimated to 
determine whether any of the treatments had a statistically significant impact on 
caloric and other nutrient intakes. These models provided a measure of the magnitude 
and significance of the various advertising treatments on nutritional contents of the 
lunch. Second, an ordered pro- bit model was used to estimate whether and by how 
much the advertising treatments changed the number of healthy items from Menu 1 to 
2. This model was estimated in order to determine how the various types of 
advertising impacted consumers’ purchases of items generally perceived as healthy or 
unhealthy. 
 
2.4.1 A difference-in-differences model 
A difference-in-differences regression model was used to deter- mine whether 
any of the treatments were statistically significant. To estimate the treatment effect, 
the DID estimator can be written as (𝑦11 − 𝑦10)  −  (𝑦01 − 𝑦00) where 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the 
outcome of interest for group 𝑖 for period 𝑡. Alternatively, a regression-based 
estimator can use the level of the outcome variable to estimate the model: 
 
(2.1)    𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑇𝑡 + 𝜃𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the outcome of interest for group 𝑖 for period 𝑡. The 𝐷𝑖 is a group dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the individual is in the treatment and zero if they 
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are in the control. The 𝑇𝑡 is a dummy variable for a time period that takes the value of 
one if it is in the post-treatment period and zero in the pre-treatment period, 𝐶𝑖 is a 
demographic variable for each individual, and 𝐷𝑖𝑇𝑡 is an interaction between the group 
and the time variable. The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of the coefficient, 𝛿, 
for the interaction term is interpreted as a consistent estimator of the treatment effect. 
The dependent variable in this research, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 , was the intake of total calories (or other 
nutrients as discussed below) for group 𝑖 for period 𝑡, which was calculated as the 
summation of the product of the number of servings selected times the total calories of 
each serving based on the USDA nutrition database. Table 2.1 lists the food items with 
their nutrition information.  
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Table 2.1: List of food items with their respective prices on the lunch menu and 
USDA nutrition database 
Food items 
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  Diet Pepsi 2.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 
  Pepsi 2.00 250 0 0 0 0 0 69 0 69 0 55 
  Gatorade Low Calorie 2.33 45 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 12 0 270 
  Mountain Dew 2.00 290 0 0 0 0 0 77 0 31 0 100 
  Unsweetened Iced Tea LIPTON 2.15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Original Iced Tea LIPTON 2.15 150 0 0 0 0 0 39 0 39 0 0 
  Tropicana Lemonade  2.59 300 0 0 0 0 0 72.5 0 70 0 50 
  Bottled Water 1.95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Green Salad with Sesame 
Oriental/Balsamic Dressing 
7.03 137 0 12 2 0 0 7 1 6 1 744 
  Green Salad and Tuna with Sesame 
Oriental/Balsamic Dressing 
7.03 316 0 13 2 0 46 7 1 6 40 1265 
  Veggie Cup with Hummus or Light 
Ranch 
4.32 84 27 3 0 0 0 13 3 10 1 156 
  Cheese Pizza (6”pan) 5.18 517 189 21 9 0 46 60 3 0 23 1013 
  Pepperoni Pizza (6” pan) 5.83 530 207 23 9 0 52 57 3 0 12 1151 
  Local Bacon Cheeseburger 7.52 683 369 41 17 0 120 41 3 0 38 1655 
  Lean Turkey Whole Grain Sandwich 6.16 329 99 11 2 0 67 26 1 0 29 565 
  Macaroni & Cheese 4.53 491 198 22 9 0 39 54 3 0 19 945 
  Doritos Nacho Cheese 1.55 294 117 13 2 0 0 40 3 0 4 211 
  Fresh Apple 1.00 72 0 0 0 0 0 19 3 0 0 1 
  Fresh Banana 1.00 105 0 0 0 0 0 27 3 0 1 1 
  Fresh Orange 1.00 62 0 0 0 0 0 15 3 0 1 0 
  Chocolate Chip Cookies 2.20 108 54 6 2 0 7 13 1 0 1 79 
  Brownie Bar 1.94 224 72 8 2 0 21 37 1 0 3 88 
  Note: Food menu and prices are from a dining hall “Trillium” that participants can easily go for lunch after the 
experiment. 
 
While an increase in total caloric intake reflects increased food consumption, 
the increase is not necessarily an indication of unhealthy food consumption. Therefore, 
other additional nutrition elements were taken into account to capture the change in 
consumption patterns; including total fat, carbohydrates, protein, added sugar, and 
sodium that are generally viewed as over-consumed nutrients. The zero-one dummy 
variables were defined for the treatments of the healthy food advertisement (𝐷1), the 
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anti-obesity advertisement (𝐷2), the unhealthy food advertisement (𝐷3) and the mixed 
food advertisement (𝐷4). The pre- (𝑇0) and post-treatment (𝑇1) dummy variables were 
conducted with the same participant. The statistical significance of each treatment was 
measured based on the estimated 𝛿 coefficients (i.e., healthy food advertising (?̂?1), 
anti-obesity advertising (?̂?2), unhealthy food advertising (?̂?3), and mixed food 
advertising (?̂?4) in the following regression model: 
 
(2.2)    𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑇𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝐶𝑖 +∑ 𝛽𝑑𝐷𝑑
4
𝑑=1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑑𝐷𝑑𝑇𝑡
4
𝑑=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
 
2.4.2 Results from DID model 
 Table 2.2 presents a detailed numeric summary of the socio-economic and 
demographic information of participants across all treatments. In this table, since the 
characteristics are measured as zero-one dummy variables, the values represent the 
proportion of the sample in each respective category. The sample characteristics are 
listed for all subjects combined, as well as for the control and four treatments. As is 
clear by this table, there were differences in the demographic and social preference 
composition among the control and treatment groups. To control for these differences, 
a vector of participant characteristics dummy variables were included in the regression 
models. 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics (mean) of demographic variables by treatments 
Cate-
gories 
Variables 
Treatments 
All Control 
Healthy 
Food 
Ads 
Anti-
Obesity 
Ads 
Unhealthy 
Food Ads 
Mixed 
Food 
Ads 
Gender Male 0.263 0.558 0.227 0.135 0.379 0.190 
Female 0.737 0.441 0.773 0.865 0.621 0.810 
Age  Age 21-30 years old 0.419 0.676 0.181 0.270 0.413 0.595 
 Age 31-40 years old 0.155 0.088 0.250 0.162 0.137 0.119 
 Age 41-50 years old 0.198 0.58 0.272 0.270 0.275 0.119 
 Age 51 years old up 0.225 0.176 0.295 0.297 0.172 0.166 
Educa-
tion  
High school  0.112 0.147 0.091 0.135 0.137 0.071 
College  0.398 0.470 0.409 0.270 0.414 0.429 
Associate/Graduate 0.489 0.382 0.500 0.595 0.448 0.500 
Income  
$30,000 – $39,999 0.231 0.382 0.227 0.216 0.241 0.119 
$40,000 – $79,999 0.425 0.264 0.386 0.514 0.448 0.500 
$80,000 up 0.280 0.264 0.341 0.162 0.276 0.333 
Decline to answer 0.064 0.090 0.045 0.108 0.034 0.047 
Marital Single 0.468 0.735 0.318 0.297 0.379 0.619 
Status Married 0.414 0.235 0.523 0.514 0.448 0.333 
 Divorced 0.188 0.029 0.159 0.189 0.172 0.047 
Health 
related 
habit 
Smoke 0.053 0.058 0.0455 0.0541 0.0690 0.047 
Not smoke 0.947 0.942 0.9545 0.9459 0.931 0.952 
Drink alcohol 0.769 0.735 0.818 0.784 0.862 0.667 
Not drink alcohol 0.231 0.265 0.182 0.216 0.138 0.333 
Buy organic foods 0.376 0.294 0.455 0.378 0.448 0.310 
Not buy organic foods 0.624 0.706 0.545 0.622 0.552 0.690 
Weight  
Consider 
Obese 0.026 0 0.045 0.054 0.034 0 
Over weight 0.156 0.029 0.250 0.162 0.310 0.047 
Slightly over weight 0.188 0.235 0.205 0.216 0.137 0.143 
Under weight 0.048 0.147 0.022 0 0.034 0.047 
Normal weight 0.580 0.588 0.477 0.567 0.482 0.762 
Race Asian 0.258 0.323 0.068 0.216 0.172 0.500 
 Hispanic 0.032 0.058 0.045 0.027 0.034 0 
 Africa 0.037 0.088 0.045 0 0.069 0 
 Caucasian 0.651 0.529 0.795 0.757 0.655 0.500 
 Native American 0.005 0 0 0 0.034 0 
 Other 0.016 0 0.045 0 0.034 0 
Number of obs 186 34 44 29 37 42 
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Table 2.3: Food advertisement effects with DID model 
 
Total 
Calories 
Intake 
Total Fat 
Intakes 
(g) 
Saturate 
Fat Intakes 
(g) 
Sodium 
Intakes 
(mg) 
Carb 
Intake 
(g) 
Healthy Food Ads ( ?̂?1) -134.36** -7.64** -2.79* -258.02** -9.65 
 (64.635) (3.326) (1.575) (113.661) (9.108) 
Anti-Obesity Ads ( ?̂?2) -93.04* -5.08* -1.81 -192.99* -8.02 
 (57.767) (3.150) (1.475) (109.395) (8.581) 
Unhealthy Food Ads (?̂?3) 19.43 3.76 2.57 145.73 -4.24 
 (65.456) (3.331) (1.588) (107.239) (11.175) 
Mixed Food Ads ( ?̂?4) -90.29* -3.17 -0.60 -130.28 -8.46 
 (54.89) (3.163) (1.512) (108.366) (9.739) 
Constant 658.81*** 29.42*** 12.53*** 1,288.6*** 75.58*** 
 (134.647) (7.279) (3.210) (271.824) (19.098) 
N=186   and  R2 0.22 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.19 
Chi-square 114.74 69.57 76.80 73.08 83.63 
Values in parenthesis are the standard errors and the ***, **, and * are 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence 
intervals respectively. 
 
Table 2.3 presents the difference-in-differences results for the treatment 
variables3. Healthy food, anti-obesity, and mixed food advertising all reduced the total 
caloric intake relative to those of the control. Specifically, the treatment group for 
healthy food advertising consumed 134.4 fewer calories compared to the control, 
which represented a 22.9% decrease compared to the control. This result was the most 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The anti-obesity treatment group consumed 93 
fewer calories than the control, which represented a 15.8% reduction. This result was 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The mixed advertising group, which featured 
all three types of advertising, consumed 90.3 fewer calories than the control group 
(15.4%).  
                                               
3 While not shown in Table 2.3, some of the socio-economic and demographic variables were 
statistically significant. For example, in the regression model with caloric intake as the dependent 
variable, the following characteristics were statistically significant: females consumed 95.2 fewer 
calories, people who drink alcohol consumed 64.7 more calories, consumers who purchase organic 
products consumed 52.7 fewer calories, and participants who indicated they were under-weight 
consumed 136.1 fewer calories. 
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When given equal exposure, the effect of healthy and anti-obesity advertising 
outweighed the effect of un- healthy advertising, thus decreasing the total caloric 
intake. This result was statistically significant at the 10% level. However, in reality, 
television advertisements are overwhelmed with loads of unhealthy advertising that 
dwarfs the amount of healthy and anti-obesity advertising in the media. As expected, 
the treatment for unhealthy food advertising had a higher caloric intake than the 
control; how- ever, this intake was not statistically significant. One explanation for 
unhealthy food advertising not having an impact is that subjects already viewed a 
tremendous amount of this type of advertising in real life and therefore the marginal 
impact of viewing a bit more in the laboratory was minimal. In summary, both healthy 
food and anti-obesity advertising have a significant effect on reducing caloric intake, 
but healthy food advertising had a stronger impact (see further discussion later on). 
 Next, we discuss the impact of different types of advertising on the 
overconsumption of various other nutrients that is associated with obesity. Healthy 
food advertising had the most impact on reducing total fat intake. The subjects in this 
treatment group consumed 7.6 less grams of fat than the control group, which 
represented a 34% reduction. This result was statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The subjects in the anti-obesity advertising treatment also consumed 5.1 grams less 
total fat than the control. Further, the subjects in the mixed advertising group 
consumed, on average, less total fat as well but the result was not statistically 
significant. Thus, while mixed advertising reduced the total intake, it did not have a 
statistically significant impact on fat intake. Similar to the results for the caloric 
intake, unhealthy food advertising increased the fat intake relative to the control group 
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but this result was not statistically significant. Again, this lack of significance likely 
reflected a zero marginal impact because of the high saturation level of this type of 
advertising. The saturated fat results, as displayed in Table 2.3, were consistent with 
the total fat results. 
 The impact of the advertising treatments on sodium intake was similar to the 
results for the total and saturated fats. The healthy advertising treatment resulted in the 
largest reduction in the sodium intake relative to the control. The subjects in this 
treatment consumed 258 (24.1%) less milligrams of sodium than the subjects in the 
control. This amount was statistically significant at the 5% level. The anti-obesity 
advertising also had a statistically significant and negative impact on the sodium 
intake. The subjects in this advertising treatment consumed 193 less grams of sodium, 
a reduction of 18%. The mixed advertising treatment had a lower sodium intake than 
the control but was not statistically significant. 
 Interestingly, none of the four treatments had a statistically significant impact 
on the carbohydrates consumed. This was probably because of the relatively low 
degree of variation in the level of carbohydrates in the ‘‘healthy’’ versus ‘‘unhealthy’’ 
menu items. An interesting finding of our research was that while healthy and anti-
obesity advertising were both significant in terms of reducing caloric and other 
nutrient intake, the former had a stronger effect than the latter. For example, healthy 
advertising had a 44.5% stronger impact on reducing calories than anti-obesity 
advertising (over 50% regarding fat and 33% regarding sodium), which was 
statistically significantly different (p-value < 0.05). There are two related explanations 
for this suggested by previous studies. First, some research suggests that negatively-
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framed advertising messages that are aimed at changing peoples’ behavior can have 
the unintended consequence of inducing resistance and reducing the probability of 
self-change, especially when advertising is emotive, as well as framed and perceived 
as a health threat (Brown, 2001; Brown and Locker, 2009). The use of “fear 
appealing,” emotive messages with information on possible health risks aimed at 
scaring recipients into changing their behavior to a healthier one, is generally not 
recommended in health promotion campaigns (Ruiter et al., 2001). 
 Second, and relatedly, previous research suggests that public health messages 
that focus on inducing behavioral changes in a non-stigmatizing way (e.g., positive 
healthy advertising) are more effective than messages that have the potential to 
stigmatize people (e.g., anti-obesity advertising). For example, Puhl et al., 2013 found 
that health messages that omitted the term “obesity” were rated as inducing more self-
efficacy in engaging in healthy behavior than those containing “obesity.” This finding 
is also consistent with Piggin and Lee, 2011 regarding the omission of the word 
“obesity” from the United Kingdom’s ‘Change4lLife’ campaign and indicates the 
importance for future research to more rigorously test how weight-related terminology 
influences public response to healthy messages. These results suggest that more 
positive-based advertising such as encouraging healthy foods is more effective in 
changing behavior than more negative-based advertising, which is aimed at 
discouraging unhealthy foods, but may turn some people off due to the perceived 
stigmatizing nature of the ads. 
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 The results from the DID regression model provided evidence that healthy 
food and anti-obesity advertising had a positive impact on changing the subjects’ 
purchases towards healthier choices. By estimating the difference between the pre- 
and post- treatments (and between the control and treatment groups) in nutrient 
elements, we found reductions in most nutrients in response to healthy food, anti-
obesity, and mixed food advertising. However, these numerical calculations can 
sometimes be at odds with the general food perceptions. For instance, some items in 
the menu, generally perceived as healthy such as tuna salad, actually had higher 
sodium contents than a small cheese pizza. Fruits have more carbohydrates than do 
cookies, and Diet Pepsi has a higher sodium content than does regular Pepsi or 
Tropicana lemonade. In order to see how the various types of advertising impacted 
consumers’ purchases of items generally perceived as healthy or unhealthy, we 
estimated an ordered probit model in the next section. 
 
2.4.3 Ordered Probit model 
The food items offered in the lunch menu were clearly divided into two 
categories: healthy (e.g., fruit and veggie platter) and unhealthy (peperoni pizza)4. 
Therefore, we constructed the ordered probit model as follows. First, the change in the 
number of healthy items chosen from Menu 1 to 2 was computed. The dependent 
variable was constructed based on the change in healthy items and took on three 
                                               
4 Definitions of the term “healthy foods” vary depending on the source and context. Healthy food, here, is defined 
based on the definition used by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA). Under the FDA, a label may say “healthy” 
if the food is (i) low in fat and saturated fat (ii) limited in amount of sodium and cholesterol and (iii) provides at 
least 10 percent of one or more of Vitamin A, Vitamin C, iron, calcium, protein, and fiber (for single-item foods). 
The beverages with zero calories are considered as a healthy drink and those with positive calories are considered 
unhealthy. 
  
28 
discrete values. If the number of healthy items increased from Menu 1 to 2, then the 
dependent variable was equal to two; and if there was no change in the number of 
healthy items, then the dependent variable was equal to one. If the number of healthy 
items decreased, then the dependent variable was equal to zero.  
 
Table 2.4: Number of subjects selecting more healthy items in Menu 2 
Eating pattern 
#Good 
items 
Number of Subjects 
Whole 
Menu 
Entrée Drink Snack 
Snack 
&Drink 
Less Healthya -2 4 2 0 18 2 
-1 26 19 16 0 23 
Neutralb 0 89 124 152 131 117 
Become 
Healthierc 
1 51 40 18 34 39 
2 14 1 0 3 3 
3 1 0 0 0 2 
4 1 0 0 0 0 
% of change 51% 33% 22% 29.5% 37.1% 
     -  To less healthy 30% 34% 47% 32% 36% 
     -  To become healthier 70% 66% 53% 68% 64% 
Total # of subjects 186 186 186 186 186 
aA negative # of good items means a subject selected fewer good items in Menu 2 than Menu 1.     
 The eating habit is assigned “Less Healthier”. 
bA zero # of good items means a subject selected # of good items in Menu 2 equal to Menu 1.          
The eating habit is assigned “Neutral or Unchanged”. 
cA positive # of good items means a subject selected more good items in Menu 2 than Menu 1.        
The eating habit is assigned “Become Healthier”. 
 
Table 2.4 summarizes the number of subjects who selected more healthy items 
in Menu 2. Because this was a non-linear model, the ordered probit results were 
interpreted in terms of a change in the probability of selecting a healthy item. The 
structure of the difference-in-differences model could still be used in the ordered 
probit model as follows5: 
 
                                               
5 The ordered probit model is more efficient than a linear OLS in dealing with an ordered discrete 
variable. 
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(2.3)   𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝐷, 𝑋] = Φ[𝛼 + 𝜃𝐶𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑑𝐷𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖
4
𝑑=1 ] = Φ[𝑢], 
 
where 𝑌𝑖 equaled 0, 1, or 2 for “less healthy,” “unchanged,” and “healthier.” The 
dummy variables for the healthy food, anti-obesity, unhealthy food, and the mixed 
food advertising treatments were denoted as 𝐷1, 𝐷2, 𝐷3, and 𝐷4 respectively. 
 
Table 2.5:  Food advertisement effects with the ordered probit model 
 (the Whole Menu) 
 Marginal Effects 
Pr(Y=0) Pr(Y=1) Pr(Y=2) 
Healthy Food Ads -0.099* -0.055* 0.154* 
 (0.055) (0.033) (0.085) 
Anti-Obesity Food Ads -0.092* -0.051* 0.144* 
 (0.055) (0.031) (0.087) 
Unhealthy Food Ads -0.011 -0.006 0.017 
 (0.072) (0.040) (0.112) 
Mixed Food Ads -0.148** -0.079* 0.229** 
 (0.060) (0.041) (0.095) 
N= 186, R-square = 46.45 
Pr(Y=0) is the probability of being “less healthy” after the treatment. Pr(Y=1) is the probability of having 
a “unchanged” eating pattern before and after the treatment. Pr(Y=2) is the probability of being “ 
healthier” after the treatment.  
Values in parenthesis are the standard errors and the ***, **, and * are 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence 
intervals respectively. 
 
Table 2.5 presents the results of the ordered probit model. All types of 
advertising, except for the unhealthy food advertising, had significant impacts on 
changing food purchase decisions from Menu 1 to 2. The mixed food advertising had 
the largest impact. The subjects in this treatment had a 14.8% lower probability of 
increasing their purchases of unhealthy items from Menu 1 to 2 and had a 23% higher 
probability of increasing their purchases of healthy items. The healthy food 
advertising treatment had similar, though somewhat smaller effects: the subjects in 
this treatment had a 9.9% lower probability of increasing their purchases of un- 
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healthy items and a 15.4% higher probability of increasing their purchases of healthy 
items from Menu 1 to 2. The anti-obesity advertising also had a statistically significant 
impact on reducing the probability of increasing their purchases of unhealthy items 
and raising the probability of increasing their purchases of healthy items, but the 
magnitudes were somewhat smaller. It is again interesting to note that the more 
positive type of healthy advertising had a stronger impact than the negative anti-
obesity advertising in raising (lowering) the probability of purchasing healthier 
(unhealthier) food. 
Some of the demographic variables (not shown in Table 2.5) were also 
statistically significant. For instance, subjects with income levels over $80,000 had a 
17.7% higher probability of increasing their purchases of unhealthy items from Menu 
1 to 2 and a 27.4% lower probability of increasing their purchases of healthy items. A 
similar, but less impactful result occurred for subjects with income levels between 
$40,000 and $80,000. Subjects who were married had a 22.1% lower probability of 
increasing their purchases of unhealthy items from Menu 1 to 2 and a 34.4% higher 
probability of increasing their purchases of healthy items. The subjects that indicated 
they were overweight had a 9.3% higher probability of increasing their purchases of 
unhealthy items from Menu 1 to 2 and a 14.4% lower probability of increasing their 
purchases of healthy items. 
The ordered probit model was also estimated separately for each of the three 
food categories: beverages, entrées, and snacks. The results are presented in Table 2.6. 
The most significant changes originated in the beverages category. For instance, the 
subjects who viewed the anti-obesity advertising had a 12.1% lower probability of 
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increasing their purchases of unhealthy beverages from Menu 1 to 2 and a 14% higher 
probability of increasing their purchases of relatively healthy beverages. Hence, the 
subjects made the most of their adjustments in response to the advertising in their 
selection of beverages. Indeed, none of the treatments, except for the unhealthy food 
advertising, had an impact on changing the probability of the food selection in the 
entrée category. 
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Table 2.6: Food advertisement effects with the ordered probit model for each food category 
 Consider only Entrées Consider only Beverages Consider only Snacks 
Marginal Effect Marginal Effect Marginal Effect 
Pr(Y=0) Pr(Y=1) Pr(Y=2) Pr(Y=0) Pr(Y=1) Pr(Y=2) Pr(Y=0) Pr(Y=1) Pr(Y=2) 
Healthy Food Ads 0.008 0.004 -0.012 -0.084* -0.013 0.097* -0.068* -0.043 0.111* 
 (0.051) (0.028) (0.080) (0.048) (0.023) (0.056) (0.049) (0.034) (0.079) 
Anti-Obesity Food Ads -0.017 -0.09 0.026 -0.121** -0.019 0.140** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.051) (0.028) (0.078) (0.053) (0.032) (0.061) (0.050) (0.032) (0.082) 
Unhealthy Food Ads 0.080* 0.042 -0.123* -0.088* -0.014 0. 101* 0.036 0.023 -0.059 
 (0.046) (0.034) (0.074) (0.052) (0.023) (0.059) (0.053) (0.034) (0.085) 
Mixed Food Ads -0.022 -0.012 0.035 -0.093* -0.014 0.107* -0.093* -0.059* 0.152** 
 (0.055) (0.031) (0.086) (0.048) (0.024) (0.055) (0.050) (0.035) (0.078) 
N=186, R-square 38.08 33.40 24.53 
Pr(Y=0) is the probability of being “less healthy” after the treatment . 
Pr(Y=1) is the probability of having a “ unchanged” eating pattern before and after the treatment. 
Pr(Y=2) is the probability of being “ healthier” after the treatment. 
Values in parenthesis are the standard errors and the ***, **, and * are 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence intervals respectively.  
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2.5 Conclusions 
This research focused on the impact of different types of food advertising on 
consumers’ purchasing behavior. In particular, we examined the impact of three broad 
types of advertising on adult food consumption: unhealthy food advertising, healthy 
food (fruits and vegetables) advertising, and anti-obesity advertising. To investigate 
these impacts, the study implemented an economic experiment in which 186 adult, 
non-undergraduate student subjects chose items from a lunch menu, and then, 
depending upon which treatment they were assigned to, were shown short clips of 
television shows interspersed with one of the three types of ads (or no ads for the 
control group), then asked to resubmit their menu choices. To determine whether any 
of the treatments had a significant impact on intake of various nutrients including total 
calories, a difference-in-differences regression model was estimated, which included 
demographic and socioeconomic variables to control for heterogeneity among 
treatments. In addition, because individual perceptions of the healthiness of food items 
might have a downward bias for their nutritional composition results, we estimated an 
ordered probit regression model to analyze how various types of advertising impact 
consumers’ purchases of items generally perceived to be healthy or unhealthy. 
The results indicated that exposure to both healthy food and anti-obesity 
advertising resulted in a significant decrease in caloric intake. That is, after controlling 
for differences in demographic and socioeconomic factors, subjects in the healthy 
advertising treatment consumed 134.4 (22.9%) fewer calories and those in the anti-
obesity treatment consumed 93 (15.8%) less calories than subjects in the control 
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(noadvertising) group. We also found that the treatment in which all types of ads were 
intermixed (healthy, un- healthy, and anti-obesity) resulted in a reduction of 90.3 
(15.4%) calories, suggesting that the positive healthy food and anti-obesity advertising 
effect outweighs the negative effect of unhealthy food advertising on caloric intake. 
Similar results were also found for other nutrients such as total fat, saturated fat and 
carbohydrates. In addition, the results based on the ordered-probit regression indicated 
that all types of advertising, except for the unhealthy food advertising, had significant 
impacts on changing food purchase decisions from Menu 1 to 2. The mixed food 
advertising had the largest impact; subjects in this treatment had a 14.8% lower 
probability of increasing their purchases of unhealthy items from Menu 1 to 2 and had 
a 22.9% higher probability of increasing their purchases of healthy items. The healthy 
food advertising treatment had similar, though somewhat smaller effects: the subjects 
in this treatment had a 9.9% lower probability of increasing their purchases of 
unhealthy items and a 15.4% higher probability of increasing their purchases of 
healthy items from Menu 1 to 2. The anti-obesity advertising also had a statistically 
significant impact on reducing the probability of increasing their purchases of 
unhealthy items and raising the probability of increasing their purchases of healthy 
items, but the magnitudes were somewhat smaller. 
The main conclusions of our experiment that have policy implications are 
three-fold. First, increasing the frequency of exposure to healthy food advertising 
would nudge people towards reducing caloric and unhealthy nutrient food intake. 
Second, increasing the frequency of anti-obesity advertising would have similar, but 
less significant effects. Third, limiting the exposure to unhealthy food advertising 
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would also reduce caloric and unhealthy nutrient intake. The fact that healthy food 
advertising had a substantially stronger (over 50% in terms of reducing fat) effect than 
the anti-obesity advertising is consistent with findings by other researchers and may be 
due to anti-obesity advertising producing a negative fear-emotive or stigmatizing 
effect on the target audience, which may turn some people off and thereby water-down 
the effect of the message. This finding has an important policy implication for framing 
and crafting advertising messages to address obesity. That is, healthy food advertising 
might have a broader and more effective reach to the American public than anti-
obesity advertising. Crafting a message that is more positive in encouraging healthy 
food consumption may be a more effective strategy in nudging people to eat healthier 
and consume fewer calories than the potentially stigmatizing nature of negative, anti-
obesity advertising. 
The main policy implication of this research is that the government should 
explore policy options to increase the frequency of healthy and anti-obesity 
advertising. Past research has concluded that the magnitude of exposure to unhealthy 
food advertising is substantially higher than that of the other two types of advertising 
(e.g., Cairns et al., 2009; Harris et al., 2009; Holt et al., 2007; Powell et al., 2007; 
Livingstone, 2005; Office of Communication, 2004; Hill and Radimer, 1997). We find 
the opposite impacts for healthy food and anti-obesity advertising. Therefore, 
providing consumers with a more balanced set of advertisements on food choices 
should be a policy option for reducing obesity. 
 
 
  
 
36 
An important caveat of this study is that it was conducted in a laboratory 
setting. Consequently, the results should be viewed as upper bound estimates for the 
various advertising impacts. The food advertising exposure presented to the 
participants in the laboratory was different from what occurs in real life. In reality, 
television viewers are inundated with unhealthy food advertising and seldom view 
either healthy food or anti-obesity ads. Also, in a laboratory setting, participants know 
that their decisions are thoroughly investigated, which is not like everyday life, and it 
can influence the decision-making process of participants even though they are 
assured of the anonymity of their actions. With the high degree of scrutiny applied in 
the lab and the relatively high stakes provided to subjects ($25 participation payment 
plus $10 in food endowment), participants might view the task with more 
responsibility and feel obligated to alter their behaviors. Therefore, subjects might 
conform to typical social norms to avoid high moral costs (Levitt and List, 2007). 
Thus, the results from the laboratory experiment should be generalized to the field 
with caution. 
Despite some limitations, the results from this study still con- tribute to the 
literature examining the economic effect of food advertising on consumers’ 
purchasing behavior. To our knowledge, this is the first study to measure the causality 
and direct exposure to all three types of food advertising. Despite the limitations 
outlined above, our study shows the potential of both healthy and anti-obesity 
advertising. Our research provides some information on the actual change in the 
selection of nutrient con- tents and food items in a lunch meal. Further research should 
examine the long-term effects and observe the nutrient change across all meals in a 
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day for an extended period of time. Overall, the results suggest that a well-designed 
anti-obesity and healthy food advertisement might be an effective means for reducing 
obesity.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A.1: Socio-demographic questions and answer option list 
#  Question Answer Options/Description 
1  What is your gender? Drop-down list:   -      Male 
- Female 
2  What is your age? Drop-down list:   -      20 or less 
- 21-30 
- 31-40 
- 41-50 
- 51 or more 
3  What is the highest level of 
education you have achieved? 
Drop-down list:   -      High School 
- Undergraduate degree  
- Associate degree 
- Graduate degree or higher 
4  How would you describe 
yourself? 
Drop-down list:   -      Caucasian 
- African American 
- Asian/Asian American 
- Hispanic 
- Native American 
- Other 
5  What is your family 
household income?  
Drop-down list:   -      Less than $40,000 
- $40,001-$80,000 
- $80,001-$120,000 
- $120,001-$160,000 
- Over 160,000 
- Decline to answer 
6  What is your marital status? Drop-down list:   -      Single 
- Married 
- Divorced 
7  How many children do you 
have?  
Drop-down list:   -      No 
- One 
- Two 
- Three 
- Four 
- More than four 
8  Do you smoke? Drop-down list:   -      Yes 
- No 
9  Do you drink alcoholic 
beverages? 
Drop-down list:   -      Yes 
- No 
10  How would you describe 
your health condition? 
Drop-down list:   -      Underweight 
- Normal weight 
- Slightly overweight 
- Overweight 
- Obese 
11  Do you often buy organic 
products? 
Drop-down list:   -      Yes 
- No 
12  On a scale of 1-5, please rate 
your preferences on the 
television segments and 
advertisements you have just 
watched. (1 - dissatisfied and 5 - 
very satisfied):  a) TV Show  b) 
Menu variety  c) Price 
Points (a) to (c) are rated from 1 to 5. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FOOD STAMPS, FOOD INSUFFICIENCY,  
AND HEALTH OF THE ELDERLY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
For elderly Americans, President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty 
legislation was remarkably successful.  Poverty rates for the elderly fell from nearly 
25 percent in 1968 to just less than 10 percent in 20136.  Even so, there still are a large 
number of poor and near-poor elderly citizens, who live in households that are unable 
to purchase the minimum level of necessities for their household members.  Many 
others face that risk, but the percent is substantially higher among the elderly.  It has 
been estimated that 23 (21) and 36 (30) percent of the elderly (nonelderly) have 
incomes below 150 and 200 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) thresholds, 
respectively (Clark et. al., 2004). Over three-year-period study from 2009 to 2011, 
Gould and Cooper (2013) found there is a disproportionately large group of elderly 
Americans with incomes between the FPL and 200 percent of the FPL accounting for 
25.1 percent of elderly adults compared with only 16.6 percent of non-elderly adults.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
6 The Census Bureau has reported that poverty rates among the elderly (those ages 65 and older) are higher under 
the supplemental poverty measure (15 percent) than under the official poverty measure (9 percent), which is due in 
large part to the fact that the former deducts health expenses from income. 
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Even though they are not officially classified as being in poverty, Gould and 
Cooper concern that modest income levels could leave them dangerously vulnerable to 
changes in federal social programs. Many need assistance from the only universal 
nation-wide welfare program for the poor and near poor in this country, the Food 
Stamp Program (FSP)7, which has been renamed to the Supplemental Food Assistance 
Program These households are the focus of this study. 
Despite the limitations they face in purchasing food and other necessities, 
participation in the FSP by eligible elderly households remains low, roughly half the 
rate of all eligible households.  Wilde and Dagata (2002) indicate that about one-third 
of eligible elderly people over age 60 receive Food Stamps despite the program’s 
special provisions for them, particularly with respect to out-of-pocket medical 
expenses. Rosso (2001) confirm that, finding elderly participation rates of 32 percent 
in 1999 and 31 percent in 2002, respectively. Cunnyngham (2010) considers state-
level trends in FSP participation among elderly individuals. Although there was 
variation across states and between consecutive years, the change in elderly 
participation rates from 2002-2006 was also positive in every state.  Nationally, the 
estimated elderly FSP participation rate – the percentage of eligible elderly individuals 
participating in the program – increased steadily from 25 percent in 2002 to 34 percent 
in 2006. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly the Food 
Stamp Program, is the primary nutrition assistance program aimed at reducing food-
related hardship.  
 
                                               
7 Because our data cover period with the original name, we use that name herein. 
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Although increasing over time, the level of participation is still low. Eligible 
nonparticipants may not have enough resources to purchase a minimally nutritionally 
adequate diet.  Further, some elderly households may experience food insufficiency, 
where insufficiency is defined as needing to skip or skimp on meals because there is 
not enough food in the house or enough money to buy necessary food.  The presence 
and degree of food insufficiency and the outcome of the FSP participation decision 
may affect the health status of the elderly.  These linkages are not well understood and 
this research attempts to fill this knowledge gap in the literature. 
Our overarching goal is to examine whether and how elderly health status is 
affected by FSP participation, food sufficiency, and other determinants. To do so we 
first ascertain (1) why so few needy elderly households choose to receive food stamps; 
(2) what determines their level of food insufficiency and finally; (3) how FSP 
participation and food insufficiency are linked to each other and then to health status? 
The insights gained are particularly timely and useful due to a tripartite set of changes.  
More specifically, policy makers need appropriate information and tools to buffer the 
elderly from the impacts of these changing demographics, economic realities, and 
other policy pressures.     
The major demographic changes are:  (1) as a group, the elderly make up an 
increasing share of the total population, and (2) life spans are increasing over time.  
Both of these trends are expected to continue.  Based upon U.S. Census Bureau 
projections in 2012, the population of age 65 and older is expected to more than 
double from 43.1 million in 2012 to 92 million by 2060. The increase in the number of 
the “oldest old” would be even more dramatic - those 85 and older are projected to 
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more than triple from 5.9 million to 18.2, reaching 4.3 percent of the total population. 
In 2056, for the first time, the older population, age 65 and over, is projected to 
outnumber the young, age under 18. A consequence of longer life spans is that savings 
for retirement, once thought to be ample, may prove inadequate. As the elderly age, 
the odds of running through personal resources increase, as do the associated odds of 
becoming poor and staying poor through extended old age. Given that one requirement 
for FSP eligibility is that countable assets be below a certain threshold, we should 
expect more elderly to become asset eligible for food stamps as they age.  
 Since 1970, approximately 90 percent of elderly Americans have received 
Social Security benefits.  Porter et al., 1999, analysts at the Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities, indicate that if it were not for those benefits, the elderly (65+) 
poverty rate would have been 47.6 percent in 1997 rather than the actual 11.9 percent. 
According to Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, in 2012, for nearly two-thirds 
(65 percent) of elderly beneficiaries, Social Security provides the majority of their 
cash income. For one-quarter (24 percent) of elderly beneficiaries, Social Security is 
the sole source of retirement income. Any policy changes that reduce real benefit 
levels to Social Security recipients would hit low-income and very old elderly 
Americans hard. Gould and Cooper (2013) estimate that the reduction in Social 
Security benefits arising from a proposed shift to indexing cost-of-living adjustments  
to the chained consumer price index8 would boost the share of 70- to 75-year-olds 
                                               
8 The Chained Consumer Price Index is a time series measure of price levels of consumer goods and services 
created by the Bureau of Labor Statistics as an alternative Consumer Price Index. It measures living costs 
differently because it assumes that when prices for one thing go up, people sometimes settle for cheaper substitutes. 
Cost-of-living adjustments would be lower with the chained CPI than with the plain old CPI through the reduction 
of the quality of consumed goods (Keister 2013). 
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below two times the supplemental poverty threshold by 1.2 percentage points, 
resulting in 132,000 more “economically vulnerable” 9 seniors. 
Another important national program for the elderly is Medicare, which has an 
age eligibility requirement of 65 years and older. Medicare plays a vital role in 
providing financial security to older people and for those with disabilities. In fiscal  
year 2013, it provides federal health insurance to 54 million people who are elderly, or 
permanently disabled, or have end-stage renal disease (KFF, 2014). Out-of-pocket 
spending tends to increase with age. In 2010, beneficiaries aged 85 and older spent 
three times more out-of-pocket spending on medical service, on average, than 
beneficiaries aged 65 to 74 (Cubanski et al., 2014). Thus, medical expenses have a real 
potential for crowding out spending on other necessities such as food. The crowding-
out would be even more severe if Medicare benefits were reduced.  Regardless, low 
income elderly Americans may have to choose between skipping medicines or 
doctor’s appointments and skipping or skimping on meals10.  Because the FSP 
uniquely deducts out-of-pocket medical expenses for the elderly when determining 
eligibility and food stamp benefits, the program can be a buffer and reduce the 
pressure to make such difficult tradeoffs among necessities11.  For this reason alone, 
many elderly now need assistance from the FSP, and many more are likely to need it 
                                               
9 “Economically vulnerable ” is defined as having an income that is less than two times the supplemental poverty 
threshold (a poverty line more comprehensive than the traditional federal poverty line). threshold (a poverty line m  
10 We note another documented tradeoff low-income households must make (Bhattacharya et. al. 2003), 
particularly in parts of the country with very cold winters, food and home fuel.  These Americans face a tradeoff 
between paying to heat the home in the winter months and paying for food. We do not account for this relationship 
in our research.  
11 A further buffer was included in the 2008 Farm Bill. A provision was enacted to remove the cap on the 
dependent care deduction for all food stamp applicants. This provision will be a boon for the elderly, particularly 
those utilizing elder day care programs or in-home elder day care. Removing the cap enhances the likelihood of 
FSP eligibility and increases FSP benefits for participants. 
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in the future. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  First, this research is 
placed in the context of extant relevant economic, nutrition, obesity, health and policy 
economic literatures.  Then, a more detailed description of data sources for this study 
is presented.  The major data source is the 2002 panel of the Health and Retirement 
Survey (HRS).  Next we discuss our economic and econometric models and develop 
our estimation protocol.  We construct and estimate an econometric model that 
accounts for the possible simultaneity between FSP participation and food 
insufficiency, and corrects the covariance matrix for the use of these two predicted 
probabilities as explanatory variables in the health status equation.  Finally, we present 
results and implications, and conclusions and suggestions for further research.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
The literature summarized below is divided into three parts. First, we review 
the numerous studies that have identified and examined various factors that influence 
the health status of elderly people. Second, previous studies that have examined the 
impact of the FSP on food consumption, nutrition intake, and elderly health are 
discussed. Finally, research on food sufficiency and security, the linkages to FSP 
Participation, and elderly health is summarized. 
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3.2.1 Research on Health 
Although linkages among income, nutrition, obesity and health have been 
extensively studied in the health economics literature, relatively less research on this 
area has focused on the elderly.  Deaton and Paxson (1998a, 1998b) have conducted 
research on life cycle patterns of health and nutrition-related indicators (e.g., self-
reported health status and body mass index) and their relationships with income.  The 
authors provide strong evidence on the suitability of using such indices in longitudinal 
analyses, and show that health status is positively correlated with income.  They also 
show that this correlation is weakest among the youngest, and increases up to age 60 
before decreasing.  Their findings are consistent with Smith and Kington (1997), who 
apply the concept of a socioeconomic status-health gradient to show that health 
produces contemporaneous and long run feedbacks on economic status, implying 
simultaneity between these variables. 
 Other income-nutrition-health status studies have focused on the more 
vulnerable elderly given their economic and health conditions (e.g., Zhang, 1999; 
Stum et al., 1998; Smith and Kington, 1997; von Weizsacker, 1996).  For instance, 
Zhang (1999) addresses the effect of income in determining health status among U.S. 
elderly Medicare beneficiaries.  Stum et al., 1998 use the National Long-Term Care 
Survey to examine whether medical expenses are financially burdensome for disabled 
elders and to determine what factors are likely to put disabled elderly at risk of 
financial burden.  Smith and Kington (1997) investigate the health outcomes resulting 
from alternative sources of income including the implications for gender, racial, and 
ethnic differences.  In short, the health economics literature indicates that: (1) there is 
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strong evidence that income is positively correlated with health status; (2) this 
relationship is simultaneous and changes during the life cycle; and (3) the most 
vulnerable groups (i.e. low income and/or deficient health) are likely to be at risk and 
therefore policy intervention is required.  Finally, this literature suggests the 
importance of understanding the linkages between economic variables and nutrition 
and health outcomes in order to effectively improve the welfare of the elderly via 
public policy. Since 1991, rates of obesity have increased dramatically. Substantial 
increases among adults of all ages suggest that obesity among older Americans is 
likely to become a greater problem in the future. More than one-third of adults aged 65 
and over were obese in 2007-2010 (Fakhouri et al., 2012).  Consequently, an increase 
in the proportion of older adults who are obese negatively affects general elderly 
health condition and increase health care spending. 
 While the data we use in this study do not allow a detailed examination of food 
intake, previous studies have shown that food expenditures decrease as people get 
older and their need for more nutrient dense food increases, which suggests the 
incidence of nutrient-insufficient health problems could worsen health status among 
the elderly. Studies along these lines by Harris and Blisard (2002) confirm the decline 
in food expenditures as the elderly age.  They indicate that households with heads of 
ages 65-74 and older than 75 spend $41.44 and $32.11 per capita per week, 
respectively. This decline generates a further concern regarding composition and 
sufficiency of the diets of the elderly. The quality of the diet among elderly people 
could be affected by food insecurity due to limited access to a variety of foods, or to 
the capacity to purchase food (Lee and Frongillo, 2001; Sharkey, 2004).  Common 
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low-income households adjust their food budget, reduce their food intake, and alter the 
type of food served when they experience inadequate resource to afford food (Bickel 
et al., 2000; Kendall et al., 1996; Olson, 1999; Tarasuk et al., 1999). Dietary variety 
decreases and consumption of energy-dense foods increases. These energy-dense 
foods, including refined grains, added sugars, and added saturated/trans fats, tend to be 
of poor nutritional quality and less expensive on a per calorie basis than alternatives 
(Drewnowski et al., 2005 and Monsivais et al., 2007). This is known as the “food 
insecurity – obesity paradox”(Brewer et al., 2010). McNamara et al., 1999 identify the 
gaps between food intakes and the Food Pyramid recommendation of the U.S. 
population and found that elderly individuals (age 60 and above) met the 
recommendations for only one of the five food groups, vegetables. The largest gap 
was in the dairy group, with the elderly consuming, on average, only 57 percent of the 
recommended amount. Further, Ranney and McNamara (2002) found the cost of 
attaining a healthier diet is relatively high for low-income households to afford, 
especially those containing the elderly.  
 
3.2.2 Research on the Food Stamp Program 
The goal of the Food Stamp Program (or Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program, SNAP) is described by Nord and Golla (2009, p,iii), as, “SNAP [FSP] 
benefits are intended to increase the access of low-income households to food and a 
nutritious diet to improve their food security.”  There is a long history of research on 
the FSP by many disciplines.  Economists are perplexed and challenged by the 
persistence of this major in-kind transfer program.  Microeconomic theory implies that 
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in kind benefits are restrictive and that giving assistance in cash would expand the 
choice set for recipients.  Even so, a reasonable projection from the past to the 
foreseeable future suggests changing to cash benefits is not politically feasible or 
likely.  Nutritionists view this large food assistance program as a major opportunity to 
enhance the amount and composition of food intakes and thereby enhance the health 
and well-being of lower-income people.  Given the longevity and magnitude of the 
program, much research has been done.  Nutritionists, economists, other researchers, 
and policy makers undertake analyses of how the program is working and how it 
might be redesigned to best achieve its objectives.  While they primarily focus on the 
entire U.S. population and only rarely on the elderly, these studies often relate 
program participation to a variety of other outcomes such as food demand, food 
intake, nutritional status, labor supply, food sufficiency and food security.   
 Over time there have been at least three major reviews of the food stamp 
program literature.  One focused on how food stamps affected food consumption 
(Fraker, 1990).  Another reviewed the literature on how food assistance and nutrition 
programs affected nutrition and health (Fox et. al., 2004).  The large body of research 
reviewed in these two studies indicates that FSP benefits increase food spending.  It 
also shows that the program may affect household food supplies by enhancing nutrient 
availability, but is unclear about whether individual nutritional intake is improved  
(Wilde, 2007).  These reviews were conducted before the major advent of food 
insecurity - food stamp research. The more recent review, by Wilde (2007) addresses 
this literature and will be discussed in the next section.    
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3.2.3 Research on Food Sufficiency and Security and Linkages to FSP 
Participation 
The similarities and differences between food security and food sufficiency 
require clarification. First, these terms are often found in their negative forms, 
insecurity and insufficiency, respectively, as in our title. Second, various surveys have 
yielded slightly different definitions for food insufficiency based upon the number and 
wording of insufficiency related questions included in the questionnaire.   Herein, we 
define a household to be food insufficient if household member(s) skipped or skimped 
on meals because they did not have enough food in the house.  The actual questions 
asked in the HRS survey instrument are listed in Appendix D Part I.  Food sufficiency 
questions preceded the development of the official food security measure. 
The conceptual definition of food security is that all household members have 
access at all times to enough food for an active healthy life (Nord et. al., 2009). The 
official measure of the food security status of a household is calculated from their 
answers to questions in the Food Security Supplement (FSS) to the December Current 
Population Survey (CPS). Unlike food sufficiency, there is only one method for 
calculating food security.  There are 18 specific questions asked; only ten if there are 
no children in the household.  These questions are delineated in Appendix D Part II.  
Based upon the answers, the household is identified as having high, marginal, low, or 
very low food security.  If the scoring yields high or marginal, the household is 
considered food secure while low or very low indicate food insecurity (USDA 2008a).  
When respondent burden is of particular concern, there is also a 6-question version of 
the FSS and an associated scale (USDA 2008b).  It is interesting to note that the fourth 
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question is almost identical to the question we use to define food sufficiency.   In that 
sense and temporally, food sufficiency can be considered a precursor to the 
development of the measurement of food security. 
 Wilde (2007, pp. 307-309) presented a categorization of the research on how 
the FSP affects food security and hunger.  He developed a set of seven categories to 
describe the research approaches used to quantify the effects on food stamps on food 
insecurity. Those include:  (1) controlling for other observable variables; (2) jointly 
modeling the effect of food stamps on foods insecurity and vice versa; (3) using 
longitudinal or panel data; (4) using propensity score matching;  (5) using a “dose-
response” approach; (6) exploiting “natural experiments”; and (7) using random-
assignment research design. 
Our research falls squarely in Wilde’s second approach, that of modeling FSP 
participation jointly with food insufficiency/insecurity using alternative simultaneous 
equation models to handle the endogeneity between participation and food security.  
As reported by Wilde, the findings vary.  Compared to naïve models, Gundersen and 
Oliveira’s (2001) approach eliminated the troublesome positive relationship between 
participation in FSP and food insufficiency. Jensen (2002) found a negative 
relationship between participation and insecurity.  Huffman and Jensen (2008), after 
adding in a labor supply equation to the simultaneous system, found that food 
insecurity with hunger positively affects FSP participation, but that FSP participation 
has no effect on food insecurity.  Yen et al., 2008, which was published after Wilde 
(2007), also falls within this category. They account for endogeneity with an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach and find that FSP participation reduces food 
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insecurity. Wilde’s third research category relates to using longitudinal or panel data, 
and that research is beginning to yield some interesting results.  The research by Wilde 
(2007) indicated some reductions in troublesome results, but did not put an end to 
those problems.  A later article by Nord and Golla (2009) is suggestive and may 
provide the clearest view of the relationships of interest, showing that food insecurity 
is reduced shortly after reenrolling in the FSP.  Given that the HRS data is a panel data 
set, it certainly could be used in that fashion in the future. This study utilizes, 
however, a cross section from the HRS in 2002.  
 While our research does fit within Wilde’s second research approach, our 
modeling and policy contributions go beyond the research reviewed therein. It is worth 
nothing that there are relatively few studies on this area focusing on the elderly.  The 
similar study of Greenhalgh-Stanley and Fitzpatrick (2013) uses the same dataset, a 
restricted HRS data, pooled from 2000 to 2010 to examine the effect of food stamp 
participation on food insufficiency and diet-related disease among the eligible elderly. 
They estimate one directional effect of the FSP participation on food insufficiency 
with an instrumental variable approach, but not vice versa; and they independently 
estimate the effect of FSP participation on reported health and diet-related diseases. 
They found FSP participation significantly increases self-reported very good health 
status. Wu (2009) examine the effects of FSP participation on elderly outcomes such 
as food spending and nutritional intake. He found that elderly eligible nonparticipants 
are, on average, more food sufficient, spend more on food consumption, and eat more 
nutritious food than participants. Nicholas (2011) studied the relationship between 
food stamp recipient and diabetes health outcomes and found no significant difference 
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in Medicare spending, outpatient utilization, diabetes hospitalizations and blood sugar 
(HbA1c) levels between recipients and eligible non-recipients after controlling for a 
detailed set of covariates including individual fixed effects and measures of diabetes 
treatment compliance. Neither study fully accounts for the endogeneity of FSP 
participation.  Ziliak et al., 2008 estimate the effect of food insecurity on health 
outcome using NHANES and PSID data; however, they do not address potential 
endogeneity of food insecurity. They found a strong negative effect of food insecurity 
on reporting very good or excellent health status.  
Our study first accounts for the possibility of simultaneity of FSP participation 
and food insufficiency on eligible elderly household following Gundersen and 
Oliviera’s (2001) method. Second, we estimate the effect of both FSP participation 
and food insufficiency on the health status of the elderly in the two-step econometric 
model.  To our knowledge, none of the related studies that use two-step estimation has 
a correction of second-step test statistics. As literature showing mixed evidence of the 
effect of FSP participation, food insecurity and elderly health outcome, we think it is 
very important to provide a correction of the covariance matrix in order to assure 
accurate statistical inference. Third, we extend and modify Murphy and Topel’s 
(1985) procedure to be appropriate for two predicted variables. The corrected 
covariance matrix of the estimators lead to a more accurate conclusion of whether FSP 
participation and food sufficiency encourage better health outcomes.  
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3.3 Data   
The data utilized in this study are the Health and Retirement Survey from the 
year 2002 panel from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). This is a national panel 
with an initial sample of about 22,000 residents in the United States over the age of 
55.  The survey includes detailed information on demographics, health care utilization, 
health status, employment, family structure, income, expenditures, participation in 
government programs, and event histories.  
Data from 18,167 respondents with no relevant missing information were 
allocated to their respective households and weighted to reflect U.S. households with a 
head of age 60 years or more.  Selected descriptive statistics regarding FSP 
participation of these households are presented in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1:  Food Stamp Program (FSP) participation by Single Person and Low- 
Income Elderly Households1 
Characteristic  Number and Percent of Households 
Elderly households  36,457,956 
FSP participants  1,451,731 
Percent participating  4.0 
   
Elderly single-person households  16,737,945 
FSP participants  1,021,642 
Percent participating  6.1 
   
Low-income elderly households2  13,446,749 
FSP participants  1,316,267 
Percent participating  9.8 
   
Low-income elderly single-person households2  8,460,582 
FSP participants  945,328 
Percent participating  11.2 
1These statistics come from a sample of 18,167 residents, less than the full sample of some 22,000. Residents 
were then assigned to their households.  Residents or households were dropped from their respective samples if 
they had missing values for any of the variables included in the table. The final unweighted sample included 
12,350 households.  
2 Low-income = gross income less than or equal to 200 percent of U.S. department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) poverty level.   
Source:  2002 Health and Retirement Survey weighted data 
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It is important to note that FSP participation rates begin with only four percent 
of all elderly households and rises to 11.2 percent of low-income elderly single-person 
households.  Actual eligibility was not calculated for the weighted data in this table.  
This and other studies show that approximately 30 percent of eligible elderly 
households participate in the program. Most studies have found that primary reason 
eligible elderly households fail to participate FSP is that they do not think they are 
eligible for the program. Many mistakenly believe their income and assets are too high 
(Accius, 2008).  
The ideal estimation sample would be drawn from the population of elderly 
households eligible for food stamps.  However, precisely which households are 
eligible is not known a priori.  Determination of eligibility is complicated especially 
after the 1996 welfare reform statutes were enacted at the state level.  Even so, we do 
determine whether each of the households in the survey is eligible for food stamps by 
matching the state of residence for each HRS household to state-level eligibility rules 
from the Urban Institute’s waiver database and from the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities reports.   
 Our precise method for determining program eligibility is specified in detail in 
Appendix B.  After following this method, we find 1,608 HRS households with 
financial respondents of age 60 or greater to be eligible for food stamps and 1,357 of 
the households having complete information on the variables utilized in our analyses.  
These constitute our eligible estimation subsample. Table 3.2 contains variable 
definitions and descriptive statistics for this group. 
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matching the state of residence for each HRS household to state-level eligibility rules 
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Table 3.2:  Variable Definitions, Means & Standard Deviations  
Variable Categories and Names Variable Definitions Mean Std. Deviation 
DEPENDENT 
   
Participation Food Stamp Program participation = 1 if household participated sometime in the past two 
years and 0 otherwise 
0.314 0.464 
Insufficiency Food Insufficiency = 1 if household member(s) skipped meals or ate less than they wanted 
to because they didn't have enough food in the house sometime over the past two years.  
0.168 0.374 
Health1 Self-reported health status = 0 if poor, 1 if fair, 2 if good, 3 if very good, and 4 if excellent 1.407 1.094 
INDEPENDENT    
Health related 1    
     Mom’s age = Mom's current age or Mom's age when she died 72.750 17.359 
     Obese = 1 if BMI>=30 0.320 0.467 
     Smoke = 1 if smoke, 0 otherwise 0.177 0.382 
     Exercise = 1 if exercise, 0 otherwise 0.208 0.406 
     Drink alcohol = 1 if drink alcohol, 0 otherwise 0.207 0.405 
 
Age1 
   
     Age 70-79 = 1 if age is from 70-79, 0 otherwise 0.281 0.450 
     Age 80-89 = 1 if age is from 80-89, 0 otherwise 0.206 0.404 
     Age 90 + = 1 if age is 90 +, 0 otherwise 0.048 0.214 
 omitted category is respondent's age ≤ 69   
Marital status1    
     Divorced = 1 if divorced, 0 otherwise 0.192 0.394 
     Widowed = 1 if widowed, 0 otherwise 0.439 0.496 
 omitted category = married,2   
Employment status1    
     Economically active = 1 if working, 0 otherwise 0.074 0.261 
     Retired = 1 if retired, 0 otherwise 0.503 0.500 
     Disabled = 1 if disabled, 0 otherwise 0.261 0.439 
 omitted variable is homemaker   
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Table 3.2 (cont’d)    
Variable Categories and Names Variable Definitions Mean Std. Deviation 
Place of residence    
     Rural = 1 if rural 0 otherwise 0.329 0.470 
     Suburban = 1 if suburban, 0 otherwise 0.287 0.453 
 omitted category is URBAN   
Regions    
     Midwest = 1 if reside in midwest, 0 otherwise 0.164 0.370 
     South = 1 if reside in south, 0 otherwise 0.259 0.438 
     West = if reside in west, 0 otherwise 0.151 0.358 
 omitted category is EAST   
Race/Ethnicity1    
     Hispanic = 1 if Hispanic, 0 otherwise  0.211 0.409 
     Nonhispanic black = 1 if non-Hispanic black, 0 otherwise 0.330 0.470 
     Nonhispanic other = 1 if non-Hispanic other, 0 otherwise 0.035 0.183 
 omitted category is nonhispanic white   
Economic    
     Income  = Annual household income (in thousands) 0.164 24.622 
     Receive SSI  = 1 if someone in the household receives SSI income, 0 otherwise 0.831 0.375 
     Own home = 1 if home is owned, 0 otherwise 0.378 0.485 
     Own vehicle = 1 if own at least 1 vehicle, 0 otherwise 0.436 0.496 
Other    
     Household size = Household size 2.000 1.365 
     High School1 = 1 if earned high school diploma or greater, 0 otherwise 0.312 0.463 
     Skip medicines1 = 1 if skipped medicines due to financial constraints, 0 otherwise 0.030 0.171 
     Female1 = 1 if female, 0 otherwise 0.674 0.469 
     IADLA1 Instrumental activities of daily living equals to the sum of three binary variables that 
indicate whether the respondent has some difficulty of using the phone, managing money 
and/or taking medicines.  The variable ranges from 0 to 3.  
0.334 0.718 
1 All these person-specific variables relate to the household financial respondent. 
2 There is one other category, never married. There were no observations in our eligible subsample with that marital status. 
Source:  2002 Health and Retirement Survey 
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3.4 Theoretical Framework 
Our theoretical framework assumes that individuals maximize utility subject to 
their budget constraint.  Utility is a function of food (F), health (H), other goods and 
services (Z), leisure time (L), if a person participated in the Food Stamp Program, and 
stigma (S) will be accrued with participation (FS). Aside from transaction costs 
associated with establishing and maintaining eligibility, stigma or lack of information 
explains why people might not participate. Stigma associated with welfare programs 
in general (Moffitt, 1983) and the Food Stamp Program (FSP) in particular (Ranney 
and Kushman, 1986) not only affects participation, but also might be the most 
important factor, given the implication of economic theory that people should always 
accept additional un-stigmatized income.  Stigma can be modeled as a latent variable 
manifested through non-participation. Lack of knowledge of the FSP could lead 
eligible individuals not to apply.  A few people, especially, isolated and immobile 
older people, or those with disabilities, might find the non-monetary cost of 
application too high. We model FSP participation, food insufficiency and health 
following Grossman’s (1972) human capital model.  Individuals do not demand 
medical services, but better health. Therefore, Grossman (1972) uses various health-
related inputs such as nutrition (N) and medical services (M) in the health production 
function (H).  
The maximization problem for the consumer is expressed below: 
 
(3.1)                                   Max U(F,H(N(F),O(F),M), S(FS), Z, L)  
(3.2)                                   𝑠. 𝑡.  Tw + A + BfsFS − CfsFS = pmM+ pfF + Z + wL ,  
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where H is health production function, which includes nutrition (N) and obesity (O) 
functions; and nutrition (N) and obesity (O) are a function of food (F). Food 
consumption could increase the level of nutrition intake to improve health status, but 
also, if over consumed, could cause obesity that deteriorates health status. Stigma (S) 
is a function of food stamp program participation (FS) in which FS =1 if an individual 
participates the program, and zero otherwise. Nutrition, obesity, medical services, and 
FSP participation do not directly affect utility. Z represents other goods and services; L 
is non-labor market/leisure time; T is total time available; (T-L)*w is labor income 
based on and individual’s wage rate (w); A is non-labor income;  Bfs is the benefit of 
FSP participation; Cfs is the monetary cost of FSP participation such as the cost of 
application, certification and re-certification for food stamps; pm is average unit cost 
of medical services, and pf is average unit price of food. All prices and the wage rate 
are normalized by the price of other goods and services (pz), thus pz= 1. Some 
assumptions are imposed for utility maximization such as food (F), medical services 
(M), other goods and services (Z), leisure time (L) are normal goods, continuous, and 
differentiable. Food stamp (FS) is an inferior good and is a binary variable. The stigma 
(S) is assumed to be a linear function of FS, that is, S(FS) = ςFS ;  ς > 0. The first 
partial derivatives of all arguments are UF, UH, UZ, UL, HN, HM, NF, OF  > 0, HO < 0, 
and US = −s where s > 0. The second partial derivatives are  NFF(F < F̃) > 0, 
 NFF(F > F̃) < 0, OFF(F < F̃) < 0,  OFF(F > F̃) > 0, HOO > 0 and HNN < 0. F̃ is a 
threshold of food consumption that increases the rate of obesity and decrease the rate 
of nutrition intake if F > F̃. This can be graphically expressed as in Figure 3.1:  
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FFI is a food insufficiency threshold. For example, an individual who consumes Fo <
FFI has health derived from food consumption [H(Fo) = H(N(Fo)) + H (O(Fo))] that 
is less than individual who consumes at F̃  where F̃ > FFI, thus [H(F̃) = H (N(F̃)) +
H (O(F̃))]. At the H(Fo) level, the individual does not have enough food to maintain 
good health, thus reporting poor or fair health status. However, if the individual 
consumes more than F̃ such as F = F2, then the health derived from food consumption 
[H(F2) = H (N(F2)) + H (O(F2))] might be lower than H(Fo) because the rate of 
obesity outweighs the rate of nutrition intake. Inversely, the consumer might report 
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Figure 3.1: The relationship of health status (H), nutrition (N), obesity (O) and 
food intake (F) 
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poor health status. Equations (3.1) and (3.2) yield the following Lagrangian 
expression: 
 
(3.3)  L = U(F, H(N(F), O(F),M), S(FS), Z, L) +   
               
           λ(Tw + A + BfsFS − CfsFS − pmM− pfF − Z −wL)     
 
The first order conditions of equation (3.3) can be expressed as 
(3.3.1)          
∂L
∂F
= UF + UHHNNF + UHHOOF − λpf = 0    
          
(3.3.2)   
∂L
∂M
= UHHM − λpm = 0     
    
(3.3.3)   
∂L
∂FS
= USς − λ(Bfs − Cfs) = 0    
              
(3.3.4)    
∂L
∂Z
= UZ − λ = 0      
     
(3.3.5)    
∂L
∂L
= UL − λw = 0      
      
(3.3.6)   
∂L
∂λ
= A + BfsFS − CfsFS − pmM− pfF − Z −wL = 0   
 
(3.5)   
UF+UHHNNF+UHHOOF
pf
=  
UHHM
pm
= UZ =
UL
w
=
−s∗ς
Bfs−Cfs
= λ, 
 
where λ  is the marginal utility of money.  Equation (3.5) satisfies the equi-marginal 
principle that the marginal utility of food per dollar spent is equal to the marginal 
utility of spending on health, the marginal utility of other goods and services, and the 
marginal utility of leisure, respectively. If  UF + UHHNNF + UHHOOF > 0, this means 
food consumption increases marginal utility per dollar spent.  
 
  
 
67 
However, if UF + UHHNNF + UHHOOF ≤ 0, food consumption decreases marginal 
utility per dollar spent. The FSP participation decision involves a direct comparison 
between maximum utility with and without participation.  Thus, a person participates 
FSP if 
 
(3.6)                                   U(FFS, HFS(N(F),O(F),M), S(FS), ZFS, LFS) − 
                                           U(FNFS, HNFS(N(F), O(F),M), 0, ZNFS, LNFS) > 0,  
  
where the binary superscripts relate to FSP participation status. FSP participation 
increases household incomes by Bfs − Cfs and will also increase consumption of F, M, 
Z, and L, thus increasing overall utility. Specifically, an increase in food consumption 
is hypothesized to improve food insufficiency such that FFI − FFS < FFI − FNFS, 
where FFI indicates a food insufficiency threshold below which at least some 
household member’s meals are reduced in size or skipped, thereby jeopardizing 
nutritional status and health. In turn, FFS is the level of food consumption when the 
individual participates in the FSP and FNFS is the level of food consumption when the 
individual does not participate in the FSP. Because additional money from 
participating FSP could increase amount of food purchased, we, thus, assume that 
FFS > FNFS.  Food insufficiency directly decreases household utility and indirectly 
decreases household utility through health (H) and nutrition function (N). The 
household will consider participating in the FSP to increase its utility as shown in 
equation (3.6). However, participating in the FSP can stigmatize the household, which 
in turn may decrease its utility. In the first order condition equations, the individual 
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will participate in the FSP if the marginal utility of net benefit from FSP participation 
is greater than the disutility of stigma. In mathematical terms,  
 
(3.7)     λ (BFS − CFS) >S,   
         
where S =−s ∗ ς   is a disutility of stigma from participating the FSP and λ > 0. Thus, 
the individual is more likely to participate in the FSP if the stigma is relatively small, 
if the marginal utility of income (λ) is large, if the cost of participating is small, or if 
participation benefits are large. We assume that eligibility for the FSP is exogenous, 
i.e. not chosen by a person through labor supply or household formation decisions for 
this study of eligible households’ behavior. The implication of this model is that FSP 
participation (FS), food insufficiency (FI) and health status (H) are derived from a 
utility maximization problem and that they are all function of parameters of the utility 
function and demographic factors that shift the utility function. First, we are interested 
in the relationship between FSP participation (FS) and food insufficiency (FI). FSP 
participation and food insufficiency are simultaneously determined. Participation in 
the FSP, for instance, could alleviate food insufficiency through providing more 
money from the FSP to buy more food.  Food insufficiency could encourage 
individuals to participate in the FSP if households have food consumption that is low 
enough to be skipping meals. From first order condition, we can solve for F* and 
determine whether F* is greater or less than FFI.  FS* can be determined based on the 
FSP participation condition in (3.7). The prices and wage ratios are excluded in the 
estimation because we assume the ratios are the same for every low-income 
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household. Both FSP participation and food insufficiency affect elderly’s health status 
through the function H(). These effects will be built into the health equation in the 
econometric framework presented below. 
 
3.5 Econometric Framework 
Our theoretical model leads to an estimation framework consisting of three 
equations estimated in two sequential steps.  The equations are FSP participation (FS), 
food insufficiency (FI), and self-reported health status (H) in equations (3.8) through 
(3.10) below, respectively.  The first two equations (3.8) and (3.9) are simultaneously 
estimated using Probit maximum likelihood estimation in Step One.  In Step Two, we 
estimate self-reported health status in equation (3.10) using Ordered Probit maximum 
likelihood estimation with the predicted values of FS and FI among the independent 
variables. The equations are: 
 
(3.8)     FS∗ =β0,FSFI
∗  +   𝐱′FSβFS  +  εFS    ;  FS = 1 iff  FS
∗ ≤ 0 and FS = 0 iff  FS∗ > 0  
(3.9)       FI∗  =β0,FIFS
∗  +  𝐱′FIβFI  +  εFI      ;  FI = 1 iff  FI
∗ ≤ 0 and  FI =  0 iff  FI∗ > 0 
(3.10)      H∗   =β0,HFS
∗  +  β1,HFI
∗ + 𝐱′HβH  +  εH  
In (3.10), the general observation mechanism for H = 0, 1,…,4 is : 
Hi = 0 if Hi ≤ μo 
= 1 if μo < Hi ≤ μ1 
= 2 if μ1 < Hi ≤ μ2 and …. 
= j if Hi > μj−1. 
 There are five categories of health status ordered from zero to four with zero 
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indicating poor health and four indicating excellent health. The more specific 
definitions of the dependent and independent variables are presented in Table 3.2.  The 
two-step framework arises from econometric difficulties that must be addressed both 
within and across steps.  First, the FS equation (3.8) and the FI equation (3.9) contain 
endogenous explanatory variables, FI∗ and FS∗, respectively.  We follow Gundersen 
and Oliviera’s (2001) framework, which is consistent with our theoretical model, and 
specify (3.8) and (3.9) first as independent equations and then as a simultaneous 
system.  Specifically, a two-equation system of simultaneous-in-propensity program 
participation and food insufficiency is estimated with Probit equations. We also 
address the issue of identification in this first step of our two-step procedure. Two 
identification variables are whether household members skipped necessary 
medications due to financial constraints (SKIP MEDICINES) and whether any 
household member participates in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program 
(RECEIVE SSI). These two variables will be discussed in detail in the identification 
section. Gundersen and Oliviera (2001) found the simultaneous specification performs 
well when estimating food stamp program participation and food insecurity 
relationships with a sample of eligible American (nonelderly and elderly) households.   
Step Two involves estimation of health status (H) in equation (3.10).  Two 
variables from the first step, the predicted index values for FSP participation (FS∗) and 
food insufficiency (FI∗), are transformed into predicted probabilities and used as 
explanatory variables in the health status equation. This raises a second econometric 
issue because the variables are based on estimates from the simultaneous system in 
Step One. The standard two-step procedure fails to account for the fact that imputed 
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repressors (predicted variables from the first stage) are measured with sampling error, 
so hypothesis tests based on the estimated covariance matrix of the second-step 
estimator are biased, even in large samples (Murphy and Topel, 1985). Thus, the use 
of predicted explanatory variables require that we modify a covariance correction 
method developed by Murphy and Topel (1985) to allow for two, rather than one, 
predicted explanatory variables (see Appendix E Part I for details). 
  
 3.5.1 Step One Estimation  
The specifications and results of the independent and simultaneous FSP 
participation and food insufficiency equations are reported in Table 3.3. We follow 
Gundersen and Oliviera’s (2001) method, which is from a general model developed by 
Maddala (1983, pp. 246-247).  We start with a reduced form two-equation system, 
which consists of FSP participation and food insufficiency equations as follows:  
 
(3.11)                   FS∗ = 𝛑𝐅𝐒𝐗 + vFS  ; FS  = 1 (participate in FSP) iff  FS
∗ ≤ 0                            
                   = 0 (not participate in FSP) iff  FS∗ > 0  
 
(3.12)                   FI∗ = 𝛑𝐅𝐈𝐗 + vFI   ;  FI  = 1 (food insufficiency) iff  FI
∗ ≤ 0                        
                      = 0 ( food sufficiency)  iff  FI∗ > 0 , 
 
where  FS∗ is a latent true value of FSP participation, FI∗is a latent true value of food 
insufficiency, 𝐗 is a vector of explanatory variables, 𝛑𝐅𝐒 and 𝛑𝐅𝐈  are vectors of 
corresponding parameter estimates, and vFS and vFI are error terms. The reduced form 
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equations (3.11) and (3.12) are independently estimated by a Probit Maximum 
likelihood estimation. The predicted index values from those two reduced form 
estimations denoted as FÎ∗ and FŜ∗ are used as an explanatory variable in the structural 
equation (3.13) and (3.14), respectively as   
 
(3.13)                                             FS∗∗ = α0,FSFÎ
∗ + 𝐗FS
′ 𝛂FS + uFS   
(3.14)                                              FI∗∗ = α0,FIFŜ
∗ + 𝐗FI
′ 𝛂FI + uFI ,   
 
where  FS∗∗ and   FI∗∗ are the latent true values of FSP participation and food 
insufficiency in structural equations, respectively; 𝐗𝐅𝐒ϵ 𝐗, 𝐗𝐅𝐈ϵ 𝐗, 𝐗𝐅𝐒 ≠ 𝐗𝐅𝐈,  α0,FS, 
α0,FI , 𝛂𝐅𝐒 and 𝛂𝐅𝐈 are vectors of corresponding parameter estimates, and uFS and uFI 
are error terms. Similar to the reduced forms, the FS∗∗ and FI∗∗ in structural equations 
are categorized in a binary form and the same order. 𝐗𝐅𝐒 and 𝐗𝐅𝐈 are vectors of 
explanatory variables which are not identical due to identifiable parameters in the 
simultaneous model. This will be discussed in the identification section below. 
Equation (3.13) and (3.14) are independently estimated by Probit maximum likelihood 
estimation. The predicted index values from these two structural equations are 
transformed into predicted probabilities denoted as FŜ∗∗ and   FÎ∗∗, which are then 
used as explanatory variables in the health status equation in the second step. It is 
worth noting that the general model of Maddala (1983, pp. 246-247) that features a 
simultaneous Probit model requires a modified correction in the variance-covariance 
matrix for FŜ∗∗ and  FÎ∗∗. The correction procedure is presented in the Appendix E 
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Part I. Before proceeding to the second step of the estimation, the issue of 
identification and endogeneity need to be addressed. 
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     Table 3.3:  Program Participation and Food Sufficiency Probit Estimates  
 Independent Probits Simultaneous Probits 
Variables 
 
FSP Participation1 
(st. error) 
Food Insufficiency1 
(st. error) 
FSP Participation1 
(st. error) 
Food Insufficiency1 
(st. error) 
Constant -1.336 
(0.209) 
*** -1.025 
(0.219) 
*** -1.43 
(0.166) 
*** -1.27 
(0.414) 
*** 
Participation2 ____ 
 
0.378 
(0.091) 
*** ____  -0.270 
(0.291) 
 
Insufficiency2 0.404 
(0.098) 
*** ____ 
 
-0.224 
(0.213) 
 ____  
Skipped medicine ____ 
 
0.736 
(0.219) 
*** ____  0.626 
(0.186) 
*** 
Receive SSI  0.344 
(0.136) 
** ____ 
 
0.296 
(0.097) 
*** ____ 
 
Income (in thousands) 0.153 
(0.182)  
0.063 
(0.200)  
0.185  
(0.123)    
 0.138 
(0.145) 
 
Age 70-79 0.172 
(0.096) 
* -0.253 
(0.097) 
*** 0.094 
(0.087) 
 -0.181 
(0.086) 
** 
Age 80-89 0.034 
(0.120)  
-0.290 
(0.130) 
** -0.058 
(0.105) 
 -0.260 
(0.092) 
** 
Age 90 + -0.179 
(0.216)  
-0.485 
(0.257) 
* -0.344 
(0.172) 
** -0.534 
(0.170) 
*** 
Divorced 0.290 
(0.118) 
** -0.119 
(0.121)  
0.270 
(0.088) 
*** 0.029 
(0.144) 
 
Widowed -0.112 
(0.103) 
 -0.396 
(0.113) 
*** -0.229 
(0.109) 
** -0.410 
(0.079) 
*** 
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Table 3.3: (cont’d)     
 Independent Probits  Simultaneous Probits  
Variables FSP Participation1 
(st. error)  
Food Insufficiency1 
(st. error) 
 FSP Participation1 
(st. error) 
 Food Insufficiency1 
(st. error) 
 
Disabled 0.266 
(0.096) 
** 0.168 
(0.109)  
0.342 
(0.093) 
*** 0.289 
(0.126) 
** 
Economically active 0.093 
(0.170)  
-0.287 
(0.201)  
-0.001 
(0.136) 
 -0.263 
(0.131) 
** 
Retired -0.115 
(0.092)  
0.023 
(0.107)  
-0.116 
(0.069) 
 -0.022 
(0.084) 
 
Rural 0.398 
(0.102) 
*** -0.167 
(0.111)  
0.344 
(0.079) 
*** -0.030 
(0.132) 
 
Suburban 0.064 
(0.104)  
-0.068 
(0.106)  
0.049 
(0.071) 
 -0.049 
(0.080) 
 
Female 0.257 
(0.099) 
*** 0.364 
(0.108) 
*** 0.392 
(0.112) 
*** 0.485 
(0.123) 
*** 
Hispanic 0.312 
(0.120) 
*** -0.182 
(0.128)  
0.257 
(0.090) 
** -0.082 
(0.127) 
 
Nonhispanic black 0.148 
(0.102)  
0.207 
(0.097) 
** 0.222 
(0.084) 
** 0.268 
(0.091) 
** 
Nonhispanic other 0.051 
(0.216)  
-0.223 
(0.285)  
-0.019 
(0.160) 
 -0.192 
(0.169) 
 
Household size 0.073 
(0.031) 
** -0.361 
(0.034)  
0.062 
(0.025) 
** -0.011 
(0.030) 
 
Highschool -0.098 
(0.088) 
 
 
-0.005 
(0.104) 
 -0.096 
(0.062) 
 -0.035 
(0.073) 
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Table 3.3 (cont’d)     
 Independent Probits  Simultaneous Probits  
Variable FSP Participation1 
(st. error)  
Food Insufficiency1 
(st. error) 
 FSP Participation1 
(Corrected st. error) 
 Food Insufficiency1 
(Corrected st. error) 
 
         
Midwest 0.062 
(0.111)  
-0.023 
(0.120)  
0.066 
(0.080) 
 0.018 
(0.090) 
 
         
South -0.136 
(0.101)  
0.068 
(0.121)  
-0.114 
(0.074) 
 0.020 
(0.088) 
 
         
West -0.502 
(0.137) 
*** 0.144 
(0.124)  
-0.461 
(0.086) 
*** -0.048 
(0.166) 
 
         
Own home -0.248 
(0.089) 
*** -0.044 
(0.095)  
-0.275 
(0.062) 
*** -0.153 
(0.102) 
 
         
Own vehicle -0.068 
(0.083)  
-0.017 
(0.100)  
-0.072 
(0.064) 
 -0.054 
(0.075) 
 
         
Obese(BMI>=30) 0.099 
(0.081)  
-0.152 
(0.092) 
** -0.056 
(0.065) 
 0.164 
(0.069) 
** 
         
IADLA -0.058 
(0.059)  
0.180 
(0.058) 
*** -0.001 
(0.055) 
 0.164 
(0.046) 
*** 
              
LOG LIKELIHOOD -761.977  -561.691  -770.112  -569.921  
         
1 The superscripts *, ** and *** represent significant coefficients at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively.   
2 For the independent Probit equations, the PARTICIPATION and INSUFFICIENCY variables are binary, while for the simultaneous Probits, they are index values 
predicted from the reduced form estimates.  Those results are presented in Table C.1 in the appendices. 
Source:  2002 Health and Retirement Survey 
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 3.5.2 Identification 
 Our two candidate identification variables are whether household members 
skipped necessary medications due to financial constraints (SKIP MEDICINES), and 
whether any household member participates in the Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) program12 (RECEIVE SSI).  Skipping needed medicines may be positively 
associated with food insufficiency and have no effect on food stamp participation.  
That is, skipping medicines is a mechanism for dealing with insufficient resources 
much like skipping meals.  If the household receives SSI benefits, we hypothesize that 
most, if not all, the stigma associated with receiving welfare is incurred when applying 
for and receiving SSI benefits.  Further, any stigma remnants associated with food 
stamps would not be participation barriers.  Based on this hypothesis, then, receipt of 
SSI income would positively affect food stamp participation, but have no effect on 
food insufficiency.     
 While our reasoning seems sound, our identification expectations need to be 
tested.  We do so by including RECEIVE SSI and SKIP MEDICINCES in the reduced 
form equations (3.11) and (3.12), respectively.13  Therein, the variable RECEIVE SSI 
is positive and significant in the FSP participation equation, but insignificant in the 
food insufficiency equation. Similarly, the variable SKIP MEDICINES is positive and 
significant in the food insufficiency equation, but not significant in the FSP 
participation equation. Taken together, these reduced form statistical results support 
utilizing these two variables for identification purposes.  Hence, we include these two 
                                               
12 The Federal Supplemental Security Income Program provides monthly cash assistance to people who are 
disabled, blind, or elderly and have little income and few assets. In 2013, nearly 8.4 percent million people 
collected SSI benefit. For nearly three-fifths of recipients, SSI represents their only source of income (SSA 2013). 
13 The reduced form estimates are presented in Table C.1 in the Appendix C. 
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variables in the appropriate equations of the independent and simultaneous 
formulations. The signs and significance of these variables are as hypothesized.  That 
is, SKIP MEDICINES positively and significantly affects food insufficiency for both 
independent and simultaneous specifications as hypothesized.  Similarly, RECEIVE 
SSI is positive and significant in both specifications of the food stamp participation 
equation as presented in Table 3.3. Specifically, individuals who skip medicine due to 
financial constraints have higher probability to experience food insufficiency (14.8 
percent) and individuals who receive SSI have higher probability to participate in FSP 
(9.5 percent) than those who do not.  
 
 3.5.3 Endogeneity  
 The main reason Gundersen and Oliviera (2001) argue for the simultaneous 
model is because eligible households, who are more likely to participate in the FSP, 
may also be more likely to be food insufficient (2001, p. 879).  Our bivariate statistics 
clearly show this to be true for our food stamp eligible sample. Based upon 
manipulation of information provided in Table 3.4, food stamp participants are almost 
twice as likely as nonparticipants to be food insufficient with 24.2 percent of food 
stamp participants and 13.4 percent of nonparticipants. When comparing food 
insufficient and food sufficient households, 45.2 percent of food insufficient 
households receive food stamps.  The percentage for food sufficient households is 
lower, 28.6 percent. For the SIPP sample of the entire population utilized by 
Gundersen and Oliviera (2001), 40 percent of the eligible households participate in 
FSP, compared to 31 percent of the eligible elderly in our HRS sample. 
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Table 3.4:  Bivariate Percent Distribution of Food Stamp Program   
Participation and Food Insufficiency 
 
Food Insufficiency  (percent)  
Yes No 
Food Stamp Program 
Participation (percent) 
Yes 7.6 23.8 
No 9.2 59.4 
Source:  2002 Health and Retirement Survey 
 
 Policy makers likely would be troubled by the bivariate statistics below and by 
the naïve independent estimates reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.3.  Note the 
positive and significant effects of food insufficiency on FSP participation and, in turn, 
FSP participation on food insufficiency.  To compare those results to their counterpart 
coefficients in columns 4 and 5 where the endogeneity between FSP participation and 
food insufficiency are accounted for by the simultaneous system, both coefficients 
have negative signs, but are not significantly different from zero. Our simultaneous 
equation models with standard error correction removed the evidence of a significant 
positive association between food stamp participation and food insufficiency.   While 
policy makers would prefer to see food stamp program participation reduce food 
insufficiency, at least our results show that the program has no significant effect and, 
in particular, does not increase food insufficiency.  
 
 3.5.4 Step One Estimation Results 
We choose the simultaneous equation specification for FSP participation and 
food sufficiency as the preferred specification and discuss only those results. Similar 
to Gundersen and Oliveira’s (2001) results, both coefficients of FSP participation and 
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food insufficiency are not significantly different from zero. Greehalgh-Stanley and 
Fitzpatirck (2013) and Huffman and Jensen (2008) found the same result that FSP 
participation did not significantly improve food insufficiency of the elderly. Unlike 
our results, Huffman and Jensen (2008) did find that food insecurity positively 
affected FSP participation. 
 The positive (+) and negative (-) significant demographic determinants of FSP 
participation are: receive SSI (+), age 90+ (-), divorced (+), disabled (-), rural (+), 
female (+), Hispanic (+), non-Hispanic black (+), household size (+), west (-), own 
house (-). The significant demographic determinants of food insufficiency are: skipped 
medicine (+), age (-), widowed (-), disabled (+), economically active (-), female (+), 
non-Hispanic black (+), obese (BMI>=30) and IADLA (+).  The marginal effects of 
the variables in the simultaneous model of FSP participation and food insufficiency 
are presented in Table 3.5. The marginal effects tell us by how much FSP participation 
and food insufficiency changes when the variables change by one unit.  
We focus on marginal effects of significant variables on both FSP participation 
and food insufficiency equations. Individuals living in the west and age 90+ are the 
least likely group to participate in FSP (-14.8 percent and -11.1 percent). Being 
female, being divorced compared to married, living in rural areas compared to urban, 
and being disabled tends to increase participation in FSP (12.6 percent, 8.7 percent, 11 
percent and 11.1 percent, respectively). Previous literature has found that FSP 
participation is closely related to employment status and household composition, since 
unemployment and divorce often precede applications for food assistance (Gleason et 
al., 1998; Lubitz and Carr, 1985).  
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Table 3.5:  Marginal Effects of the variables in simultaneous models of FSP 
Participation and Food Insufficiency 
Independent Variable 2 
FSP Participation3 
Marginal Effects1 
 Food Insufficiency
3 
Marginal Effects1 
Participation ---  -0.068  
Insufficiency -0.072  ---  
Skip medicines ---  0.148 ***  
Receive SSI 0.095 ***  ---  
Income (in thousands) 0.059  0.034  
Age 70-79 0.030  -0.043 **  
Age 80-89 -0.018  -0.064 **  
Age 90+ -0.111 **  -0.131 ***  
Divorced 0.087 ***  0.009  
Widowed -0.073 **  -0.096 ***  
Disabled 0.110 ***  0.071 **  
Economically active -0.0003  -0.061  
Retired -0.038  -0.007  
Rural 0.111 ***  -0.003  
Suburban 0.015  -0.009  
Female 0.126 ***  0.117 ***  
Hispanic 0.082 **  -0.015  
Nonhispanic black 0.071 **  0.064 **  
Nonhispanic other -0.006  -0.046  
Household size 0.019 **  -0.002  
Highschool -0.031  -0.009  
Midwest 0.021  0.004  
South -0.036  0.004  
West -0.148 ***  -0.013  
Own home -0.089 ***  -0.037  
Own vehicle -0.023  -0.013  
Obese 0.018  -0.025 **  
IADLA -0.0002  0.037 ***  
1 Marginal effects for continuous variables are calculated as follows:   
 For continuous variables:  , where F(•) indicates the standard normal distribution function.   
 For binary variables:  the marginal effects are:  Prob [y|x=1] – Prob [y|x=0]. See Greene (2002).  
2  The independent variables listed either have significant Probit coefficients or are members of categories of     
variables where at least one variable is significant in the relevant equation.  
3  The superscripts *, ** and *** represent significant coefficients at the ten, five, and one percent level,  
respectively. 
 
The FSP participation rate is lower among employed individuals, who tend to 
have less time than unemployed individuals do and may find the application process 
burdensome (McKernan and Ratcliffe, 2003). Individuals who own a house compared 
to ones who do not exhibit lower probabilities of participation in the FSP (-8.9 
( ) (*)E Y F
X X
 

 
  
 
82 
percent). This might be associated to the absence of financial obligations. In addition, 
asset ownership may discourage participation among low-income households with 
assets below the FSP limit. These households may choose not to participate because 
program application and recertification incur high transaction costs for applicants with 
assets (Huang et al., 2010). The level of annual household income, however, has no 
significant impact on either FSP participation or food insufficiency. This is not 
surprising because one of the FSP eligibility criteria for elderly households is the net 
income test, in which the gross income is subtracted by standard deduction, earn 
income deduction, dependent care deduction and medical deduction. Therefore, these 
deductions leave out high income elderly from the sample. Race disparity plays an 
important role in determining the program participation. Hispanics and non-Hispanic 
black individuals tend to participate in FSP more than white individuals (8.2 percent 
and 7.1 percent, respectively).  
For food insufficiency, the marginal effects suggest that individuals age 90+ 
are the lowest risk group in food insufficiency (-13.1 percent) compared to individuals 
at age less than 70 who are at the highest risk. Females and disabled individuals are 
more vulnerable to experience food insufficiency (11.7 percent, 7.1 percent, 
respectively) relative to the rest. Non-Hispanic blacks have the highest risk of being 
food insufficient (11.7 percent). IADLA index shows that individuals who have higher 
IADLA are more likely to experience food insufficiency (7.4 percent). 
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 3.5.5 Step Two Estimation Results 
This step focuses on exploring the determinants of the self-reported health 
status by financial respondents of food stamp eligible households in our sample.  The 
health status ranges from zero (poor health) to four (excellent health). The mean self-
reported health status (HS) in our sample is 1.54, which falls between good and fair. 
These statistics are derived from Table C.2 in Appendix C, which also details the 
frequencies and percent of the households reporting health status, FSP participation 
and food sufficiency categories.  
 The ordered dependent variable of the health status equation (3.10) is 
estimated using Ordered Probit maximum likelihood. We modify the ordered Probit 
equation (3.10) by including predicted probabilities of FSP participation and of food 
insufficiency estimated from the simultaneous estimation in the first stage rather than 
the original propensities.  Because these predicted explanatory variables are used, 
Murphy and Topel’s (1985) covariance correction method is required for each of the 
predicted variables. The procedure of the covariance correction is presented in 
Appendix E Part I.  
With excellent health assigned a value of four, very good health with a value of 
three, good health with a value of two, fair health with a value of one, and poor health 
given a value of zero, the signs of variables with a positive (negative) coefficient mean 
that as the variables increases (decreases), health status increases (declines). We report 
parameter estimates of the health status equation in Table 3.6 along with the 
uncorrected and corrected standard errors. Based upon the uncorrected standard errors 
in the third column, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship 
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between participation in the FSP participation and health status. That is, elderly 
participants in the FSP have a lower health status than FSP eligible nonparticipants.  
Also, the coefficient of the probability of being food insufficient is negative and 
significant, meaning that health status declines as food insufficiency increases.  
 
Table 3.6:  Self-Reported Health Status Ordered Probit Estimates with 
Uncorrected and Corrected Standard Errors 
Variables Coefficient  Uncorrected 
Std. Error 
 Corrected 
Std. Error 
 
Probability of participation. -1.552  0.583 *** 0.991 
 
Probability of food insufficiency. -3.530  0.553 *** 1.520 ** 
Mother’s age 0.001  0.001  0.002  
Income 0.430  0.153 *** 0.209 ** 
Divorce 0.129  0.118  0.172  
Age 70-79 -0.042  0.085  0.135  
Age 80-89 -0.138  0.099  0.132  
Age 90+ -0.162  0.165  0.232  
Widowed -0.302  0.091 *** 0.123 ** 
Economically active 0.268  0.130 ** 0.161 * 
Retired 0.055  0.087  0.128  
Rural 0.145  0.115  0.304  
Suburban -0.003  0.074  0.103  
Female 0.481  0.095 *** 0.143 *** 
Household size -0.014  0.027  0.043  
High school 0.115  0.071 * 0.115  
Hispanic 0.045  0.098  0.130  
Nonhispanic black 0.362  0.088 *** 0.127 *** 
Nonhispanic other 0.168  0.167  0.224  
Midwest -0.065  0.078  0.135  
South -0.220  0.089 *** 0.173  
West -0.205  0.121 * 0.245  
Own Home -0.128  0.082  0.141  
Own Vehicle 0.022  0.067  0.091  
Smoke -0.108  0.079  0.089  
Exercise 0.406  0.073 *** 0.088 *** 
Drink Alcohol 0.163  0.073 ***          0.096   
Obese -0.195  0.064 ***          0.088  ** 
Mu(1) -1.460  0.266 *** 0.365 *** 
Mu(2) -0.432  0.266 * 0.352  
Mu(3) 0.410  0.263 * 0.355  
Mu(4) 1.277  0.271 *** 0.367 *** 
Chi-Squared 256.188                  --                  --  
Prob[ChiSqd > value] 0.0000000       --   --    
The superscripts *, ** and *** represent significant coefficients at the ten, five, and one percent level, 
respectively. 
Source:  2002 Health and Retirement Survey 
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 However, the results change when using the Murphy and Topel’s (1985) 
standard error correction method, which more than doubles the uncorrected standard 
errors displayed in the fourth column of Table 3.6.  When the correct standard errors 
are used, while food insufficiency continues to lead to declining health status, 
participation in the FSP no longer has a statistically significant impact on health status. 
This result underscores the importance of the Murphy and Topel’s (1985) method in 
hypothesis testing.  
 Our empirical result of negative effect of food insufficiency on health status is 
similar to several research in which individuals who are food insufficient will 
experience nutritional deprivation or substandard nutrition due to insufficient food 
intake (Gundersen and Kreider, 2009 (in children); Kursmark and Weitzman, 2009 (in 
children); Dixon et al., 2001 (in adults); Stuff et al., 2004 (in adults). Specifically, the 
food-insufficient elderly tend to consume lower quantities of a number of nutrients 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Lee and Frongillo, 2001), in particular protiein, calcium, 
and vitamins A and B-6 (Rose and Oliveira, 1997a). Thus, it is difficult for them to 
maintain good health status (Ziliak et al., 2008) and more likely for them to report 
fair/poor health status (Lee and Frongillo, 2001). The insignificant effect of FSP 
participation contradicts our hypothesis that FSP participation should improve food 
insufficiency and thus promote better health.  
We find that participating in FSP has no significant effect on health status. The 
same result is found in a study of Greenhalgh-Stanley and Fitzpatrick (2013). There 
are two theoretical possibilities for this result. First, many critics of the FSP have 
accused it of encouraging participants to buy more food, particularly unhealthy foods, 
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which are relatively cheaper and contribute to weight gain. If true, then the participant 
would fail to achieve significant health improvement due to the negative health effect 
from obesity. Two studies found positive effect of FSP on obesity (Baum, 2011 and 
Meyerhoefer and Pylypchuk, 2008); however, Baum (2011) notes that the effects are 
relatively small. Without more information about the food preference of the FSP 
eligible household and the amount of food items purchased, Gundersen (2013) 
suggests that it is not clear whether the increased income due to the FSP will increase 
obesity. However, our empirical findings in the first step contradict this possibility 
because we found no association between FSP participation and obesity (see Table 
3.4). Similar results are found in the majority of studies (Baum, 2012; Leung et al., 
2011; Fan, 2010).  
The second possibility is the additional money from the FSP neither increases 
obesity nor is sufficient for elderly households to purchase enough food to improve 
health condition. Several studies show elderly FSP participants have no better nutrient 
intake than non-eligible or eligible nonparticipating counterparts (Leung et al., 2011; 
Fey-Yensan, 2003; Weimer, 1998), or even found them spending less on food and 
consuming fewer proteins (Wu 2009) and nutrients (Butler 1996). This might result 
from high food prices particularly for healthy items such as fruits and vegetables. As a 
result, they face a “heat or eat dilemma” in which their food budget is sacrificed to 
keep the house warm and lights on (Thayer et al., 2008). Thayer et al., 2008 found that 
food stamp benefits are insufficient to improve food insufficiency; for example, even 
households receiving the maximum food stamp benefit would have to spend an 
additional $2,520 in Boston and $3,165 in Philadelphia annually to purchase the 
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TFP14. The average food stamp benefit is about $750 per year and this amount would 
lead to an increase of $180 in their annual food expenditure (Wu, 2009).  The average 
FSP benefit for an elderly household was $128 per month, which is a lower benefit 
than many other types of FSP households due to smaller household size (Leftin, 
2010). Wu (2009) suggests that with this level of benefits, FSP benefits may be too 
low to reduce the incidence of food insufficiency.  To investigate whether the level of 
food stamp benefits could affect the health status of the elderly, the weekly household 
expenditures from food stamps is used in the model as opposed to binary program 
participation. The positive correlation is found between health status and weekly 
household expenditures from food stamps (0.0437). This indicates that increasing food 
stamp expenditures is related to improving health status of low-income elderly. The 
weekly household expenditures from the food stamps equation are estimated 
simultaneously with food insufficiency equations in the first step. Due to zero 
expenditure for all non-participants, the food stamp expenditure dependent variable is 
zero-truncated.  Thus, simultaneous tobit-probit equations are estimated. In the second 
step, the ordered probit health status equation is estimated with predicted values of 
food stamp expenditures and food insufficiency from the first step estimation. The key 
results are presented in Table 3.7. 
 
 
 
                                               
14 The US Department of Agriculture’s Thrifty Food Plan (TFP) is the national standard for a “nutritious diet at a 
minimal cost.” This cost- specific food plan for a family of four determines maximum food stamp benefits and was 
the basis for developing poverty thresholds in the US. 
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Table 3.7: The self-reported health status estimation results using a weekly 
household food stamp expenditures  
Step 1 : Simultaneous tobit-probit estimations 
Food insufficiency Coefficient  Uncorrected Std. Error  
Weekly household FS expenditures 
+ Other covariates 
-0.001  0.008    
Weekly household FS expenditures Coefficient  Uncorrected Std. Error  
Food insufficiency 
+ Other covariates 
-0.456  16.508    
Step 2 : Ordered probit estimation       
Health status Coefficient  
M&T 
 Std. Error 
 Marginal 
Effect 
 
Food insufficiency -1.449 *** 0.608  -0.087  
Weekly household FS expenditures 
+ Other covariates 
0.017 *** 0.006  0.001  
 
1  The superscripts *, ** and *** represent significant coefficients at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively  
2 The full estimation results is available from the authors. 
 Source:  2002 Health and Retirement Survey 
 
In the top panel of Table 3.7, weekly household food stamp expenditures have 
a negative effect on food insufficiency and vice versa. However, both simultaneous 
equations are not statistically significant.  Weekly household food stamp expenditures 
have a positive and significant effect on the health status. A $1 increase in food stamp 
expenditures increases the probability of health improvement among low-income 
elderly by 0.001. The results reveal the importance of the level of food stamp 
expenditures in the household that could potentially affects the health of low-income 
elderly. Given the evidences of lower FSP benefits from many studies, participating 
stigma and application burden, the FSP eligible elderly are still rational to participate 
the program. Theoretically, individuals participate in the FSP if the marginal utility of 
net benefit from FSP is greater than the disutility of stigma, that is, λ (BFS − CFS) > S. 
As we know that marginal utility of income in low-income elderly households is 
relatively high (λ ≫ 0). Stigma (S) has been shown to be one of the primary concerns 
of participation, accounting for 67 percent of eligible elderly (U.S. GAO, 2000 pp.26). 
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However, the majority of the FSP eligible elderly receive welfare from more than one 
program and those are presumably less stigmatized by participation. About 80 percent 
of the FSP eligible elderly in our HRS sample participated in Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) program. Responses to PSID survey questions of nonparticipation 
reason suggest a significant portion of information barrier rather than stigma (Wu, 
2009). With a large marginal utility of income and a relatively small stigma level, the 
low net benefits of the FSP are still positive; however, the level of net benefits, in fact, 
does not uniformly suffice for all eligible elderly to reach the significant level of food 
that improves health. Therefore, it follows that the insignificant effect of FSP 
participation on health improvement is due to the positive, but insufficient FSP net 
benefit amount. 
We also observed levels of significance declining in other variables after 
correcting standard errors. The variables that maintain significance are: income (+), 
widowed (-), economically active (+), female (+), Non-Hispanic black (+), exercise 
(+) and obese (-). The sign of the non-Hispanic black coefficient is counterintuitive, 
indicating that being non-Hispanic black households are more likely to have better 
health outcome than the white counterparts. In general, non-Hispanic blacks on 
average have lower health than whites in the population. It is worth noting that our 
sample consists only eligible households, which may be the reason we get the counter-
intuitive sign for non-Hispanic blacks. 
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We present the marginal effects on all five categories of health status in Table 
3.8. The marginal effects on poor and very good health categories have the highest 
magnitudes.   
  
 We consider only the statistically significant variables. Individuals who are 
food insufficient have a higher probability to report poor health status up to 96 
percent, and lower probability to report very good health by 53.5 percent compared to 
food sufficient counterparts. Our findings suggest that food insufficiency has a 
tremendous negative effect on elderly health. Obese individuals have higher 
probability to report poor health by 8.2 percent and lower probability to report very 
good health by 4.6 percent compared to non-obese counterparts. Widows are more 
likely to report poor health by 5.4 percent and less likely to report very good health by 
3 percent compared to married counterparts. Females are less likely to report poor 
health by 13.2 percent and more likely to report very good health by 7.3 percent 
Table 3.8 :  Marginal Effects2 of Selected Variables on Self-Reported Health Status  
Independent Variable 1 Poor 
Health 
Fair 
Health 
Good 
Health 
Very Good 
Health 
Excellent 
Health 
Probability of participation 0.425 0.129 -0.196 -0.236 -0.122 
Probability of food insufficiency* 0.967 0.294 -0.448 -0.535 -0.278 
Income (in thousands)* -0.117 -0.035 0.054 0.065 0.034 
Widowed* 0.082 0.025 -0.038 -0.046 -0.024 
Economically active* -0.073 -0.022 0.034 0.041 0.021 
Female* -0.132 -0.040 0.061 0.073 0.038 
Nonhispanic black* -0.099 -0.030 0.046 0.055 0.029 
Exercise* -0.111 -0.033 0.052 0.061 0.032 
Obese* 0.054 0.016 -0.025 -0.030 -0.015 
*Significant coefficients in the health status equation based upon corrected covariances from Table 3.6.  
1The independent variables listed either have significant Ordered Probit coefficients or are members of 
categories of variables where at least one variable is significant in the health equation.  
2 The full listing of marginal effects is available from the authors 
Source:  2002 Health and Retirement Survey 
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compared to male counterparts. Having vigorous exercise prevents worsen health 
status among elderly, that is, it decreases the likelihood of reporting poor health (-11 
percent) and increases the likelihood of reporting very good health (7.3 percent). Each 
additional thousand dollars increase in annual elderly household income helps 
improve elderly health because individuals with those additional income are less likely 
to report poor health up to 11.7 percent and more likely to report very good health by 
6.5 percent. Last, individuals who are still working at this age have lower probability 
to report poor health by 7.3 percent and higher probability to report very good health 
by 4.1 percent, compared to homemaker counterparts.  
 
3.6 Summary, Conclusions and Implications for Future Research 
The main purpose of this research was to investigate how health status is 
affected by FSP participation, food insufficiency, and other determinants. Our 
investigation sought to explain three important policy questions: (1) why so few needy 
elderly households choose to receive food stamps; (2) what determines their level of 
food insufficiency, and finally; (3) how FSP participation and food insufficiency are 
linked to each other and then to health status? The analysis was based on health 
information in the 2002 Health and Retirement Survey and state-specific FSP criteria.   
 In addition to the unique data used in the study, there are two main 
contributions of the econometric model used in the analysis.  Our first step 
simultaneous multivariate Probit estimates of FSP participation and food insufficiency 
of the needy elderly qualitatively replicate Gundersen and Oliviera’s (2001) earlier 
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research based on SIPP15 data for the entire population.  That is, when the endogeneity 
of FSP participation and food insufficiency is accounted for, the significant positive 
effect of food insufficiency on FSP participation becomes statistically insignificant, as 
does the troubling significant positive effect of FSP participation on food 
insufficiency, which becomes negative, but insignificant.    
 The major econometric contribution is the correction of all health equation 
coefficient standard errors using Murphy and Topel’s (1985) technique.  This 
technique is necessary because of the use of two predicted values, the probabilities of 
FSP participation and food insufficiency, as explanatory variables in the health status 
equation.  Use of the correct standard errors is important since, without the correction, 
FSP participation is found to worsen health status, which is clearly an undesirable 
policy outcome.  When the corrected standard error is applied, however, FSP 
participation is found to not have a statistically significant impact on health status.  
Our theoretical framework explains one possibility for the insignificant effect of FSP 
participation on health status. The FSP net benefits, though increasing food purchasing 
power, are inadequate to help elderly to achieve the minimum threshold of food that 
could significantly improve health status. Even with the correction, as the probability 
of being food insufficient increases, health status worsens and significantly so.  
 In terms of future research there are two areas that merit further attention.  Step 
One of this research can trace its heritage back to one of Wilde’s (2007) approaches 
that FSP participation and food insecurity are jointly estimated.  The link is even 
stronger given the nature of our results, that is most (not all) of the prior research using 
                                               
15 Survey of Income and Program Participation 
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this approach finds no effect of the FSP participation on food insecurity.  A major 
reason for this finding could be because all these studies rely upon cross-section data. 
The dynamic model of FSP participation and food insecurity could better explain 
short-term and long-term impact of those two variables on health status; however, 
truly understanding could require longitudinal panel data. One other avenue for 
investigation is to exploit the fact that the surveys that measure food insecurity also 
measure food spending in detail.  Explaining that spending in relation to the thrifty 
food plan16 spending amount and the food security levels obtained may also yield new 
insults of use to policy makers. 
                                               
16 The Thrifty Food Plan (TFP) is one of four USDA-designed food plans specifying foods and amounts of foods to 
provide adequate nutrition. It is used as the basis for designing Food Stamp Program benefits. It is the cheapest 
food plan and is calculated monthly using data collected for the consumer price index (CPI). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Food Stamp Program Eligibility Determination 
 
 To determine which households are eligible for food stamps and, hence, 
included in our estimation sample, we rely upon the regulations as reported in the 
Characteristics of Food Stamp Households:  Fiscal Year 2002 (USDA, 2003).  We 
employ data from the HRS survey to establish categorical eligibility criteria as well as 
to conduct net income and countable assets eligibility tests.  
 
Categorical Eligibility 
Regulations establish that some households are categorically eligible for the FSP 
without income or asset considerations. Accordingly, we classify a household as 
eligible if all of its members receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or if the 
household receives welfare income (e.g., cash or in-kind Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF) benefits.  
 
Net Income Test 
Elderly households are exempt from the gross income test. Therefore, the only 
applicable income eligibility criterion is the net income test.  We determined net 
income by subtracting deductions permitted under the FSP from monthly gross 
income. We employed the deductions allowed in year 2002.  The following deductions 
from household’s gross monthly income were used to arrive at net monthly income: 
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•  Standard Deduction - Households receive a standard deduction based on location 
and household size. For example, a household with one to four members received a 
deduction of $134 in the contiguous United States in fiscal year 2002. The standard 
deduction for outlying states and territories varies to reflect price differences 
between these areas and the contiguous United States (Table B.1). 
•  Earned Income Deduction - Households received a deduction equal to 20 percent of 
the combined earnings of household members. 
•  Dependent-Care Deduction - Households with dependents receive a deduction for 
expenses involved in caring for dependents while other household members work, 
search for a job, or attend school.  The HRS compiles information about home-care 
expenses in the household. Consequently, we deduct $175 per month per dependent, 
assuming that the dependent is older than two years old. 
•  Medical Deduction - Household with elderly members can employ a medical 
deduction.  To calculate this deduction, we employ the monthly out-of-pocket 
medical expenses minus medical expenses covered by government insurance 
programs minus $35. The deduction is zero if the resulting number is less or equal 
than zero. 
•  Child Support Payment Deduction - This deduction is not taken into account in our 
analysis. We assume that elderly households do not pay for child support. 
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•  Excess Shelter Expense Deduction - We create a housing expense variable that 
includes rent, mortgage payments, utility bills and property taxes.  According to the 
regulations, households with elderly members can subtract the full value of shelter 
costs that exceed 50 percent of their adjusted income (i.e. after all other deductions 
have been made). 
 
Table B.1: Value of Standard, Maximum Dependent-Care, and Excess Shelter 
Expense Deductions in the Continental United States and Outlying Areas in Fiscal 
Year 2002 
Area Standarda Maximum Dependent-Careb,c Excess Shelter 
Continental United States… $134 $200/$175 $354 
Alaska ……………………. 229 200/175 566 
Hawaii …………................ 189 200/175 477 
Guam …………………….. 269 200/175 416 
Virgin Islands ……………. 118 200/175 279 
a Prior to fiscal year 1997, the standard deduction was adjusted each October to reflect changes in the CPI-U for 
nonfood items. Since fiscal year 1997, the standard deduction has been frozen at fiscal year 1996 levels. 
b The household limit on the dependent-care deduction is equal to the maximum dependent-care deduction 
multiplied by the number of dependents in the household. 
c The higher dependent-care deduction pertains to dependents under age 2; the lower deduction is for  
  dependents age 2 or more. 
Source:  U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Source:  Characteristics of Food Stamp Households, Fiscal Year 2002, Appendix C, Table C-4, page 82. 
 
After calculating the net monthly income, we sort households into two 
categories, those whose net income is at or below the poverty line and above it.  The 
poverty line varies by state and household size (Table B.2). To be eligible for the FSP, 
a household must have a net monthly income at or below 100 percent of the poverty 
guideline. 
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Assets Test 
The second critical test is based on the value of countable assets. This test is applied if 
the household first passed the net income test.  If so, an elderly household in our 
sample is eligible for FSP if its countable assets were less than $3,000 in 2002.  Cash, 
liquid assets and vehicles are examples of countable assets. We summed the values of 
the following countable assets from the HRS survey:  IRA accounts, value of stocks, 
value of bonds, checking and saving accounts, Treasury bills and government bonds. 
 
Table B.2: HHS Poverty Income Guidelines for Fiscal Year 2002 FSP a 
 
 
Household Size 
  Continental 
  United States,    
  Guam, and the 
  Virgin Islands 
Alaska Hawai 
1 $8,590 $10,730 $9,890 
2 11,610 14,510 13.360 
3 14,630 18,290 16,830 
4 17,650 22,070 20,300 
5 20,670 25,850 23,770 
6 23,690 29,630 27,240 
7 26,710 33,410 30,710 
8 29,730 37,190 34,180 
Each Additional Member +3,020 +3,780 +3,470 
a These numbers, which were used as poverty guidelines for the FSP in fiscal year 2002, were issued by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and published in the February 2001 Federal Register.  
  The Bureau of the Census establishes different poverty thresholds, which are used primarily for statistical 
purposes. 
  Source: 66 Federal Register 33, February 16, 2001. 
 
The missing piece in the HRS data is the value of each vehicle.  Only the total 
value of vehicles owned by household members is collected in the HRS.  Another 
complication is vehicle asset regulations vary across states. For example, by August 
2003, twenty one states had adopted policies that excluded the value of all vehicles 
from the asset test. Other states adopted policies that excluded the value of one vehicle 
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per adult or per household or increased the allowable value of one or more vehicles. 
Only seven states were still using the federal FSP rules. 
Our strategy to for implementing the vehicle variable was first to identify those 
cases in which it is possible to determine whether or not the household is eligible for 
FSP without knowing the specific vehicle information. In particular, we know that the 
household is eligible/ineligible in the following cases: 
 When the HRS reported value for vehicles in the household is less than 
$4,650 (this is the standard deduction for vehicle for each household) – 
asset eligible. 
 When the state exempts all vehicles from countable assets – asset eligible. 
 When countable assets without the vehicle values are greater than $3,000 – 
asset ineligible. 
 When the value of countable assets (including the value of vehicles) 
reported in HRS is less than $3000 – asset eligible. 
 When a household is categorically eligible because all members receive 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or the household receives cash or in-
kind Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) benefits – assets 
irrelevant. 
 When the household is ineligible based on the net income test – assets 
irrelevant. 
 When household received food stamps in 2002 – eligible. 
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Final Eligibility Determination 
 
To determine eligibility, the household has to pass both the net income and the 
countable assets tests. Based on this information we are able to sort out 97.1 percent of 
the households. The remaining 2.9 percent are excluded from the estimating sample.  
Thus, our estimation sample includes only elderly households in the HRS deemed to 
be eligible for food stamps.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
Ancillary Statistics and Estimates 
 
 
Table C.1: Reduced Form Probit Estimates of Food Stamp 
Participation and Food Insufficiency 
Variables FSP Participation1  
             (st. error) 
Food Insufficiency1 
                (st. error) 
     
Constant -1.228 
(0.204) 
*** -0.901 
(0.224) 
*** 
     
Skipped Medicinc -0.153 
(0.223)  
0.680 
(0.217) 
*** 
     
Receive SSI 0.317 
(0.132) 
** -0.093 
(0.148)  
     
Income 0.164 
(0.186)  
0.098 
(0.206)  
     
Age 70-79 0.146 
(0.103) 
 -0.228 
(0.096) 
** 
     
Age 80-89 -0.004 
(0.119)  
-0.277 
(0.228) 
** 
     
Age 90 + -0.233 
(0.214)  
-0.495 
(0.250) 
** 
     
Divorced 0.280 
(0.117) 
** -0.044 
(0.125)  
     
Widowed -0.146 
(0.103)  
-0.372 
(0.119) 
*** 
     
Disabled 0.292 
(0.096) 
*** 0.222 
(0.109) 
** 
     
Economically active 0.063 
(0.169)  
-0.284 
(0.199)  
     
Retired -0.118 
(0.093)  
0.006 
(0.108)  
     
Rural 0.372 
(0.101) 
*** -0.124 
(0.109)  
     
Suburban 0.060 
(0.103)  
-0.057 
(0.106)  
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Table C.1 (cont’d) 
        Reduced  Form                        Probit Estimates 
Variables FSP Participation1 Food Insufficiency1 
 (st. error) (st. error) 
     
Female 0.300 
(0.099) 
*** 0.416 
(0.109) 
**
* 
     
Household size 0.068 
(0.033) 
** -0.030 
(0.036)  
     
Highschool -0.094 
(0.082)  
-0.009 
(0.102)  
     
Hispanic 0.290 ** -0.147  
 (0.119)  0.125  
     
Nonhispanic black 0.171 
(0.103) 
* 0.227 
(0.097) 
** 
     
Nonhispanic other 0.028 
(0.213)  
0.208 
(0.280)  
     
Midwest 0.066 
(0.116)  
-0.001 
(0.119)  
     
South -0.126 
(0.100)  
0.053 
(0.120)  
     
West -0.480 
(0.136) 
*** 0.083 
(0.122)  
     
Own home -0.255 
(0.088) 
*** -0.085 
(0.094)  
     
Own vehicle -0.063 
(0.084)  
-0.039 
(0.101)  
     
IADLA -0.038 
(0.059)  
0.171 
(0.057) 
**
* 
     
LOG LIKELIHOOD -770.691  -569.920  
     
Note:  ***, **, * = significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent level, respectively. 
Source:  2002 Health and Retirement Survey 
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Table C.2: Frequency and Percent of Food Stamp (FS) Participation 
Food Insufficiency (FI) and Health Status 
Frequency of FS and FI by Health Status 
Health Status FS  
Only 
FI 
Only 
Both Neither Row  
Total 
      
Excellent  9 9 0  35   53 
Very Good 29 13 5 131 178 
Good 80 24 19 225 348 
Fair 135 44 38 251 468 
Poor 70 35 41 164 310 
 
Column Total 
 
323 
 
125 
 
103 
 
806 
 
1357 
      
FS and FI as a Percent of Health Status 
 
Health Status FS  
Only 
FI 
Only 
Both Neither Row  
Total 
      
Excellent 17 17  0 66 100 
Very Good 16  7  3 74 100 
Good 23  7  5 65 100 
Fair 29  9  8 54 100 
Poor 23 11 13 53 100 
      
Column Total - - - - - 
 
Health Status as a Percent of FS and FI 
 
Health Status FS 
Only 
FI 
Only 
Both Neither Row  
Total 
      
Excellent   3   7   0   4 - 
Very Good   9 10   5 16 - 
Good 25 19 18 28 - 
Fair 42 35 37 31 - 
Poor 22 28 40 20 - 
      
Column Total17 101 99 100 99 - 
Source:  2002 Health and Retirement Survey 
 
 
 
  
                                               
17 Columns do not sum to 100 percent due to rounding. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Part I 
Questions for Defining Food Insufficiency  
 
There are two linked questions in the HRS that relate to food sufficiency. 
 
1. In question HQ415 the household financial respondent is asked: Since the previous 
interview, have you always had enough money to buy the food you need? 
 
2. Question HQ416 is only asked if the response to the previous question is 
inapplicable or not yes.  That is, the response to question HQ415 was, “no,” “don’t 
know,” or “refused.”   If so, respondent is asked:  At any time since the previous 
interview have you skipped meals or eaten less than you felt you should because 
there was not enough food in the house?  A “yes” response to this question means 
that the household is food insufficient.   
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APPENDIX D 
 Part II 
Food Security 
 
Questions used to assess the Food Security of Households in the CPS Food Security 
Survey 
 
1. “We worried whether our food would run out before we got money to buy more.” 
 Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months? 
 
2. “The food that we bought just didn’t last and we didn’t have money to get more.”  
 Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months? 
 
3. “We couldn’t afford to eat balanced meals.”   Was that often, sometimes, or never 
true for you in the last 12 months? 
 
4. In the last 12 months, did you or other adults in the household ever cut the size of 
your meals or skip meals because there wasn’t enough money for food?  (Yes/No) 
 
5. (If yes to question 4), How often did this happen – almost every month, some 
months but not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months? 
 
6. In the last 12 months, did you ever eat less than you felt you should because there 
wasn’t enough money for food?  (Yes/No) 
 
7. In the last 12 months, were you ever hungry, but didn’t eat, because there wasn’t 
enough money for food?  (Yes/No) 
 
8. In the last 12 months, did you lose weight because there wasn’t enough money for 
food?  (Yes/No) 
 
9. In the last 12 months did you or other adults in your household ever not eat for a 
whole day because there wasn’t enough money for food?  (Yes/No) 
 
10. (If yes to question 9), How often did this happen -- almost every month, some 
months but not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months? 
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(Questions 11-18 were asked only if the household included children age 0-18) 
 
11. “We relied on only a few kinds of low-cost food to feed our children because we 
were running out of money to buy food.”  Was that often, sometimes, or never true 
for you in the last 12 months? 
 
12. “We couldn’t feed our children a balanced meal, because we couldn’t afford that.”  
Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months? 
 
13. “The children were not eating enough because we just couldn’t afford enough 
food.”  Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months? 
 
14. In the last 12 months, did you ever cut the size of any of the children’s meals 
because there wasn’t enough money for food?  (Yes/No) 
 
15. In the last 12 months, were the children ever hungry but you just couldn’t afford 
more food?  (Yes/No) 
 
16. In the last 12 months, did any of the children ever skip a meal because there 
wasn’t enough money for food?  (Yes/No) 
 
17. (If yes to question 16), How often did this happen -- almost every month, some 
months but not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months? 
 
18. In the last 12 months did any of the children ever not eat for a whole day because 
there wasn’t enough money for food?  (Yes/No) 
 
 
Source: Nord M, Andrews M, Carlson S. 2009.  Household Food Security in the United States, 2008. Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economics Research Service, Report NO. ERR-83.  58 pp. November.  Page 
3. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Part I 
Covariance Matrix Correction in Simultaneous Probit Equations 
I. Likelihood Functions 
 The likelihood functions are taken from the general expression in Mallar 
(1997). The log likelihood Probit function for the structural FSP participation equation 
is  
𝑙𝑛ℒ𝐹𝑆∗∗ = ∑ [𝐹𝑆𝑖 ln(𝑄𝐹𝑆,𝑖) + (1 −
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐹𝑆𝑖)(1 − 𝑄𝐹𝑆,𝑖)] , 
where  𝑄𝐹𝑆,𝑖 = ∫ (2𝜋)
−1/2𝑒−𝑡
2/2𝑑𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝑆,𝑖
−∞
 and  𝐼𝐹𝑆,𝑖 = 𝛼0,𝐹𝐼𝑭?̂?
∗ +𝑿𝑭𝑰
′ 𝜶𝑭𝑰. 
The log likelihood Probit function for the structural obesity equation is  
𝑙𝑛ℒ𝐹𝐼∗∗ = ∑ [𝐹𝐼𝑖 ln(𝑄𝐹𝐼,𝑖) + (1 −
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐹𝐼𝑖)(1 − 𝑄𝐹𝐼,𝑖)] , 
where  𝑄𝐹𝐼,𝑖 = ∫ (2𝜋)
−1/2𝑒−𝑡
2/2𝑑𝑡
𝐼𝐹𝐼,𝑖
−∞
 and  𝐼𝐹𝐼,𝑖 = 𝛼0,𝐹𝑆𝑭?̂?
∗ + 𝑿𝑭𝑺
′ 𝜶𝑭𝑺. 
 
II. Covariance Matrices 
Based on Maddala (1983, pp243-247), we follow the steps as following:  
Step 1: The reduced forms in (1) and (2) are estimated by Maximum Likelihood Probit 
Estimation, and get a predicted value of 𝐹𝑆∗ and 𝐹𝐼∗ denoted as 𝐹𝑆 ∗̂ and 𝐹𝐼∗̂ 
respectively.  
(1)   𝑭𝑺∗ = 𝚷𝑭𝑺
∗  𝑿 + 𝝊𝑭𝑺
∗   , 𝚷𝑭𝑺
∗ =
𝚷𝑭𝑺
𝝈𝑭𝑺
  and 𝝊𝑭𝑺
∗ =
𝝂𝑭𝑺
𝝈𝑭𝑺
   
 (2)     𝑭𝑰∗ = 𝚷𝑭𝑰
∗ 𝑿+ 𝝊𝑭𝑰
∗   , 𝚷𝑭𝑰
∗ =
𝚷𝑭𝑰
𝝈𝑭𝑰
  and 𝝊𝑭𝑰
∗ =
𝝂𝑭𝑰
𝝈𝑭𝑰
  ,   
where 𝐹𝑆∗ and 𝐹𝐼∗ are observed only a latent variable (zero and one). Thus, we can 
only estimate 𝚷𝑭𝑺
∗  and 𝚷𝑭𝑰
∗  , not 𝚷𝑭𝑺and 𝚷𝑭𝑰 
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Step 2: Substitute 𝑭?̂?∗ and  𝑭?̂?∗ into the structural forms in equation (3) and (4) 
respectively, and estimate both equations by Maximum Likelihood Probit Estimation.   
(3)         𝑭𝑺∗∗ = 𝛼0,𝐹𝑆𝑭?̂?
∗ +𝑿𝑭𝑺
′ 𝜶𝑭𝑺 + 𝝐𝑭𝑺     
(4)     𝑭𝑰∗∗ = 𝛼0,𝐹𝐼𝑭?̂?
∗ +𝑿𝑭𝑰
′ 𝜶𝑭𝑰 + 𝝐𝑭𝑰,     
where 𝛼0,𝐹𝑆= 𝛾𝐹𝑆
𝜎𝐹𝐼
𝜎𝐹𝑆
   , 𝛼0,𝐹𝐼 =  𝛾𝐹𝐼
𝜎𝐹𝑆
𝜎𝐹𝐼
 , 𝜶𝑭𝑺 =
𝜷𝑭𝑺
𝝈𝑭𝑺
 , 𝜶𝑭𝑰 =
𝜷𝑭𝑰
𝝈𝑭𝑰
 , 𝝐𝑭𝑺 =
𝜺𝑭𝑺
𝝈𝑭𝑺
 , 𝝐𝑭𝑰 =
𝜺𝑭𝑰
𝝈𝑭𝑰
 
 
Step 3: Although equation (3) and (4) will give us an unbiased estimator, the 
covariance matrix is not correct.  Let 𝑎𝐹𝑆 =
𝜙𝐹𝑆
Φ𝐹𝑆(1−Φ𝐹𝑆)
 and  𝑎𝐹𝐼 =
𝜙𝐹𝐼
Φ𝐹𝐼(1−Φ𝐹𝐼)
, where  
𝜙 is a standard normal probability density (PDF) and  Φ is a cumulative standard 
normal distribution (CDF) estimated of fitted values from reduced form equation (1) 
and (2),  𝐴𝐹𝑆 = 𝜙𝐹𝑆 ∗ 𝑎𝐹𝑆  , 𝐴𝐹𝐼 = 𝜙𝐹𝐼 ∗ 𝑎𝐹𝐼 , 𝒁𝐹𝑆 = [
Π𝐹𝐼
∗ 𝑿
𝑿𝑭𝑺
] and 𝒁𝐹𝐼 = [
Π𝐹𝑆
∗ 𝑿
𝑿𝑭𝑰
].  The 
variance-covariance matrix for the 𝑭𝑺∗∗ equation is defined as  
  𝑊1
−1[𝑊1 −𝑊3𝑊2
−1𝑊4 −𝑊4
′𝑊2
−1𝑊3
′ +𝑊3𝑊2
−1𝑊3
′]𝑊1
−1 , where  
𝑊1 =
1
𝑁
∑𝐴𝐹𝑆𝒁𝐹𝑆𝒁𝐹𝑆
′
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝑊2 =
1
𝑁
∑𝐴𝐹𝐼𝑿𝐹𝑆𝑿𝐹𝑆
′
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝑊3 =
1
𝑁
∑𝐴𝐹𝑆
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝛼0,𝐹𝑆𝒁𝐹𝑆𝑿𝐹𝑆
′  
𝑊4 =
1
𝑁
∑𝑎𝐹𝑆𝑎𝐹𝐼
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝐸((𝐹𝑆 −Φ𝐹𝑆)(𝐹𝐼 − Φ𝐹𝐼)) 𝑿𝐹𝑆𝒁𝐹𝑆
′  
 
 
 
 
 
The variance-covariance matrix for the 𝑭𝑰∗∗ equation is defined as 
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 𝑊1
−1[𝑊1 −𝑊3𝑊2
−1𝑊4 −𝑊4
′𝑊2
−1𝑊3
′ +𝑊3𝑊2
−1𝑊3
′]𝑊1
−1,  where  
𝑊1 =
1
𝑁
∑𝐴𝐹𝐼𝒁𝐹𝐼𝒁𝐹𝐼
′
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝑊2 =
1
𝑁
∑𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑿𝐹𝐼
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑿𝑭𝑰
′  
𝑊3 =
1
𝑁
∑𝐴𝐹𝐼
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝛼0,𝐹𝐼𝒁𝐹𝐼𝑿𝐹𝐼
′  
𝑊4 =
1
𝑁
∑𝑎𝐹𝑆𝑎𝐹𝐼
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝐸((𝐹𝑆 −Φ𝐹𝑆)(𝐹𝐼 − Φ𝐹𝐼)) 𝑿𝐹𝐼𝒁𝐹𝐼
′  
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APPENDIX E 
 
Part II 
Murphy and Topel’s Standard Error Correction 
 From Green (2003, pp. 510), the Murphy and Topel (1985) correction of the 
asymptotic covariance matrix at the second step is given by  
𝑉2 = 𝑉2̂ + 𝑉2̂(?̂?𝑉1̂?̂?
′ − ?̂?𝑉1̂?̂?
′ − ?̂?𝑉1̂?̂?
′)𝑉2̂, 
where  𝑉2̂(𝑝𝑥𝑝) is the asymptotic variance matrix of the second stage, 𝑉1̂(𝑞𝑥𝑞) is the 
asymptotic variance matrix of the first stage, ?̂? and ?̂? matrices are based on the first 
derivative of the second- and first- stage log likelihood function with respect to the 
first- and second-stage parameter vectors 𝜃1 and 𝜃2. The 𝜃1 is an estimated parameter 
vector by maximum likelihood in the first stage. The 𝜃2 is an estimated parameter 
vector by maximum likelihood in the second stage, with 𝜃1 inserted in place of 𝜃1. 
The two-stage estimation consists of the two marginal distributions, 𝑓1(𝑦1|𝒙1, 𝜃1) and 
𝑓2(𝑦2|𝒙2, 𝜃2, (𝒙1, 𝜃1)). Although 𝜃1 and 𝜃2 could be estimated jointly by Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML), fitting the models by using a two-step 
estimation procedure by Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) is less 
complicated and fairly straightforward (Green, 2003). The ?̂? and ?̂? matrices are 
presented as :  
?̂?(𝑝𝑥𝑞) = {∑(
𝜕 ln 𝑓𝑖2
𝜕𝜃2
)(
𝜕 ln 𝑓𝑖2
𝜕𝜃′̂1
)
𝑁
𝑖=1
} 
?̂?(𝑝𝑥𝑞) = {∑(
𝜕 ln 𝑓𝑖2
𝜕𝜃2
)(
𝜕 ln 𝑓𝑖1
𝜕𝜃′̂1
)
𝑁
𝑖=1
}, 
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where 𝑓𝑖2 and 𝑓𝑖1 are observation 𝑖’s contribution to the likelihood function of second-
stage model and first-stage model, respectively. In our case, the second-stage model 
includes two predicted variables from the first-stage models. Because the first-stage 
model includes two simultaneous equations – FSP participation and food insufficiency 
equations, the two first-stage equations are independent from each other after taken 
account of simultaneity and corrected standard errors using Maddala’s method (1983). 
If there are two generated variables and both are independent, the matrix ?̂?= 
[𝐶𝐹𝑆 𝐶𝐹𝐼], matrix ?̂? = [𝑅𝐹𝑆 𝑅𝐹𝐼] and 𝑉1̂ = [
?̂?𝐹𝑆 0
0 ?̂?𝐹𝐼
] where 𝐶𝐹𝑆 and ?̂?𝐹𝐼  belong to 
FSP participation equation, 𝐶𝐹𝑆 and ?̂?𝐹𝐼  belong to food insufficiency equation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT AND OBESITY:  
EVIDENCE FROM NLSY 97 SURVEY DATA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Unemployment and obesity are two significant problems afflicting millions of 
people in the United States today. The prevalence of adult obesity has nearly tripled 
since the 1960s, increasing from 13% in 1960-1962 to 36% in 2009-2010 (Flegal et 
al., 1998, 2012). It is well-documented that although obesity is high among the overall 
population, substantial disparities exist among racial/ethnic minorities and vary on the 
basis of socioeconomic status. For instance, unemployed individuals, who have lower 
incomes, are more likely to consume cheaper and more fattening food (Cawley, 2004). 
During the economic recession from 2007-2009, the unemployment rate hit its highest 
level since 1983. Average U.S. household annual income fell from $55,627 to $51,017 
between 2007 and 2012. The increase in unemployment and reduction in incomes that 
occurred over this period resulted in many households choosing less expensive food 
budgets, which resulted in poorer nutrition and diet quality (Todd, 2014). While the 
association between unemployment and obesity has been extensively studied, the 
results of these studies are mixed in terms of the magnitude and the sign of the 
correlation. Some researchers have found a positive correlation between the 
unemployment rate and obesity or body weight status (Charles and DeCicca, 2008; 
Janssen et al., 2006; Bockerman et al., 2006). This finding may be due to unemployed 
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people overeating as a way to comfort themselves (Zhang, 2014). Economic stress 
often results in eating cheaper, less healthful food, and stress alone can lead to 
overeating or other negative eating habits (Stoddard et al., 2009). People who are 
unemployed spend relatively more time on eating because they have more time to do 
so and frequently they turn to food to find a sense of fulfillment (Stringham et al., 
2004) 
 However, not all studies have found a positive association between obesity 
and unemployment.  For instance, Todd (2014) found that during the economic 
recession from 2009-2010, the overall quality of diet for working-age adults (20-59) 
improved slightly through lower total calories consumed from food away from home, 
as well as its share of daily calories. In addition, Ruhm (2000, 2005) used micro-data 
from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) to examine the 
relationship between economic conditions and health, and found that individuals are 
more likely to be in the healthiest weight ranges during temporary economic 
downturns compared with more prosperous times and that obesity increases when the 
economy strengthens. Other studies suggest that economic upturns create more job 
stress and result in less time for self-care activities such as eating well or exercising 
(Neumayer, 2003; Tapia Granados, 2005; Gerdtham and Ruhm, 2006).  While these 
results offer evidence of a strong relationship between unemployment and obesity, the 
causal direction is not clear.  
The reverse directionality of unemployment and obesity impact has also been 
extensively studied. Morris (2007) investigated the impact of obesity on 
unemployment and the endogeneity of obesity and unemployment using three 
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approaches: a univariate probit model; propensity score matching; and an instrumental 
variable regression with a recursive bivariate probit model. His findings show that 
obesity has a statistically significant and negative effect on employment. According to 
the American Obesity Association, obese persons are frequently stereotyped as 
emotionally impaired, socially handicapped, and as possessing negative personality 
traits, which lead them to be at greater risk of being laid off or experiencing job 
discrimination. Obesity may also reduce work productivity. The empirical evidence 
shows that weight increases the probability of health-related work limitations, and the 
probability of receiving disability-related benefit payments (Burkhauser and Cawley, 
2004). Obesity may also increase the number of sick days or rates of absenteeism, 
which creates higher cost for employers, and more sick days may lead to job 
discrimination (Janssen et al., 2005). A stereotype some employers have is that obese 
individuals are less productive (Everett, 1990), or discrimination arises through 
uncertainty, or lack of knowledge about the productivity of obese workers (Pagan and 
Davila, 1997). There may be prejudice by employers, reflecting their dislike for obese 
workers and the psychological costs incurred when dealing with them (Moon and 
McLean, 1980).  There is some evidence that overweight/obese job applicants face 
weight discrimination based on several experimental studies in the U.S. at every stage 
of employment, from the hiring decision through wage setting and promotion (Puhl 
and Brownel, 2001).  A study by the Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity at Yale 
University in 2008 found that discrimination against overweight people-particularly 
women is as common as racial discrimination. In term of unemployment duration, the 
percentage of time spent being unemployed during working years is significantly 
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higher for each BMI deviation from the median BMI attained at age 20, and the 
probability of re-gaining employment after a period of unemployment is significantly 
lower (Paraponaris et al., 2005). However, other studies (Sargent and Blachflower, 
1994; Harper, 2000) have found an insignificant effect of obesity on employment. 
The relationship between unemployment and obesity during times of economic 
stagnation is not well understood and the research reported here attempts to fill this 
knowledge gap in the literature. Unlike other non-modifiable risk factors contributing 
to social and economics costs and a person’s overall likelihood of well-being, these 
two risk factors are modifiable if the true effects are known. A major challenge, 
however, in measuring the true effect of unemployment and obesity is the 
“confoundedness problem”. Confoundedness is a condition where an extraneous 
variable, also known as a confounding variable, is correlated with both outcomes and 
treatment groups. Hence, the mis-estimation due to the failure to account for 
confounding variables causes a spurious relationship and omitted-variable bias. A 
random assignment can eliminate the problem in experimental studies; however, it is 
not plausible in survey data studies such as the present one.  One example of a 
confounding variable in this case is a mental depression. One in every ten Americans 
deals with mental depression each year, according to the results of a nationwide 
survey by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). About 60-80 percent 
of people who live with mental illness are unemployed (NASMHPD, 2007) and for 
people living with the most severe mental illnesses, unemployment rates can be as 
high as 90 percent (National Governors Association, 2002). Unemployed people were 
four times as likely to live with severe mental illness as their employed counterparts 
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(Mental Health America, 2009). The apparent weight-mental health connection is 
found in several studies. People with major depression are twice as likely to be obese 
as those who do not suffer depression (McElroy, 2009). A positive association 
between mental depression and obesity has been found in most studies (Baumeister 
and Harter, 2007; Richardson et al, 2006; Johnston et al., 2004; Becker et al., 2001). 
Several US survey studies have observed gender differences in this relationship, with 
positive associations between obesity and depression among women, and either 
negative (Carpenter et al., 2000; Palinkas et al., 1996) or no associations among men 
(Istvan et al., 1992). Mental depression may cause obesity though overeating, making 
poor food choices, avoiding exercise, and becoming more sedentary (Hasler et al., 
2005; Richardson et al., 2003; Goodman and Whitaker, 2002). 
To measure the association between unemployment and obesity, we use an 
econometric technique to alleviate simultaneity and confoundedness problems to 
provide an unbiased estimate of the effects. Specifically, a two-equation system of 
unemployment and obesity probit equations is estimated simultaneously in the study. 
The identification issue is addressed and an instrumental variable approach is used. 
The two instrumental variables for unemployment and obesity equations are the 
number of months the individual received unemployment insurance (UI) in the past, 
and the mother’s body mass index (BMI), respectively.  
This research contributes to the literature on obesity and unemployment in 
several ways. First, we investigate not just a one directional relationship, but 
simultaneity between unemployment and obesity in the U.S. using an instrumental 
variable approach. This is useful because it provides a more accurate understanding of 
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how and whether obesity affects unemployment, and unemployment affects obesity at 
the same time. Second, the study uses data during the economic recession in 2010 
when the unemployment rate was at its peak level since 1983. The relationship 
between unemployment and obesity during times of economic stagnation is not well 
understood, and this research attempts to fill this knowledge gap in the literature.  
Third, the paper estimates the effect of unemployment and obesity for both males and 
females. Most previous studies using an instrumental variable approach have been 
limited to only one gender of the sample due to specific attribution of the instrumental 
variable, e.g. using a BMI of child as an instrument for individual’s BMI where a BMI 
of child is only attached with female respondents (Cawley, 2000) or using age at onset 
of first menarche (first menstrual cycle) as an instrument for adult’s BMI (Crouse, 
2014).   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, the econometric 
model is presented, which accounts for the possible simultaneity between 
unemployment and obesity and identification. Second, a detailed description of data 
sources for this study and the descriptive statistics are presented. The major data 
source is the 2010 National Longitudinal of Youth Survey 1997 (NLSY97). Finally, 
results, implications and conclusions are suggested for further research.  
 
4.2 Econometric Modeling 
The econometric model consists of two equations. To remedy econometric 
potential problems of simultaneity and confoundedness between unemployment and 
obesity, the endogenous unemployment and obesity of the individuals are estimated 
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simultaneously using an instrumental variable approach. 
The general model of Maddala (1983, pp. 246-247) is used in the estimation. 
The two-reduced form system consisting of unemployment and obesity equations is 
expressed as follows:  
 
(4.1)   𝐿∗ = 𝝅𝑳𝑿 + 𝑣𝐿  ;         𝐿 = 0 (employed) 𝑖𝑓𝑓  𝐿
∗ ≤ 0  
        = 1 (unemployed) 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐿∗ > 0 
(4.2)                𝐵∗ = 𝝅𝑩𝑿 + 𝑣𝐵 ;        𝐵 = 0 (BMI < 30) 𝑖𝑓𝑓   𝐵
∗ ≤ 0  
                 = 1 ( BMI ≥ 30)  𝑖𝑓𝑓  𝐵∗ > 0 , 
 
where  𝐿∗ is a latent true value of unemployment , 𝐵∗is a latent true value of obesity 
measured as a true Body Mass Index (BMI), 𝑿 is a vector of explanatory variables, 𝝅𝑳 
and 𝝅𝑩  are vectors of corresponding parameter estimates, and 𝑣𝐿 and 𝑣𝐵 are error 
terms. The latent value of unemployment is categorized in binary form taking the 
value one if the individual is unemployed and zero if the individual is employed. The 
BMI is a standard measurement of obesity based on height and weight that applies to 
adult men and women. According to CDC, 35% of the U.S. population of adults (aged 
20 years or over) was categorized as obese or worse in 2011-2012, and since we are 
primarily interested in the upper level of the BMI scale in this study, these six 
categories of BMI18 are re-categorized into two as: (1) 𝐵𝑀𝐼 < 30 (overweight or 
below) and (2) 𝐵𝑀𝐼 ≥ 30 (obese or above).  
                                               
18 BMI is calculated as weight in pounds multiplied by 703 and divided by height in inches squared. The BMI scale 
is generally categorized into six categories: 𝐵𝑀𝐼 < 18.5 (underweight), 18.5 ≤ 𝐵𝑀𝐼 < 25 (normal weight), 25 ≤
𝐵𝑀𝐼 < 30 (overweight), 30 ≤ 𝐵𝑀𝐼 < 35 (obese), 35 ≤ 𝐵𝑀𝐼 < 40 (clinically obese) and 𝐵𝑀𝐼 ≥ 40 (dangerously 
obese). 
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Unfortunately, the latent true BMI in equation (4.2) is not observed due to the 
BMI in NLSY97 dataset being calculated from self-reported weight and height 
information. It has been documented that self-reported weight and height is subject to 
some degree of reporting errors, which may bias coefficient estimates (Cawley, 2004). 
Self-reporting may result in a mis-measurement of actual obesity and will introduce 
endogeneity bias if the measurement error is correlated with the self-reported values. 
 Specifically, respondents are known to declare higher height and lower weight 
than the actual measurement (Robert, 1995; Ziebland et al., 1996) resulting in lower 
BMI. Similar to Cawley (2004), the correction for self-reporting errors in this research 
uses the Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES III), 
which includes both self-reported weight and height and independently measured 
weight and height. According to Lee and Sepanski (1995), if one has validation data, 
which in this case contains measured, and self-reported weight and height (and, 
therefore, BMI), one can regress the measured BMI on its self-reported value, and use 
the estimated coefficient to correct for self-reported bias.  Specifically, the estimated 
OLS coefficient is multiplied by the self-reported BMI to create an estimate of true 
BMI.  Measured BMI is regressed on self-reported BMI and its square (in deviation 
about race-gender group-specific means) in the sub-sample of NHANES III in which 
respondents aged 25-31 years old corresponding to respondents’ age in the sample of 
the NLSY97. The BMI models fit the data very well judging by high 𝑅2. The 
regression results are presented in Table F.1 in the Appendix F. The fitted value of 
BMI, after corrected for self-reporting errors, is used throughout the paper as the latent 
true BMI.  
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The reduced forms in equation (4.1) and (4.2) are independently estimated by a 
probit maximum likelihood estimation, respectively. The predicted index values from 
those two reduced form estimations denoted as ?̂?∗ and ?̂?∗ are used as an explanatory 
variable in the structural equation (4.4) and (4.3), respectively as   
 
(4.3)                        𝐿∗∗ = 𝛼0,𝐿?̂?
∗ + 𝑿𝐿
′𝜶𝐿 + 𝑢𝐿   
(4.4)                    𝐵∗∗ = 𝛼0,𝐵?̂?
∗ + 𝑿𝐵
′ 𝜶𝐵 + 𝑢𝐵 , 
 
where  𝐿∗∗ are the latent true value of unemployment and   𝐵∗∗ are the latent true 
values of obesity in structural equations, 𝑿𝑳𝜖 𝑿, 𝑿𝑩𝜖 𝑿, 𝑿𝑳 ≠ 𝑿𝑩,  𝛼0,𝐿, 𝛼0,𝐵 , 𝜶𝑳 and 
𝜶𝑩 are vectors of corresponding parameter estimates, and 𝑣𝐿 and 𝑣𝐵 are error terms. 
Similar to the reduced form equation (4.1) and (4.2), the 𝐿∗∗ and 𝐵∗∗ in structural 
equations are categorized in a binary form and the same order, respectively. 𝑿𝑳 and 
𝑿𝑩 are vectors of explanatory variables which are not identical due to identifiable 
parameters in the simultaneous model (discussed in an identification section). 
Equation (4.3) and (4.4) are independently estimated by probit maximum likelihood 
estimation, respectively. It is worth noting that the general model of Maddala (1983, 
pp. 246-247) features a simultaneous probit model. Such a model requires a modified 
correction in the variance-covariance matrix for ?̂?∗∗ and  ?̂?∗∗. The correction procedure 
is presented in the Appendix F.4.  
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4.2.1 Identification 
The parameters of two-simultaneous equations are identified if both equations 
do not have an identical set of parameters. Thus, the identification of a simultaneous 
equation can be thought of in term of the possibility of instrumental variable 
estimation. The candidates for instrumental variable for unemployment and obesity 
respectively are the number of months the individual received unemployment 
insurance (UI) in the past, and the individual’s mother’s BMI, respectively.  Previous 
research shows that the duration of unemployment insurance (UI) increases the 
probability of unemployment, mostly by increasing the reservation wage (the 
minimum wage at which a worker will accept employment) and by decreasing the cost 
of unemployment (Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976). Meyer (1990) found that the UI has 
a negative effect on the probability of becoming employed. The extension of UI 
benefits during the recent recession raised the unemployment rate by 0.1 to 0.5 
percentage points. About half of this effect was due to workers continuing to look for 
work rather than exiting the labor force (Rothstein, 2011). The advantage of using UI 
as an instrumental variable is it is strongly correlated with the individual’s 
unemployment, but is exogenous to the individual’s obesity.  
The use of an individual’s mother’s BMI as an instrumental variable for 
obesity is based on the fact that parental weight is highly correlated with offspring 
weight due to genetics. A strong relationship has been observed between biologic 
parents-child pairs (Zonta et al., 1987) and twins (Poulsen et al., 2001) in regard to 
BMI. It is estimated that genetic factors explain approximately 40% of the variance in 
body fat (Bouchard et al., 1988) and up to 70% of variance in abdominal obesity 
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(Carey et al., 1996). In addition, previous studies (Stunkard et al., 1986; Maes et al., 
1996; Grilo and Pogue-Geile, 1991) provide evidence that the correlation between 
parents’ and a child’s BMI may have little to do with shared environmental factors. 
However, in the NLSY97, the majority of individuals only included their mother’s 
BMI information. Therefore we use only the mother’s BMI as an instrument for 
individual’s obesity. A weakness of using only the mother’s BMI as a valid instrument 
is that it ignores the father’s genetic makeup in terms of affecting the child’s BMI. 
However, several medical studies on the genetic transmission from parents to their 
children’s obesity have found that mother’s obesity is more important than father’s 
obesity in influencing the metabolic syndrome19 or the insulin resistance syndrome in 
her child (Druet et al., 2006; Bjornholt et al., 2000; Dabelea et al., 2000; Pettitt et al., 
1990). Although an obese mother can give birth to normal birth weight babies, these 
babies have a higher probability of later developing obesity and insulin resistance 
syndrome (Mingrone et al., 2008; Obregon, 2010) because the insulin resistance 
syndrome is developed in fetuses of the obese mother in utero (Catalano et al., 2009). 
Obesity is commonly associated with metabolic syndrome because obesity makes it 
more difficult for cells to respond to insulin. Abdominal obesity is ranked as the first 
risk factor of the metabolic syndrome prevalence in the U.S. (CDC, 2009).  
The model is identified with two instruments for two endogenous repressors in 
simultaneous equations and the instruments are valid because they satisfied an 
exclusion restriction that the excluded instruments only directly affect its own 
                                               
19 The metabolic syndrome (MS) is also known as insulin resistance syndrome because most people who have 
metabolic syndrome have insulin resistance where the body inefficiently makes insulin to move glucose (sugar) 
into cells for use as energy. This syndrome is a cluster of conditions - increased blood pressure, a high blood sugar 
level, excess body fat around the waist (Abdominal obesity) and abnormal cholesterol levels - that occur together, 
increasing your risk of heart disease, stroke and diabetes (Mayo clinic). 
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endogenous regressors, but not directly affect the dependent variables.  The model is a 
non-linear simultaneous equation system; the traditional F-Statistic test on instrument 
relevance20 and the Hausman test on instrument exogeneity are not applicable. The 
correlation is simply employed to see the strong correlation between the instruments 
and endogenous regressors21. Ideally, the best candidate to be an instrumental variable 
is an exogenous variable that appears in other equations in the model because it is 
correlated with the endogenous regressor in the model via the reduced form equations, 
but it is not correlated with the error term in any equation. The two reduced forms in 
equation (4.1) and (4.2), which include both UI and mother’s BMI variables are 
independently estimated. The regression results show that the UI variable is positive 
and statistically significant, but the mother’s BMI variable is not significant in 
equation (4.1). In contrast, the mother’s BMI variable is positive and statistically 
significant in equation (4.2), but the UI variable is not significant in that equation. The 
reduced form regression results presented in Table F.2 in the Appendix F validate the 
use of both instrumental variables. With respect to identification of the two-step 
estimation, we thus include these two instrumental variables in both reduced form 
equation (4.1) and (4.2). In the structural equations, the UI and the mother’s BMI 
variables are included as an explanatory variable in equation (4.3) and equation (4.4), 
respectively.  
 
                                               
20 Instrument Relevance: Valid instruments are highly correlated with the endogenous regressors even after 
controlling for the exogenous regressors. This requirement can be empirically tested in the first stage regression. 
21 The correlation results found the unemployment insurance (UI) is statistically correlated with the unemployment 
status (0.3064), but not the individual’s BMI whereas the mother’s BMI is statistically correlated with the 
individual’s BMI (0.2673), but not the individual’s employment status.  
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4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) is designed to 
represent the entire population of American youth. All youths were between 12 and 16 
years of age when the first of annual survey was conducted in 1997. Retention rates 
for those NLSY97 respondents remaining eligible for survey have remained close to 
90 percent during the 16 years of surveys. The survey year of 2010 is a sample in our 
study. The 7,479 respondents were interviewed from October, 2010 to June, 2011. The 
respondent’s employment status was recorded by week until the week of interview. 
The employment status at the week of interview is used as a respondent’s current 
employment status. The study focuses on respondents who are currently working or 
currently unemployed. Thus, respondents who did not report their employment status 
at the week of their interview as “unemployed” or “working” were dropped from the 
sample. For example, respondents who reported being “out of labor force”, “active 
military services”, “not determined” or “no information” were dropped. The 
percentage distribution of employment status and obesity presented in Table 4.1 shows 
that the average BMI of unemployed respondents (30.09) is higher than that of the 
employed respondents (28.37). The 41% of unemployed respondents have BMI >=30 
compared to 32 % of the employed counterparts.  
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Table 4.1: Percentage distribution of employment status and  
Body Mass Index (BMI)1 
                           Employment status 
Body mass index (BMI) Unemployed   Employed 
Average BMI 30.09   28.37 
BMI>=30 41%   32% 
BMI<30 59%   68% 
Observations 162   2,710 
1 The BMI, after corrected for self-reporting errors. 
 
The final sample consists of 2,872 observations with 1,501 males and 1,371 
females. The unemployed respondents account for 6% in the sample (Table 4.2). The 
self-reported BMI is calculated from respondent’s self-reported weight and height at 
the interview date. The BMI, after corrected for self-reporting errors, is used 
throughout the paper as the respondent’s true BMI. The average BMI of the 
respondents in the sample is 28.44 and the respondents who have BMI>=30 account 
for 33% of the sample (Table 4.2).  
The instrumental variables for unemployment and obesity are indicator 
variables of the respondent who received unemployment insurance (UI) more than 6 
months in the past 23 months and a mother’s BMI >=30, respectively. The number of 
months the respondent received UI is calculated by accumulating self-reported UI 
reception by month during the past 23 months until the month of interview.  During 
the recession in 2009-2011, Congress approved an extension of a program to provide 
unemployment benefits for up to 99 weeks (~23 months) - an addition of 73 weeks to 
the traditional 26 weeks (~ 6 months) offered by the states. However, the duration 
varies from state to state based on how bad the unemployment situation was in the 
regions. The 23-month unemployment benefit is used for a maximum UI duration for 
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each respondent in the study. The UI benefit is categorized into two as: 1 if the 
respondent received UI benefit more than 6 months in the past 23 months and 0 if the 
respondent received UI 6 months or less or never received in the past 23 months. The 
respondents who received UI benefit more than 6 months accounts for 4% of the 
sample. The mother’s BMI is calculated from mother’s self-reported weight and 
height in 1997 and corrected for self-reporting errors using the sub-sample of 
NHANES III in which respondents aged 26-82 years old corresponding to mothers’ 
age in the sample of the NLSY97 in 1997. The regression results are presented in 
Table F.1 in the Appendix. The average mother’s BMI is 27.83. The mother’s BMI is 
categorized into two as 1 if mother’s BMI >=30 and 0 if otherwise. The respondent’s 
mother who has BMI>=30 accounts for 29% of the sample. 
The following socioeconomics repressors are included in the unemployment 
and obesity regression equations: age, age squared, gender, race (black, hispanic, 
white and mixed race), highest education degree obtained (graduate, college, high 
school and less than high school), region of residence (northeast, north central, west 
and south), marital status (married, never married, others (separated, divorced or 
widowed)), household size, have children, and income of other family members in the 
previous year which is calculated from the difference between gross family income 
and respondent’s income in the past year. The summary statistics of the variables used 
in the study are presented in Table 4.2.   
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Table 4.2: Variable definition and descriptive statistics of the sample         
Variables Definition of variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
A. Endogenous Variables           
Employment Status 1 if respondent reported unemployed as of the survey date 0.06 0.23 0 1 
BMI of respondent BMI after corrected self-reporting errors 28.44 6.88 12.22 70.31 
BMI >= 30 1 if respondent has BMI >=30 0.33 0.008 0 1 
BMI < 30 1 if respondent has BMI < 30 0.67 0.008 0 1 
B. Instrumental Variables           
BMI of respondent's mother BMI of respondent's mother after corrected self-reporting errors 27.83 6.40 16.90 70.30 
Mother's BMI >= 30 1 if respondent's mother has BMI >=30 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Mother's BMI <30 1 if respondent's mother has BMI < 30 0.71 0.45 0 1 
 UI Benefit Number of months respondent has received an unemployment 
insurance (UI) benefit 1 
0.80 2.74 0 23 
More than 6 months 1 if respondent received UI benefit more than 6 months (~26weeks) 0.04 0.21 0 1 
      
C. Demographic Variables           
Age Age of respondent at the date of interview 27.90 1.44 25 31 
Male 1 if respondent is male 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Race           
Black 1 if respondent reported race "Black" 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Hispanic 1 if respondent reported race "Hispanic" 0.19 0.39 0 1 
White 1 if respondent reported race "Non Black and Non Hispanic" 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Mixed race (base) 1 if respondent reported race "Mixed race (non-Hispanic)" 0.01 0.10 0 1 
      
Education The highest education the respondent has          
Graduate degree 1 if respondent has a graduate education 0.07 0.26 0 1 
College degree 1 if respondent has a bachelor education 0.35 0.48 0 1 
High school 1 if respondent has a high school education 0.53 0.50 0 1 
None (base) 1 if respondent has lower high school education 0.05 0.22 0 1 
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Table 4.2 (cont.): Variable definition and descriptive statistics of the sample 
Variables Definition of variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Region Region of the residence as of the survey date 2         
NE 1 if respondent resided in northeastern region 0.15 0.36 0 1 
NC 1 if respondent resided in north central region 0.23 0.42 0 1 
WE 1 if respondent resided in western region 0.22 0.41 0 1 
SO (base) 1 if respondent resided in southern region 0.40 0.49 0 1 
      
Marital status Marital status as of the survey date         
Married 1 if respondent reported "Married" 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Never Married 1 if respondent reported "Never Married" 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Others 1 if respondent reported "Separated" or "Divorced" or "Widowed" 0.07 0.26    
      
Household size Number of people living in the household as of the survey date 3.13 1.58 1 15 
Children 1 if respondent has children 0.42 0.49 0 1 
      
Income Gross family income in the previous year 70,619.10  55,335.18  0 290,810 
 Respondent’s income in the previous year 33,165.85 23,216.27 0 130,254 
 Income of other Family members  37,682.22 49,172.41 1 290,610 
Number of observations    2,872      
1 The number of months the respondent received UI are calculated by accumulating self-reported UI reception by month during the past 23-month period until the 
month of interview.  During the recession (2009-2011), Congress approved an extension of a program to provide unemployment benefits for up to 99 weeks - an 
addition of 73 weeks to the traditional 26 weeks offered by the states. However, the duration varies from state to state based on how bad the unemployment situation 
is in the regions. The maximum extension 23 months is used in the calculation. 
2 Northeast (CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT) , North Central (IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, OH, ND, SD), South (AL, AR, DE, DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, 
MD, MS, NC, OK, SC,TX, VA, WV), West (AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY) 
3  The income of other family members is set to one, assuming the respondents do not have other income from the family members because log of zero is undefined. 
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4.4 Estimation results 
 The results of the simultaneous unemployment and obesity equations are 
reported in Table 4.4. Before estimating the simultaneous equation models expressed 
in equations (4.3) and (4.4), we first estimate these two equations under the 
assumption that unemployment and obesity are exogenous to illustrate what the results 
would be under this incorrect assumption. In other word, the propensity of the 
individual to be unemployed has no influence on whether the individual is obese  
(BMI>=30) and the propensity of the individual to be obese has no influence on 
whether the individual is unemployed. In the univariate probit models, the variables 
for identification in the simultaneous equation models are also included in conjunction 
with other demographic regressors. The UI benefit and mother’s BMI indicator 
variables are included in unemployment and obesity equations, respectively.  The 
results from the univariate probit models are presented in Table 4.3. In these simplistic 
models, obese individuals are more likely to be unemployed (1.5%) and unemployed 
individuals are more likely to be obese (5.7%). Both of these variables are statistically 
significant at 90% confidence level. 
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Table 4.3: The unemployment and obesity univariate probit results  
Variables Unemployment 
  Obese 
  Coeff 1   
Std. 
Error 
Marginal 
Effect   Coeff 1   
Std. 
Error 
Marginal 
Effect 
Unemployed 2  --    --     0.167 * 0.090 0.057 
Obese (BMI >=30) 2 0.141 * 0.080 0.015   --    --  -- 
Age at survey date 0.438  1.169 -0.001  -0.411  0.719 -0.141 
Age squared -0.009  0.021 0.047  0.008  0.012 0.002 
Male -0.072  0.085 -0.007  -0.009  0.052 -0.003 
Race (base : Mixed race)                   
Black -0.481  0.336 -0.005  0.404 *  0.231 0.138 
Hispanic -0.190  0.372 -0.020  -0.095  0.263 -0.033 
White -0.350 
 
0.337 -0.037  -0.081  0.258 -0.027 
Education (base: Less than highschool)               
Graduate education -0.708 *** 0.234 -0.076  -0.408  ***  0.152 -0.140 
College education -0.664 *** 0.159 -0.071  -0.250 **  0.119 -0.085 
Highschool Education -0.395 *** 0.143 -0.042  0.006  0.113 0.002 
Region (base : South)                   
Northeastern region -0.114  0.122 -0.001  -0.029  0.076 -0.009 
Northcentral region 0.104  0.105 0.011  -0.030  0.066 -0.010 
Western region -0.108  0.115 -0.011  -0.058  0.070 -0.019 
Marital status (base : Divorced,Separated,Widowed)           
Married -0.483 *** 0.147 -0.052  0.029  0.106 0.010 
Never married -0.294 ** 0.142 -0.031  0.006  0.105 0.002 
Household size 0.034  0.026 0.004  0.027  0.018 0.009 
Have children -0.145 
 
0.101 -0.015  0.129 ** 0.063 0.044 
Log income of other family 
members 
0.001  0.010 0.0001  0.007  0.006 0.002 
Constant -5.762  16.255    4.288  10.308  
Pseudo-R2 0.047   0.056  
Observations 2,872   2,872  
1 The superscripts *,**,and *** represent significant coefficients at the 90% , 95% and 99% confidence 
level, respectively.  
2 For the univariate probit equations, the unemployed and obese variables are binary, while for the 
simultaneous probit equations; they are index values predicted from the reduced form estimates. Those 
results are presented in Table F.2 in the Appendix F. 
 
The above approach assumes that obesity conditional on the covariates is 
independent of unemployment and vice versa. The associations between 
unemployment and obesity are positive and significant, but imprecisely measured due 
to omitted variable bias and possible reversed causality. An instrumental variable 
   
140 
regression using a recursive bivariate probit model is used to control for the 
endogenity when the dependent variable and endogenous regressor are binary variable 
(Wooldridge, 2002, pp 477-8; Morris, 2007). The main IV recursive bivariate probit 
results are presented in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4: The unemployment and obesity IV recursive bivariate probit results1  
 
  Unemployment  Obese 
Variables   Coeff 2   Std.Err 
 
  Coeff 2   Std.Err 
 Unemployed 3    --   --     0.324 
 
0.275 
 Obese (BMI >=30) 3   0.026  0.330 
 
   --    --   
+ Other covariates         
ρ  0.742  0.206  -0.087 0.141  
Wald test ρ=0 [p-value] 𝜒2(1)=0.126    𝜒2(1)=0.376   
  [0.719]    [0.539]   
Impact of the instrument on   Unemployment Obese 
  Coeff 1   Std.Err  Coeff 1  Std.Err  
Mother's BMI >=30    --    --   
 
0.665 *** 0.052 
 UI Benefit       
More than six months of UI   1.610 *** 0.126 
 
--  
 
--    
+ Other covariates        
1 The IV bivariate probit regressions are conditional on other covariates i.e. age, gender, races, educations, 
regions, marital status, household size, number of children, income of other family members in the past 
year.  
2 The superscripts *,**,and *** represent significant coefficients at the 90% , 95% and 99% confidence 
3 For the bivariate probit equations, the unemployed and obese variables are binary 
 
 
In the top panel of Table 4.4, one can see that obesity has a positive effect on 
unemployment and unemployment has a positive effect on obesity, but neither 
relationship is statistically significant. Similar to Lindeboom et al., 2010; Cawley, 
2000, and Norton and Han, 2008, this study finds no evidence that obesity causes 
unemployment using an instrumental variable model, but is contrary to the results 
obtained by Morris (2007). Cawley (2000) suggested that the observed correlation 
between body mass index and unemployment may be due to unemployment instead 
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causing weight gain or unobservable factors causing both unemployment and weight 
gain. Current unemployment may affect current obesity. For example, individuals may 
be obese because they perform poorly in the labor market (Pagan and Davila, 1997). 
The ρ in a recursive bivariate probit unemployment equation is positive. This means 
that unexplained factors that affect unemployment are positively correlated with 
unexplained factors that affect obesity. A Wald test for both the unemployment and 
obesity equations fail to reject the hypothesis that ρ=0. This suggests that, assuming 
the instrument is valid, the endogeneity of obesity and unemployment do not 
significantly affect the univariate probit estimates. The bottom panel reports the 
significance of the instruments. As expected, even after controlling for the full set of 
covariates, unemployment insurance (UI) and mother’s BMI are positive and highly 
significant predictors of unemployment and obesity, respectively, indicating that the 
instruments satisfy the non-weakness requirement.  
An instrumental variable regression using a recursive bivariate probit model 
cannot fully capture potential unobserved factors causing both unemployment and 
obesity or reversed causality. This may cause the insignificant effects.  The 
simultaneous probit model is an appropriate model to estimate the simultaneity of 
unemployment and obesity. The results of the simultaneous probit models are 
presented in Table 4.5. The standard errors of simultaneous probit models are 
corrected following Maddala’s method (1983, pp. 246-247; presented in the Appendix 
F.4). It is worth mentioning that the unemployed and obese explanatory variables in 
simultaneous probit equation models in Table 4.5 are not binary. They are index 
values, which are predicted from the reduced form estimation in equation (4.1) and 
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(4.2). The interpretation of these two variables is different from the other explanatory 
variables. Thus, we only focus on the directionality of the effect of these two variables 
in the simultaneous equation models. Unemployed individuals are more likely to be 
obese than employed individuals and it is statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level. Obese individuals are more likely to be currently unemployed 
compared to non-obese individuals; however, the result is not statistically significant.  
The marginal effects of the explanatory variables in the simultaneous probit 
equation models are presented in Table 4.5. The forth column shows the marginal 
effect of the characteristics of individuals on the likelihood of unemployment. The UI 
benefit is positively associated with unemployment. Individuals receiving UI benefits 
for more than 6 months during the past 23 months have a 14.9% higher probability to 
be currently unemployed than individuals who received UI benefits 6 month or less in 
the past 23 months. The characteristics of individuals, which have the highest 
probability of unemployment, are mixed race, less than high school education, 
southern region, divorced, separated, or widowed, and have no children. White 
individuals have the lowest probability to be unemployed (-5%). Educational 
attainment plays a very significant role in determining the likelihood of 
unemployment. Individuals with a graduate degree have the lowest probability to be 
unemployed (-6.4%). 
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Table 4.5: The unemployment and obesity simultaneous probit results 
 
  Unemployment  Obese 
Variables 
  Coeff 1   
Corr 
Std.Err 
Marginal 
Effect   Coeff 1   
Corr 
Std.Err 
Marginal 
Effect 
Unemployed 2    --   --  --   0.103 ** 0.047 0.033 
Obese (BMI >=30) 2   0.002  0.066 0.0002   --    --  -- 
Mother's BMI >=30    --    --  --  0.695 *** 0.035 0.227 
UI Benefit  (base : never or less than six months of UI)     
More than six months of UI   1.605 *** 0.100 0.149   --   --  -- 
Age at survey date   0.623  0.592 0.058  -0.711 
 
0.452 -0.231 
Age squared   -0.012  0.010 -0.001  0.013
 
0.008 0.004 
Male   -0.150 ***  0.042 -0.014  -0.008  0.033 -0.002 
Race (base : Mixed race)                     
Black   -0.251 
 
0.221 -0.023  0.437 ** 0.167 0.142 
Hispanic   -0.349
 
0.220 -0.032  -0.047  0.166 -0.015 
White   -0.537** 0.216 -0.050  0.087  0.166 0.028 
Education (base: Less than highschool)     
Graduate education   -0.689 *** 0.126 -0.064  -0.263 ** 0.101 -0.085 
College education   -0.679 *** 0.102 -0.063  -0.150 * 0.084 -0.048 
Highschool Education   -0.432 *** 0.096 -0.040  0.058  0.076 0.018 
Region (base : South)                     
Northeastern region   -0.154 ** 0.062 -0.014  -0.005  0.048 -0.001 
Northcentral region   0.077  0.054 0.007  -0.015  0.042 -0.005 
Western region   -0.187 *** 0.057 -0.017  0.006  0.044 -0.002 
Marital status (base : Divorced,Separated,Widowed)     
Married   -0.511 *** 0.088 -0.047  0.046  0.071 0.015 
Never married   -0.332 *** 0.087 -0.031  -0.00008  0.068 -0.00002 
Household size   0.054 *** 0.015 0.005  0.021  0.012 0.006 
Have children   -0.197 *** 0.051 0.018  0.152 *** 0.041 0.049 
Log family income of other 
family members   
 -0.016 **   0.005  -0.0015   0.007 *   0.004  0.002 
Constant   -8.014 *** 1.114    8.209 *** 0.855  
Pseudo-R2  0.095   0.180  
Observations  2,872   2,872  
1 The superscripts *,**,and *** represent significant coefficients at the 90% , 95% and 99% confidence level, 
respectively.  
2 For the univariate probit equations, the unemployed and obese variables are binary, while for the 
simultaneous probit equations; they are index values predicted from the reduced form estimates. Those results 
are presented in Table F.2 in the Appendix F.  
 
Individuals with a college degree prominently decrease the probability of 
unemployment by 2% from attaining high school degree. People living in the 
northeastern and western regions have a 1.4% and 1.7% respectively lower probability 
to be unemployed than individuals living in the southern region. Married individuals 
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have the lowest probability to be unemployed (-4.7%). Marriage is still seen as a 
normative developmental milestone in American culture (DePaulo and Morris, 2005; 
Morris et al., 2007). Single people are perceived as less mature, and less well adjusted 
than married people (Etaugh and Birdoes, 1991; Morris et al., 2008). Thus, the 
stereotypes of single people might be seen as less committed to their jobs compared to 
married people, and might thus be discriminated against in employment decisions 
(Jordan and Zitek, 2012). One additional person in the household increases the 
probability of the individual being unemployed by 0.5%. Individuals with children, 
however, are less likely to be unemployed (-1.8%) than individuals without children. 
There is more of an imperative to take a job, any job, if individuals have dependents 
(Harknett). People with low-income working families are often taking jobs with lower 
wages and less job security, compared with the middle-class jobs they held before the 
economic downturn (NELP, 2012). The log incomes of other family members show 
significant and negative but small effect on unemployment (-0.1%). 
The marginal effects of the characteristics of individuals on the likelihood of 
obesity are presented in the seventh column in Table 4.5. The mother’s BMI is 
strongly associated with individual’s BMI. The individuals who have an obese mother 
(BMI>=30) are more likely to be obese (22.7%) than individuals who have a non-
obese mother. African Americans are the most likely to be obese (14.2%). This 
finding corresponds with the Gallup-Healthways Well-being survey in 2012 that 
African Americans are among the most likely in the United States to be very obese, 
with about 9% falling into obese class II and 6% obese class III -- the highest Body 
Mass Index (BMI) categories. Our results show that individuals with a graduate degree 
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are the least likely to be obese (-8.5%) following by a college degree (-4.8%). 
Individuals with a high school degree are the highest risk group of being obese. The 
individuals with children, however, are more likely to be obese (4.9%) than 
individuals without children. The log incomes of other family members show 
significant and positive but small effect on obesity (-0.2%). The rest of the explanatory 
variables are not statistically significant in the simultaneous equation models.  
 Note that the univariate probit equation estimations indicate positive and 
significant effects of obesity on unemployment and, in turn, unemployment on 
obesity. In the instrumental variable regression based on a recursive bivariate probit 
model, obesity has not statistically significant effect on unemployment and vice versa. 
However, the results of the simultaneous probit equation estimations, for which the 
endogeneity between unemployment and obesity is accounted for, found that only 
unemployment has a positive and significant effect on obesity. It is worth noting that 
without correction of standard errors, this simultaneous estimation method yields 
insignificant effect of both unemployment and obesity. The evidence here indicates 
that obesity and unemployment are not independent and suggests in order to find true 
effects of each one, both should be estimated simultaneously. Our results suggest that 
unemployment positively impacts obesity, but not vice versa. 
The study uses data in the period of economic recession in 2010 where a post-
dismissal traumatic stress disorder is presumably ubiquitous and much more 
pronounced than other normal periods. One potential confounder is a mental 
depression that could potentially correlate with both unemployment and obesity and 
could create a spurious relationship if the estimate fails to account for. In addition to a 
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multivariate model, which could handle large numbers of covariates such as age, sex, 
ethnicity and control potential confounders simultaneously, the estimation includes a 
mental depression covariate in a simultaneous equation system. The process of 
accounting for covariates is also called adjustment and comparing the results can 
clarify how much the suspected confounders in the model distort the relationship 
between exposure and outcome (Pourhoseingholi et al. 2012). The adjusted model 
with a potential confounder, mental depression, in the estimation shows that its 
inclusion does not impact the previous results for the variables of interest, 
unemployment and obesity (Table F.3 in the Appendix F). Thus, the exclusion of the 
mental depression variables does not appear to invalidate the model. In addition, the 
different BMI values close to the principal cut off point of obesity i.e. BMI >= 29 or 
BMI >=32 are chosen to estimate in the regression models for robustness check of the 
model. The results are statistically consistent. 
 
4.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Unemployment could affect weight gain through over-eating as a means to 
cope with unemployment stress, or due to more time for eating and the consumption of 
cheaper, more fattening food. Alternatively, obesity could affect unemployment. In 
1995-1996, 7% of US adults reported at least one time experience of weight 
discrimination, and in 2004-2006, that percentage rose to 12% of adults, which was a 
66% increase (Andreyeva et al., 2008). Friedman and Puhl (2012) reported that 
overweight and obese job applicants are viewed as having poor self-discipline, low 
supervisory potential, poor personal hygiene, and less ambition and productivity. The 
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perpetuating negative cycle of joblessness and obesity will occur in the situation in 
which unemployment may cause some people to engage in binge eating that leads to 
obesity and pre-existing obesity may make it harder for others to find and keep work 
at the same time. 
To estimate the true simultaneous effects of unemployment and obesity on 
each other, the impact of unemployment on probability of obesity and the impact of 
obesity on probability of unemployment are simultaneously estimated with Maximum 
Likelihood probit estimations using an instrumental variable approach. The results 
show that unemployment increases the likelihood of obesity, but not vice versa. The 
univariate probit and bivariate probit models are also estimated to see the effect. 
Without correcting for endogeneity, the univariate probit results reveal a significant 
and positive impact of obesity on unemployment, and vice versa. An instrumental 
variable regression with a recursive bivariate probit model used to account for 
endogeniety, but not simultaneity, found insignificant results. Our contribution in 
simultaneous estimation and properly adjusting the standard errors is not only 
warranted in our econometric application, but also in policy implication. The results 
underscore the importance of the standard error correction in hypothesis testing. Our 
results find that being unemployed increases the likelihood of being obese. However, 
we find no effect of obesity on employment status, which contradicts the evidence of 
weight discrimination. 
Notwithstanding insignificant impact of obesity on unemployment status, other 
results from the study suggest future researchable issues. First, the study found that 
being unemployed significantly contributes to the probability of being obese. The 
   
148 
impact of extended periods of unemployment on weight gain should be further 
investigated because obesity-related health consequences would become more 
prominent and raise a concern for policymakers. Second, although the results found no 
statistical evidence of weight discrimination, it is inconclusive that normal or 
underweight individuals would decrease their risks of unemployment due to no 
statistical difference in the probability of unemployment between obese and non-obese 
individuals. Last, the results of this study affirm that the influence of several socio-
economics characteristics heavily affect the probability of being unemployed and/or 
obese. This suggests importance of socioeconomic status in explaining employment 
and obesity status.  
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Rössler W, Angst J. (2005). “Depressive symptoms during childhood and adult 
obesity”. Molescular Psychiatry 10: 842-850. 
 
Janssen I, Boyce WF, Simpson K, Pickett W. (2006). “Influence of individual- and 
area-level measures of socioeconomic status on obesity, unhealthy eating, and 
physical inactivity in Canadian adolescents”. Am J Clin Nutr 83: 139-145.  
 
Janssen I, Katzmarzyk PT, Boyce WF, Vereecken C, Mulvihill C, Roberts C, Currie 
C, Pickett W. 2005. Comparison of overweight and obesity prevalence in 
school-aged youth from 34 countries and their relationships with physical 
activity and dietary patterns. Obesity Reviews 6: 123-132. 
 
 
   
153 
Jordan AH, Zitek E. (2012). “Marital Status Bias in Perceptions of Employees”. Basic 
and Applied Social Psychology 34(5): 474-481.  
 
Lee L, Sepanski JH. (1995). “Estimation of Linear and Nonlinear Errors-in-Variables 
Models Using Validation Data”. Journal of the American Statistical Association 
90(429): 130-140. 
 
Lindeboom M, Lundborg P, van der Klaauw B. (2010). “Assessing the impact of 
obesity on labor market outcomes”. Economics and Human Biology 8: 309-319. 
 
Maddala G. (1983). “Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics”. 
Cambridge UK: Cambridge University press. 
 
Maes HHM, Beunen GP, Vlietinck RF, Neale MC, Thomis M, Vanden BE, Lysens R, 
Simons J, Derom C, Derom R. 1996. Inheritance of physical fitness in 10-year-
old twins and their parents. Med. Sci. Sports Exerc 28: 1479-1491.  
 
McElroy SL. (2009). “Obesity in patients with severe mental illness: Overview and 
management”. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 70(3): 12-21.    
 
Meyer BD. (1990). “Unemployment insurance and unemployment Spells”. 
Econometrica 58(4): 757-782.  
 
Mingrone G,  Manco M, Maria Elena Valera Mora, Guidone C,  Iaconelli A,  Gniuli 
D, Leccesi L,   Chiellini C,  Ghirlanda G. (2008). “Influence of maternal obesity 
on insulin sensitivity and secretion in offspring”. Diabetes Care 31(9): 1872-
1876. 
 
Morris S. (2007). “The impact of obesity on unemployment”. Labor Economics 14: 
413-433. 
   
154 
Morris WL, DePaulo BM, Hertel J, Taylor LC. (2008). “Singlism-another problem 
that has no name: prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination against singles”. In 
T. G. Morrison & M. A. Morrison (Eds.), The psychology of modern prejudice: 
165-194. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science.  
 
National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors (NASMHPD) and 
Advocates for Human Potential, Inc. (2007). “Promoting independence and 
recovery through work: employment for people with psychiatric disabilities”. 
National Governors Association, Center for Best Practices: 2007: 
www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0707MHWEBCASTBRIEF.pdf. 
 
National Governors Association. (2002). “Strategies States Can Use to Employ 
Persons with Mental Illness”. National Governors Association, Center for Best 
Practices: www.nga.org/cda/files/0703MENTALILLNESS.pdf. 
 
Neumayer E. (2003). “Weak versus strong sustainability”. Edward Elgar Publishing: 
Cheltenham, UK, 2003. 
 
Obregon MJ. (2010). “Maternal obesity results in offspring prone to metabolic 
syndrome”. Endocrinology 151(8): 3475-3476. 
 
Pagan JA, Davila A. (1997). “Obesity, occupational attainment and earnings”. Social 
Science Quarterly 78: 756-770. 
 
Palinkas L, Wingard D, Barrett-Connor E. (1996). “Depressive symptoms in 
overweight and obese older adults: a test of the “jolly fat” hypothesis”. J 
Psychosom Res 40: 59-66. 
 
 
 
   
155 
Paraponaris A, Saliba B, Ventelou B. (2005). “Obesity, weight status and 
employability: Empirical evidence from a French national survey”. Economics 
& Human Biology 3(2): 241-258. 
 
Pettitt DJ, Saad MF, Bennett PH, Nelson RG, Knowler WC. (1990). “Familial 
predisposition to renal disease in two generations of Pima Indians with type 2 
(non-insulin-dependent) diabetes mellitus”. Diabetologia 33: 438 - 443. 
 
Poulsen  P, Vaag A, Kyvik K, Beck-Nielsen H. (2001). “Genetic versus environmental 
etiology of the metabolic syndrome among male and female twins”. 
Diabetologia 44: 537-543. 
 
Pourhoseingholi MA, Baghestani AR, Vahedi M. (2012). “How to control 
confounding effects by statistical analysis”. Gastroenterol Hepatol Bed Bench 
5(2): 79-83. 
 
Puhl R, Brownell KD. (2001). “Bias, discrimination, and obesity”. Obesity Research 
9: 788-805.  
 
Richardson LP, Davis R, Poulton R, McCauley E, Moffitt TE, Caspi A, Connell F. 
(2003). “A longitudinal evaluation of adolescent depression and adult obesity”. 
Archives Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine 157: 739-745. 
 
Roberts RE, Deleger S, Strawbridge WJ, Kaplan GA. 2003. “Prospective association 
between obesity and depression: evidence from the Alameda county study”. 
International Journal of Obesity 27: 514-521.           
  
Rothstein J. (2011). “Unemployment Insurance and Job Search in the Great 
Recession”. NBER Working Paper No. 17534. 
 
   
156 
Ruhm CJ. (2000). “Are recessions good for your health?”. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115: 617-650. 
 
Ruhm CJ. (2005). “Healthy living in hard times”. Journal of Health Economics 24: 
341-363. 
 
Sarget JD, Blanchflower DG. (1994). “Obesity and stature in adolescence and 
earnings in young adulthood: Analysis of a British birth cohort”. Arch Pediatr 
Adolesc Med 148(7): 681-7. 
 
Stoddard E. (2009). “Will Americans put on “recession pounds?”. Reuters. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/ healthNews/idUSTRE50805W20090109. 
Accessed July 16, 2009.  
 
Stringham J, Workman DR. (2004). “The unemployment survival guide”. Gibbs Smith 
Publisher, Utah. 
 
Stunkard AJ, Sorensen TIA, Hanis C, Teasdale TW, Chakrabory R, SchullWJ, 
Schulsinger F. (1986b). “An adoption study of human obesity”. N. Engl.J. Med. 
314(4): 193-198.   
 
Tapia Granados JA. (2005). “Response: On economic growth, business fluctuations, 
and health progress”. International Journal of Epidemiology 34: 1226-33.  
 
Todd J, Morrison RM. (2014). “Changes in Eating Patterns and Diet Quality Among 
Working-Age Adults, 2005-2010” ERS Report No. 161. 
 
Wooldridge JM (2002). “Econometric analysis of cross-section and panel data”. MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
   
157 
Zhang Q, Lamichhane R, Wang Y. (2014). “Associations between U.S. adult obesity 
and state and county economic conditions in the recession”. Journal of Clinical 
Medicine 3: 153-166. 
 
Ziebland S, Thorogood M, Fuller A, Muir J. (1996). “Desire for the body normal: 
Body image and discrepancies between self reported and measured height and 
weight in a British population”. Epidemiol Community Health 50: 105-106. 
 
Zonta LA, Jayakar SD, Boisio M, Galante A, Pennetti V. (1987). “Genetic analysis of 
human obesity in an Italian Sample”. Hum. Hered 37(3): 129-139. 
 
   
158 
APPENDIX F 
 
Table F.1: The regression results of measured BMI on self-reported BMI using 
NHANES III  (1999-2010) 1,2 
Male respondents aged 25-31years old 
Measured BMI Black   Hispanic   White   
Mixed 
Race      
Self-reported BMI 1.046 *** 0.932 *** 1.019 *** 0.971 ***   
  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.013)  (0.008)      
Adj R-squared 0.9  0.83  0.93  0.90      
Observations 317  466  659  80      
                      
Female respondents aged 25-31years old 
Measured BMI Black   Hispanic   White   
Mixed 
Race 
      
Self-reported BMI 1.064 *** 1.032 *** 1.007 *** 1.048 ***   
  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.015)  (0.076)      
Adj R-squared 0.90  0.83  0.88  0.83      
Observations 378  556  882  94      
                      
Female respondents aged 26-82 years old 
Measured BMI Black   Hispanic   White   
Mixed 
Race 
  All  
Self-reported BMI 1.024 *** 1.027 *** 1.031 *** 1.061 *** 1.028 *** 
  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.027)  (0.004)  
Adj R-squared 0.89  0.83  0.92  0.84  0.89  
Observations 2,525  2,985  6,015  483  12,008  
                      
1 Controlled by age, age squared, the squared deviation from gender-race mean BMI 
2 Standard errors in the parentheses 
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Table F.2: The unemployment and obesity reduced form probit results 
Variables Employment Status    Obese 
  Coeff 1   Std.Error   Coeff 1   Std. Error 
Mother's BMI >=30 -0.014  0.087  0.67 *** 0.052 
UI Benefit (base: never or less than six months of UI)           
More than six months of UI 1.363 *** 0.115  0.14  0.109 
Age at survey date -0.325  1.151  -0.74 *** 0.052 
Age squared 0.005  0.021  0.01  0.697 
Male -0.039  0.086  -0.04 *** 0.012 
Race (base: Mixed race)               
Black -0.390  0.335  0.40  0.251 
Hispanic -0.366  0.336  -0.10  0.253 
White -0.600 * 0.331  0.00  0.248 
Education (base: Less than high school)               
Graduate education -0.525  0.331  -0.31 ** 0.153 
College education -0.497 * 0.250  -0.18  0.119 
High school Education -0.285 * 0.166  0.03  0.111 
Region (base: South)     0.146        
Northeastern region -0.120  0.126  -0.04  0.075 
North central region 0.054  0.105  -0.03  0.065 
Western region -0.110  0.115  -0.02  0.069 
Marital status (base: 
Divorced,Separated,Widowed)  
              
Married -0.464 *** 0.147  -0.02  0.098 
Never married -0.308 * 0.137  -0.07  0.096 
Household size 0.035  0.026  0.02  0.018 
Have children -0.240 * 0.101  0.13 ** 0.061 
  (base: Income>$50,000)               
Income<= $5,000 0.889 *** 0.198  0.15  0.119 
$5000< Income<= $10,000 0.767 *** 0.204  0.15  0.125 
$10,000 < Income<= $25,000 0.357 ** 0.177  0.20 ** 0.084 
$25,000 < Income<= $50,000 0.242  0.174  0.17 ** 0.078 
Constant 4.480  15.981  8.63  9.709 
1 The superscripts *, **, and *** represent significant coefficients at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence 
level, respectively.  
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 Table F.3: The unemployment and obesity simultaneous probit results including a 
mental depression variable as an explanatory variable 
  Employment Status    Obese  
  
Coeff 1   
Corr 
Std.Err 
Marginal 
Effect 
  Coeff 1   
Corr 
Std.Err 
Marginal 
Effect 
Unemployed            0.090 * 0.049 0.030 
Obese (BMI >=30)  0.0005  0.066 0.00004          
Mother's BMI >=30  -    -  -  0.697 *** 0.036 0.226 
UI Benefit  (base : never or less than six months of UI)           
More than six months of UI 1.59 *** 0.101 0.148  -  - - 
Mental Depression 0.138 ** 0.051 0.012  0.198 ** 0.039 0.064 
Age at survey date 0.592  0.595 0.055  -0.766 * 0.463 -0.248 
Age squared -0.011  0.010 -0.001  0.015 * 0.008 0.005 
Male -0.142 ***  0.042 -0.013  -0.001  0.034 -0.0003 
Race (base : Mixed race)                   
Black -0.229  0.222 -0.021  0.466 ** 0.171 0.151 
Hispanic -0.325  0.221 -0.030  -0.019  0.172 -0.006 
White -0.513 ** 0.217 -0.047  0.199  0.170 0.038 
Education (base: Less than highschool)                  
Graduate education -0.682 *** 0.126 -0.063  -0.237 ** 0.103 -0.076 
College education -0.660 *** 0.102 -0.061  -0.126  0.086 -0.040 
Highschool Education -0.421 *** 0.096 -0.039  0.074  0.077 0.024 
Region (base : South)                   
Northeastern region -0.157 ** 0.062 -0.015  -0.005  0.049 -0.001 
Northcentral region 0.071  0.055 0.006  -0.018  0.043 -0.005 
Western region -0.188 *** 0.057 -0.017  0.006  0.045 0.001 
Marital status (base : Divorced,Separated,Widowed)           
Married -0.491 *** 0.088 -0.046  0.068  0.073 0.022 
Never married -0.318 *** 0.087 -0.029  0.015  0.069 0.004 
Household size 0.053 *** 0.015 0.005  0.020  0.012 0.006 
Have children -0.193 *** 0.054 -0.018  0.156 *** 0.042 0.051 
Log family income of other family 
members -0.016 *** 0.005 -0.001  0.007 * 0.004 0.002 
Constant -7.679 *** 1.209    8.874 *** 0.804  
      
Pseudo-R2 0.182   0.095  
Observations 2,872     2,872   
1 The superscripts *,**,and *** represent significant coefficients at the 90% , 95% and 99% confidence level, 
respectively.  
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F.4 Covariance Matrix Correction in Simultaneous Probit Equations 
I. Likelihood Functions 
 The likelihood functions are taken from the general expression in Mallar 
(1997). The log likelihood probit function for the structural umployment equation is  
𝑙𝑛ℒ𝐿∗∗ = ∑ [𝐿𝑖 ln(𝑄𝐿𝑖) + (1 −
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐿𝑖)(1 − 𝑄𝐿𝑖)] , 
where  𝑄𝐿𝑖 = ∫ (2𝜋)
−1/2𝑒−𝑡
2/2𝑑𝑡
𝐼𝐿𝑖
−∞
 and  𝐼𝐿𝑖 = 𝛼0,𝐵𝑖?̂?
∗ +𝑿𝑩
′ 𝜶𝑩. 
The log likelihood probit function for the structural obesity equation is  
𝑙𝑛ℒ𝐵∗∗ = ∑ [𝐵𝑖 ln(𝑄𝐵𝑖) + (1 −
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐵𝑖)(1 − 𝑄𝐵𝑖)] , 
where  𝑄𝐵𝑖 = ∫ (2𝜋)
−1/2𝑒−𝑡
2/2𝑑𝑡
𝐼𝐵𝑖
−∞
 and  𝐼𝐵𝑖 = 𝛼0,𝐿𝑖?̂?
∗ +𝑿𝑳
′𝜶𝑳. 
 
II. Covariance Matrices 
Based on Maddala (1983, pp243-247), we follow the steps as following:  
Step 1: The reduced forms in (1) and (2) are estimated by Maximum Likelihood Probit 
Estimation, and get a predicted value of 𝐿∗ and 𝐵∗ denoted as 𝐿∗̂ and 𝐵∗̂ respectively.  
(1)    𝑳∗ = 𝚷𝑳
∗ 𝑿 + 𝝊𝑳
∗   , 𝚷𝑳
∗ =
𝚷𝑳
𝝈𝑳
  and 𝝊𝑳
∗ =
𝝂𝑳
𝝈𝑳
 
(2)    𝑩∗ = 𝚷𝑩
∗𝑿+ 𝝊𝑩
∗   , 𝚷𝑩
∗ =
𝚷𝑩
𝝈𝑩
  and 𝝊𝑩
∗ =
𝝂𝑩
𝝈𝑩
  , 
 where 𝐿∗ and 𝐵∗ are observed only a latent variable of unemployment status and 
obesity, respectively (zero and one). Thus, we can only estimate 𝚷𝑳
∗ and 𝚷𝑩
∗  , not 
𝚷𝑳and 𝚷𝑩 
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Step 2: Substitute ?̂?∗ and ?̂?∗ into the structural forms in equation (3) and (4) 
respectively, and estimate both equations by Maximum Likelihood Probit Estimation.   
(3)    𝑳∗∗ = 𝛼0,𝐿?̂?
∗ +𝑿𝑳
′𝜶𝑳 + 𝝐𝑳 
(4)    𝑩∗∗ = 𝛼0,𝐵?̂?
∗ +𝑿𝑩
′ 𝜶𝑩 + 𝝐𝑩 ,  
where 𝛼0,𝐿= 𝛾𝐿
𝜎𝐵
𝜎𝐿
   , 𝛼0,𝐵 =  𝛾𝐵
𝜎𝐿
𝜎𝐵
 , 𝜶𝑳 =
𝜷𝑳
𝝈𝑳
 , 𝜶𝑩 =
𝜷𝑩
𝝈𝑩
 , 𝝐𝑳 =
𝜺𝑳
𝝈𝑳
 , 𝝐𝑩 =
𝜺𝑩
𝝈𝑩
 
Step 3:  Although equation (3) and (4) will give us an unbiased estimator, the 
covariance matrix is not correct.  Let 𝑎𝐿 =
𝜙𝐿
Φ𝐿(1−Φ𝐿)
 and 𝑎𝐵 =
𝜙𝐵
Φ𝐵(1−Φ𝐵)
, where 𝜙 is a 
standard normal probability density (PDF) and  Φ is a cumulative standard normal 
distribution (CDF) estimated of fitted values from reduced form equation (1) and (2) ,  
𝐴𝐿 = 𝜙𝐿 ∗ 𝑎𝐿 , 𝐴𝐵 = 𝜙𝐵 ∗ 𝑎𝐵 , 𝒁𝐿 = [
Π𝐵
∗𝑿
𝑿𝑳
] and 𝒁𝐵 = [
Π𝐿
∗𝑿
𝑿𝑩
]. The variance-
covariance matrix for the 𝑳∗∗ equation is defined as  
  𝑊1
−1[𝑊1 −𝑊3𝑊2
−1𝑊4 −𝑊4
′𝑊2
−1𝑊3
′ +𝑊3𝑊2
−1𝑊3
′]𝑊1
−1 , where  
𝑊1 =
1
𝑁
∑𝐴𝐿𝒁𝐿𝒁𝐿
′
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝑊2 =
1
𝑁
∑𝐴𝐵𝑿𝐿𝑿𝐿
′
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝑊3 =
1
𝑁
∑𝐴𝐿
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝛼0,𝐿𝒁𝐿𝑿𝐿
′  
𝑊4 =
1
𝑁
∑𝑎𝐿𝑎𝐵
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝐸((𝐿 − Φ𝐿)(𝐵 − Φ𝐵)) 𝑿𝐿𝒁𝐿
′  
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The variance-covariance matrix for the 𝑩∗∗ equation is defined as 
[𝑊1 −𝑊3𝑊2
−1𝑊4 −𝑊4
′𝑊2
−1𝑊3
′ +𝑊3𝑊2
−1𝑊3
′]𝑊1
−1, where  
𝑊1 =
1
𝑁
∑𝐴𝐵𝒁𝐵𝒁𝐵
′
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝑊2 =
1
𝑁
∑𝐴𝐿𝑿𝐵
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑿𝑩
′  
𝑊3 =
1
𝑁
∑𝐴𝐵
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝛼0,𝐵𝒁𝐵𝑿𝐵
′  
𝑊4 =
1
𝑁
∑𝑎𝐿𝑎𝐵
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝐸((𝐿 − Φ𝐿)(𝐵 − Φ𝐵)) 𝑿𝐵𝒁𝐵
′  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
